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Suppose you want to do as much good as possible. What should you do? According 
to members of the effective altruism movement—which has produced much of the 
thinking on this issue and counts several moral philosophers as its key 
protagonists—we should prioritise among the world’s problems by assessing their 
scale, solvability, and neglectedness. Once we’ve done this, the three top priorities, 
not necessarily in this order, are (1) aiding the world’s poorest people by providing 
life-saving medical treatments or alleviating poverty itself, (2) preventing global 
catastrophic risks, such as those posed by nuclear war or rogue artificial intelligence, 
and (3) ending factory farming. 
These claims are both plausible and striking. If correct, they should prompt a stark 
revision of how we approach our altruistic activities. However, the project of 
determining how to do the most good—as opposed to say, whether we should do the 
most good—has only recently, within the last ten years, become the subject of 
serious academic attention. Many key claims have not yet been carefully scrutinised. 
This is a cause for concern: are effective altruists doing good badly? 
In this thesis, I critique and develop some of the latest claims about how individuals 
can do the most good. I do this in three areas: the value of saving lives (preventing 
premature deaths), how best to improve lives (making people happier during their 
lives), and cause prioritisation methodology (frameworks for determining which 
problems are the highest priorities). In each case, I raise novel theoretical 
considerations that, when incorporated, change the analysis.  
Roughly speaking, my main conclusions are (1) saving lives is not as 
straightforwardly good we tend to suppose, may not be good at all, and is not clearly 
a priority; (2) happiness can be measured through self-reports and, based on the 
self-reported evidence, treating mental health stands out as an overlooked problem 
that may be an even more cost-effective way to improve lives than alleviating 
poverty; (3) the cause prioritisation methodology proposed by effective altruists 
needs to be moderately reconceptualised and, when it is, it turns out it is not as 
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Suppose you want to do as much good as possible. What should you do? According 
to members of the effective altruism movement—which has produced much of the 
thinking on this issue and counts several moral philosophers as its key 
protagonists—we should prioritise among the world’s problems by assessing their 
scale, solvability, and neglectedness. Once we’ve done this, the three top priorities, 
not necessarily in this order, are (1) aiding the world’s poorest people by providing 
life-saving medical treatments or alleviating poverty itself, (2) preventing global 
catastrophic risks, such as those posed by nuclear war or rogue artificial intelligence, 
and (3) ending factory farming.1 
These claims are both plausible and striking. If correct, they should prompt a stark 
revision of how we approach our altruistic activities. However, the project of 
determining how to do the most good—as opposed to say, whether we should do the 
most good—has only recently, within the last ten years, become the subject of 
serious academic attention. Many key claims have not yet been carefully scrutinised. 
This is a cause for concern: are effective altruists doing good badly? 
In this thesis, I critique and develop some of the latest claims about how individuals 
can do the most good. I do this in three areas: the value of saving lives (preventing 
premature deaths), how best to improve lives (making people happier during their 
lives), and cause prioritisation methodology (frameworks for determining which 
 
1  Singer (2015) and MacAskill (2015) are the two original books advocating effective altruism. For a 
more recent articles setting out and defending effective altruism, see MacAskill (2018) and Pummer 
and MacAskill (2019).  
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problems are the highest priorities).2 In each case, I raise novel theoretical 
considerations that, when incorporated, change the analysis. 
Roughly speaking, my main conclusions are (1) saving lives is not as 
straightforwardly good we tend to suppose, may not be good at all, and is not clearly 
a priority; (2) happiness can be measured through self-reports and, based on the 
self-reported evidence, treating mental health stands out as an overlooked problem 
that may be an even more cost-effective way to improve lives than alleviating 
poverty; (3) the cause prioritisation methodology proposed by effective altruists 
needs to be moderately reconceptualised and, when it is, it turns out it is not as 
illuminating a tool as we might have thought and hoped. 
Before I provide some context to the chapters and outline their contents, I make 
three remarks. 
First, the aim of the thesis is to see what follows, given particular moral theories, 
rather than to evaluate which moral theory is correct. Philosophers have focused 
extensively on the latter over the years, which is why I turn to the former to make 
my contribution; we will shortly see it reveals a rich bounty of interesting theoretical 
questions. Hence, this thesis is of the flavour ‘if X were true, then the surprising 
result is Y’ without arguing for the truth of any particular X. 
Second, I expect the subject matter of the thesis to be of greatest interest to those 
(such as this author) who believe that, if we want to do the most good, the practical 
priority is to make people happy, rather than make happy people, or prevent the 
 
2  I note my usage of ‘improve lives’ is arguably non-standard. Ordinarily, improving lives would refer 
to increasing individuals’ well-being during their lives, rather than, less ecumenically, their 
happiness. As I focus specifically on happiness, where such specificity is required, as opposed to any 
other good that may constituent well-being (in whole or in part), the non-standard usage is more 
appropriate.   
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making of unhappy animals.3 I focus on saving and improving lives and offer no 
argument here that those who already prioritise something besides these need to 
reconsider their position. 
Third, the chapters have, for the most part, been written so each is comprehensible 
without having read the others; as I am not advocating a particular moral view or 
building towards a single conclusion, this seemed the easiest way to structure the 
thesis. The final two chapters are something of an exception to this—both develop 
ideas from earlier in the thesis and will be less understandable if they are read by 
themselves. Given this structure, this introductory chapter serves the important role 
of putting the different chapters into context and explaining how the arguments 
connect to one another. 
There are seven chapters. Chapters 1 to 3 concern saving lives, chapters 4, 6, and 7 
are about improving lives, chapters 5 and 6 relate to cause prioritisation. To explain 
the overlap, chapter 6 proposes a new approach to cause prioritisation and applies 
it in the case of improving lives. The context and contents of the chapters now 
follow. 
Prima facie, saving a life does a great deal of good. Given the best estimates are that 
we can prevent a premature death for, on average, only a few thousand pounds if we 
donate to certain effective charities, it is easy to see why one would think saving lives 
is the most good you can do.4 However, on closer inspection, matters are not so 
straightforward.  
 
3 This paraphrases Narveson (1973) who at p. 70 states “morality is in favour of making people happy 
but neutral about making happy people”. I add a further reference to animals to accommodate the 
fact some think preventing the existence of unhappy animals is high priority. 
4 According to the analysis of charity evaluator GiveWell (2019a) 
10 
 
Chapter one raises one complication: what if, when considering the value of saving 
lives, we account for the fact that most people are meat eaters? Peter Singer has 
famously argued that eating meat is wrong on the grounds of the animal suffering 
this causes.5 Singer has also argued that we would be morally required to jump into 
a shallow pond to save a drowning child even if this would ruin our expensive 
clothes.6 I argue that, assuming meat eating is wrong on the grounds of the animal 
suffering caused, it is plausible that meat eaters cause so much suffering that saving 
the life of an average stranger is bad. If we grant the compelling principle that we 
are not required to bring about the worse of two outcomes (or slight variants of this 
principle), then it follows that we are not required to save lives, even in cases where 
we can easily rescue someone. I do not seek to argue meat eating is wrong on 
grounds on animal suffering; this argument investigates what follows if we accept 
that view. The more general result of the argument is that, even if we do not think 
accounting for meat eating is sufficient to make saving lives bad, it will reduce the 
value of doing so by some amount. I note this is the only chapter in which I engage 
in normative issues, that is, about what we ought to do; all the other chapters are 
concerned solely with the value of outcomes. 
Chapter 2 adds another wrinkle to determining the value of saving lives. Many 
people seem to accept the ‘Intuitive View’, that saving lives is good and—as the Earth 
is overpopulated—that averting new lives is good too. Although it is not widely 
recognised, the Intuitive View is in internal tension—another way to reduce 
population size is by not saving lives. This raises some questions, for instance, 
whether and how the Intuitive view could be true. I develop Greaves’ earlier analysis 
 
5  Singer (1975) 
6  Singer (1972) 
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of this topic and then investigate both how probable the Intuitive View is and what 
the practical implications are of accounting for under/overpopulation.7 I do this by 
first assuming Totalism is the correct theory of population ethics, and second 
assuming a Person-Affecting View. I argue that the Intuitive View is distinctly 
unlikely on Totalism: it is more probable that one of saving lives or averting lives is 
bad. Further, were the Intuitive View true, the value of each of saving and averting 
lives would be small—far smaller than we would expect—and thus both are relatively 
unpromising interventions if the aim is to do the most good. This result is 
problematic for Peter Singer who seems to hold the Intuitive View, Totalism, and 
that life-saving and life-averting charities are among the most-effective giving 
opportunities—this combined position is highly improbable.8 On a Person-Affecting 
view, the Intuitive View is (unsurprisingly) far more likely. If both the Person-
Affecting and Intuitive Views are true, the values of saving and averting lives would 
fall within a large range (how large is specified in the chapter). The general result is 
that we don’t know the values of saving or averting lives unless we know how under- 
or overpopulated the world is. I close by briefly arguing that it’s not obvious where 
the world is in relation to optimum population size (whether we think just this 
generation or all generations matter); hence it’s correspondingly unclear what the 
value of saving lives is on this wider analysis. 
Chapters 1 and 2 consider some problems that arise when we account for the other-
regarding impacts of saving a life—the impact saving lives has on others (human 
 
7  Greaves (2015) 
8 See the recommendations made by The Life You Can Save (2019) a charitable organisation founded 
by Singer and named after his book of the same name – i.e. Singer (2009). Lazari-Radek and Singer 
(2014) present arguments for and against Totalism and conclude on p. 373 that there are deep 
difficulties in the way of any defensible view on this question. However, in personal conversations 
(in 2018 and 2019), Singer has stated that, with reservations, he thinks Totalism is correct. 
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and non-human). Many people seem to think saving lives is the most good we can 
do—the particular effective altruist suggestion is to save the lives of children in the 
developing world with cheap, effective health interventions. Those making this 
suggestion seem to be basing this primarily on the self-regarding value of saving a 
life—the value to the person whose life is saved.9 Chapter 3 takes a step back and 
asks whether, if we ignore these other-regarding effects, saving lives could still be 
the most good we can do. I set out four commonly-held, but not exhaustive, views 
of the value of creating and ending lives (such accounts are a combination of a 
population axiology with an account of the badness of death). In each case, I claim 
it’s not obvious that saving lives is the most cost-effective option—either there is an 
alternative that seems similarly cost-effective or the view is sufficiently 
underdetermined that we cannot straightforwardly make the comparison. 
Taken together, the conclusions of the first three chapters are that (1) accounting 
for the other-regarding effects of saving lives makes it far less clear that saving lives 
is good and (2) even if we ignore these other-regarding effects, saving lives is still 
not clearly a priority on any of a commonly-held range of views. 
In chapter 4, the focus moves on to how best to improve lives, that is, to make people 
happier during their lives. Singer and MacAskill seem to suggest that the best way 
to do this is by alleviating global poverty.10 While this suggestion is also, on its face, 
highly plausible, I argue this is not so clearly the case either.  
 
9  The phrase ‘self-regarding’ is borrowed  from Greaves (2015). Note this is not the value of saving a 
life to the life-saving agent – which we might call the ‘warm glow’ value – but that to the person who 
is saved; on this terminology, the ‘warm glow’ value would be one of the other-regarding impacts of 
saving a life.  
10 Singer (2015), MacAskill (2015) 
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Chapter 4, the longest in the thesis, starts with the observation that, while MacAskill 
and Singer seem to hold that well-being consists in happiness, they do not seem to 
make use of the ‘subjective well-being’ (SWB) literature from psychology and 
economics—where individuals provide self-reported measures of their moment-by-
moment happiness and/or their overall life satisfaction. Instead, MacAskill and 
Singer rely on more conventional metrics for well-being such as income and 
Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs), a measure of health.11 I suggest four possible 
objections to using self-reports, rather than of any other metric(s), to determine 
what increases happiness: (1) happiness is not measurable through self-reports; (2) 
individuals’ scores are not interpersonally cardinally comparable (i.e. a one-point 
increase for one person on a 0-10 scale is equivalent to a one-point increase for 
anyone else); (3) there isn’t enough available evidence of such self-reports to use 
them to guide decision-making; (4) it is unnecessary to use such data as they 
wouldn’t change the priorities anyway. Chapter 4 addresses the first objection fully 
and the latter three partially. I argue that, despite the doubts, ‘subjective well-being’ 
(this umbrella term includes both happiness and life satisfaction) can be measured 
through self-reports. I explain why it’s broadly reasonable to treat the self-reports 
as interpersonally cardinally comparable even though we cannot be certain of this. 
I also argue that even if the scales are not interpersonally cardinally comparable that 
should does not present a sufficient reason not to use them. Regarding the latter two 
objections, I provide suggestive evidence that there is enough data on SWB to 
inform our actions and it may lead us towards different priorities: the clearest case 
is mental health, which stands out as a major cause of unhappiness and has not been 
 
11  MacAskill (2015); Singer (2015) 
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considered an important issue by effective altruists so far. A more compelling reply 
to the final two objections is offered in chapter 7. 
As chapter 4 reveals there is a new, potential priority if we want to make people 
happier, this prompts the question of what method, in general, we should use to 
determine which of the world’s problems are more important than others (more 
important in the sense that they allow us to do more good). MacAskill notes that the 
typical priority-setting method used by effective altruists is the three-factor ‘cause 
prioritisation’ framework, on which problems are evaluated by considering their 
scale, solvability, and neglectedness.12 The obvious thought is we should just apply 
this method to the domain we are focusing on—improving lives. The problem is that, 
while the three-factor method seems to capture something important, no careful 
analysis has been done of the method and there are a number of open questions 
about how exactly it works. For instance, MacAskill implies it’s possible to evaluate 
problems via the framework prior to making quantitative cost-effective assessments 
of the solution to those problems.13 This is somewhat mysterious—how it is possible 
to evaluate a problem(/cause) prior to assessing the cost-effectiveness of particular 
solutions(/interventions) to that problem? 
In chapter 5, I set out the cause prioritisation method, clarify its workings, and 
address some outstanding questions. I suggest the priority-setting process should 
be partially reconceptualised. The most important conclusion is that using the scale-
neglectedness-solvability framework to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of a problem 
(e.g. poverty) ultimately relies on how carefully we have estimated the cost-effective 
 
12  MacAskill (2018) 
13  Ibid 
15 
 
of particular solutions to that problem (e.g. particular poverty interventions). 
Hence, the cause prioritisation method turns not to offer much in the way of useful 
shortcuts for determining what the most important problems are: if we want to find 
out how to do the most good, we’ll have to carefully assess the many different ways 
we might solve the problems in front of us. 
Having identified the limits of the cause prioritisation methodology in chapter 5, 
chapter 6 proposes a new method, ‘cause mapping’, in order to help organise our 
search for potential solutions to the problems we are interested in. In essence, cause 
mapping involves breaking the priority-setting process into a series of distinct steps 
and considering the relevant possibilities at each step in order to help us structure 
our thinking. I then apply the cause mapping approach to the question of how best 
to improve lives. The result is a ‘long list’ of options which, prima facie, seem to be 
highly promising ways to improve lives. In addition to mental health and poverty, I 
suggest pain, positive education (i.e. teaching resilience and life skills in schools), 
and drug policy reform stand out. As such, I set some further possibilities that, to 
my knowledge, have not yet been seriously considered by any effective altruists. 
What is required next is a careful empirical investigation of these options. 
While I am unable to assess all these possibilities, I do examine one in some detail 
in chapter 7. As Singer and MacAskill draw their charity recommendations from 
GiveWell, a charity evaluator, I attempt a first-pass cost-effectiveness analysis using 
SWB scores, which compares GiveWell’s eight top recommendations to a developing 
world mental health organisation, StrongMinds.14 StrongMinds seems roughly on a 
par, in terms of cost-effectiveness, to GiveWell’s top-rated life-improving 
 
14 Note references to GiveWell in MacAskill (2015); Singer (2015) 
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recommendations. Comparing life-saving to life-improving charities turns out to be 
highly sensitive to an unresolved methodological question (where on a 0-10 life 
satisfaction scale is the ‘neutral’ point that is equivalent to non-existence) and I am 
unable to draw conclusions here. The analysis in this chapter also allows me to 
decisively meet the latter two objections raised in chapter 4 about the use of SWB 
data, by showing there is enough available evidence guide decision-making and that 
it does indicate new priorities. 
Have effective altruists been doing good badly? I do not go so far as to claim that—
not least because it’s unclear how we would evaluate this question. However, in this 
thesis, I am able to set out a range of important, novel theoretical considerations. 
This challenges current thinking about how to the most good in several key areas 
and shows how those looking to do the most good can do good even better.
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Chapter 1: The Meat Eater Problem 
0. Abstract  
I argue, pace Singer, that if we’re wrong to eat meat because of the suffering this 
causes then we would not be required to save an easily rescuable child from 
drowning in a shallow pond. At least, this follows if we grant certain other plausible 
normative and empirical assumptions. 
1. Introduction 
Consider the following familiar case: 
Shallow Pond: you are walking past a shallow pond and see a drowning child. 
You can easily rescue the child but doing so will ruin your new suit.1 
What should you do? Nearly everyone accepts we are morally required to jump in. 
As Peter Singer explains: “this will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is 
insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing.”2 
More generally, we accept the Principle of Easy Rescue: 
The Principle of Easy Rescue: we are required to save lives in rescue cases: 
one-off instances where we can physically save an average stranger at a trivial 
cost to ourselves. 
 
1  This case comes from Singer (1972) 
2  Ibid, p231 
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A second question: is it wrong to be a meat eater, someone who regularly consumes 
animal products produced from factory farms?3 Many think it is and accept the 
Weak Carnism Thesis:4  
Weak Carnism Thesis: it’s wrong to be a meat eater because of the animal 
suffering this causes. 
Such people conclude we ought to become vegans or vegetarians. While there are 
other reasons one might believe meat eating is wrong—the environmental impact, 
the violation of animals’ rights, etc.—I will only focus on animal suffering here as it 
is the easiest way to generate the problem I now raise.  
Many believe both the Principle of Easy Rescue and the Weak Carnism Thesis are 
true. The most obvious example is Singer: he is the originator of the Shallow Pond 
case and encourages people to give to life-saving charities;5 he has publicly 
campaigned against factory farming on animal suffering grounds and advocated 
veganism for many years.6 The conjunction of the two beliefs is widely held among 
moral philosophers and, increasingly, in society at large. 
This essay argues the beliefs are incompatible, given additional plausible empirical 
and normative assumptions and, faced with a choice of which to give up, it is the 
Principle of Easy Rescue that should be abandoned. This conclusion is reached in 
five moves.  
 
3 I will use the term ‘meat eaters’ as a shorthand for ‘factory-farm-produced-animal-product-
consumers’. This is revisionary: someone who consumes battery-farmed eggs, but no animal flesh 
would be a meat eater; someone who ate meat only from free-range animals would not be. Given the 
state of the world, this revision is unproblematic (see footnote 18). 
4  For instance, Singer (1975)  
5  Singer (1972) 
6  Singer (1975)   
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First, I observe a widely-held intuition is that we are not required to save lives, even 
if we can do so easily, when the consequences would be bad enough. Consider: 
Drowning Dictator: you live in a country ruled by a dictator. One day, when 
walking past a pond you see him drowning—he has a distinctive appearance, 
and you recognise him from his ubiquitous propaganda posters. You can 
easily rescue him, but you realise that doing so will not only ruin your 
expensive new shoes, but he will go on to torture and terrorise thousands of 
people in the future. 
Presumably, few think we are required to save the dictator. When, exactly, are the 
consequences bad enough? Consider: 
The No Requirement to cause Acts of Greater Evil (‘NRAGE’) Principle: you 
are not required to prevent something bad from happening if, in so doing, 
this will bring about an even worse outcome. 
How would NRAGE apply to Drowning Dictator? We have a choice between (A) 
allowing a bad thing or (B) preventing that bad thing, but in so doing bringing about 
something even worse. NRAGE holds we are not required to do (B). The principle is 
minimal: it still leaves open whether both choices are permitted or that the better 
outcome is mandatory. Further, NRAGE does not specify how the value of outcomes 
is assessed, only that, however this is done, we are not required to pick the worse 
outcome. 
While the wording of NRAGE will be unfamiliar, its plausibility is straightforward. 
Consequentialists hold you are required to choose the better option; hence you are 
not required to choose the worse one. Many non-consequentialists accept there is a 
lesser-evil justification for doing harm: we are permitted to cause harm if this will 
prevent a substantially greater harm. The justification for the harm needing to be 
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substantially greater is the familiar doing/allowing distinction: the normative 
badness of doing harm is such that a substantially larger harm needs to be prevented 
to overcome this normative badness.7 Importantly, however, Drowning Dictator is 
not a case of causing a harm to prevent a greater evil; rather, it seems akin to a choice 
between allowing a lesser evil—the dictator’s death—and allowing another, greater 
evil—the suffering that results if the dictator lives. In a choice between allowing a 
lesser and a greater evil, it seems that we are not required to allow the greater evil. 
Non-consequentialists might think we are permitted to allow either evil, or we are 
required to pick the lesser of the two, but it seems counter-intuitive to think we 
could be required to pick the greater evil (I will return to this later).  
Second, I argue that if the Weak Carnism Thesis is true, then the Strong Carnism 
Thesis is plausible: 
Strong Carnism Thesis: meat eaters cause a sufficiently large amount of 
animal suffering via their diet that the consequences of saving a stranger’s 
life in rescue cases are (in expectation) worse than those of not saving them. 
This is mainly an empirical claim. I argue that meat eaters cause so much suffering 
that saving their lives in rescue cases would be worse than not saving them. At least 
in a country like America, given around 95% of people are meat eaters and 99% of 
meat comes from factory farms, it is not difficult to infer that, if saving meat eaters 
is bad, saving a randomly sampled stranger is bad in expectation too.8 
 
7  E.g. see Frowe (2018) for a discussion of the lesser-evil justification.  
8 According to the National Chicken Council (2018) less than 1% of US chickens are free range. 
Sentience Insitute (2018) estimate that 99.5% of land animals – meat chickens, egg chickens, 
turkeys, pigs and cows – in the US are reared in factory farms. Note the vast majority of animals are 
chickens: Americans eat 8 billion chickens for meat each year, but only 90 million cows and 65 
million pigs. A consumer report by GlobalData (2017) found 6% of American self-identify as vegans. 
A poll conducted by Vegetarian Resource Group (2016) of 2,000 adult Americans found 3.4% ate a 
solely vegetarian diet, i.e. they agreed with the statement “I never eat meat, fish, seafood, or poultry”. 
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Third, I observe it is inconsistent to believe the Principle of Easy Rescue, NRAGE, 
and the Strong Carnism Thesis. The Principle of Easy Rescue states we are required 
to save strangers (at least, where we can do so at minimal cost to ourselves). NRAGE 
and the Strong Carnism Thesis together entail that although saving the life of a 
random stranger would prevent something bad (i.e. the stranger’s death), we are 
not required to prevent this because saving the random stranger would be worse 
than not saving them. These three principles are jointly inconsistent: they require 
us to both save and not save strangers in rescue cases. To avoid inconsistency, we 
must revise at least one of the three. 
Fourth, I assume that, faced with this inconsistency, most are tempted to conclude 
NRAGE is false and the Principle of Easy Rescue true. I show this strategy is less 
promising than it looks. While we can revise NRAGE, for the two revisions I 
consider we can also make a corresponding adjustment to the Strong Carnism 
Thesis and re-generate the inconsistency. 
Fifth, now that we are pushed to abandon the Principle of Easy Rescue, I explain 
why this conclusion is less implausible, on reflection, than it appears.9 
The result is that those who believe it is wrong to eat meat because of the suffering 
this causes to animals should find it plausible that meat eaters cause enough 
 
9 Since writing up this argument, I discovered the idea that concerns for meat eating could make 
saving humans lives bad has been discussed, but seemingly not written about, in the effective 
altruism and animal advocacy communities. One written treatment I found is Weathers (2016), who 
considers whether the idea eating meat should cause some reduction in the value of saving lives. 
Weathers concludes meat eating may not be bad (the created animals might be happy) and, even if 
it is, saving lives is still good. I take my contribution, then, to be (a) rigorously examining (in writing) 
what we might need to hold to make saving lives bad (in light of concerns about meat eating), (b) 
assessing whether those things do hold, (c) proposing a plausible a normative principle, NRAGE, 
which is inconsistent with the Strong Carnism Thesis and Principle of Easy Rescue, and thus (d) 
showing the meat eater problem is not only an awkward issue for consequentialists. 
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suffering (on different specifications of ‘enough’) that we are not required to save 
lives, even when we can do so easily.  
Then, having stated the argument, I set out two further (troubling) implications. 
First, those, such as Singer, who hold morality requires us to choose the better of 
two options (either tout court or when it is not too demanding), will hold it is wrong 
to save the lives of strangers.10 Second, accounting for humans’ impact on animals 
may substantially alter our charitable priorities.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 argues those who accept the Weak 
Carnism Thesis should find the Strong Carnism Thesis plausible. Section 3 
considers how we might tinker with NRAGE. Section 4 argues giving up the 
Principle of Easy Rescue is the correct response to the inconsistency. Section 5 
discussions two implications of the argument. Section 6 concludes.  
2. If the Weak Carnism Thesis is true, how plausible is the Strong 
Carnist Thesis?  
In this section, I ask how plausible the Strong Carnism Thesis is given the Weak 
Carnism Thesis. The purpose of this chapter is not to persuade those who find the 
Weak Carnism Thesis implausible, but to explore what might follow if this thesis is 
true. While I do not claim the Strong Carnism Thesis is clearly true, there is a 
credible case for it, and it is not something that can reasonably be rejected out of 
hand.  
 
10  Frowe (2018) gives a non-consequentialist argument for the view that we are required to do the 
lesser evil where this is not overly demanding.  
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Before we go any further, let me state the four sub-claims I assume which, together, 
entail the Weak Carnism Thesis. First, animals in factory farms lead lives with net 
negative well-being. Second, the individual purchasing decisions of meat eaters 
cause animals to be created.11 Third, creating unhappy lives—lives with net negative 
lifetime well-being—is bad.12 Fourth, the total negative well-being caused by 
creating unhappy animals is sufficiently large, relative to the benefit a meat eater 
gets from eating meat (compared to the scenario in which they do not) to make being 
a meat eater wrong.13 
I evaluate the Strong Carnism Thesis in three steps. First, I ask whether the self-
regarding value of saving meat eater’s lives–that is, the value associated with the 
individual whose life is saved—is greater than the animal impact of that life—that 
is, the net disvalue the person causes to animals through their diet. Animal impact 
is one part of the other-regarding impact of saving a life, that is, the impact saving 
a life has on everyone else. Second, I consider the other other-regarding impacts. 
Third, I account for the fact not all humans are meat eaters. 
2.1 Comparing self-regarding value of meat eaters’ lives to their animal 
impact 
By value(/disvalue), I will have happiness(/unhappiness) in mind, unless otherwise 
specified, where happiness is a net positive balance of pleasure over displeasure 
(unhappiness the reverse). I later discuss whether valuing goods besides happiness 
changes the result. For the moment then, the first question is effectively: do meat 
 
11 This is probably the most contested assumption. Kagan (2011) argues you do sometimes make a 
difference.  
12 Of the assumptions, this is the one I am most sympathetic to thinking is untrue.  
13 For the purposes of the argument, it’s unimportant what would count as ‘sufficiently large’.  
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eater cause more unhappiness to animals through their diets than they experience 
happiness themselves? 
Suppose we’re assessing the amounts of happiness experienced and unhappiness 
caused over the period of a year. We start by asking: how many years of animal life 
do meat eaters cause to be created for each year they eat meat? Meat eaters might 
eat lots of animals, but to keep things simple, let’s assume meat eaters just eat 
chicken products – chicken meat and hens’ eggs. This isn’t a very distortionary 
assumption given the empirical data on animal consumption.14 Matheny and Chan 
estimate that an average American would need to eat 82.6 chickens a year if they 
got all 20kg of their annual recommended amount of protein from chicken meat.15 
As chickens live around 7 weeks before being killed, meat eaters will, therefore, 
create 10.8 chicken life-years each year they live. To simplify the later calculations, 
I round this number down to 10. 
Given that the Weak Carnism Thesis is true, this means a chicken’s life is, on 
average, unhappy. I assume that human life is, on average, happy. Next, we ask: how 
happy are the humans compared to the chickens they create? Using this 10-to-1 
number, if the humans are less than ten times happier than the chickens are 
unhappy, then, all else being equal, it is worse to save the life of an average meat 
 
14  Matheny and Chan (2005) point out that broiler chickens constitute 60% of all farm animal life-
years in the US, broiler breeders 3.5%, egg-laying chickens 19.6%, which totals 83.1%. As broilers 
and egg-laying chickens produce roughly the same amount of protein per life-year, 1.8kg and 1.6kg, 
respectively, to get 20kg of protein from just chickens would require 10.8 broiler chickens or 12.5 
layer chickens. For simplicity, I have ignored meat eaters’ fish consumption. Including this would 
arguably cause a non-trivial increase in the estimate of animal suffering caused. Animal Charity 
Evaluators (2017) estimate 3.7-7.24 farmed fish life years are required per capita per year in the US; 
farmed fish plausibly have net negative lives (see e.g. Animal Charity Evaluators (2019) for analysis). 
Importantly, I note the Strong Carnism Thesis is less plausible in poorer countries/regions: there is 
a strong association between country wealth and meat eating, a point I note in section 5. The 
empirical task of estimating in which countries the Strong Carnism thesis might hold is outside the 
scope of this analysis.  
15   Ibid. p585. 
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eater than not save them. As a shorthand, I’m going to use “HA’’ to refer to the 
average happiness level of humans divided by the average happiness of the factory-
farmed animals. To reduce confusion, I’ll use the absolute value of HA (the 
magnitude of the number without regard to its sign). Thus, supposing humans are 
at happiness level 1 and the animals at -1, then HA would be 1. 
This second question is harder to answer. We might attempt to do so by asking 
ourselves “are humans’ capacities for happiness more than 10 times greater than 
those of chickens?” We might doubt chickens can feel great happiness—they will 
never experience J S Mill’s ‘higher pleasures’ or Parfit’s ‘the best things in life’, 
whatever these are—and conclude meat eaters are at least 10 times happier than the 
average chicken is unhappy.16 However, capacities are not necessarily relevant: we 
need to know the average magnitudes of happiness and unhappiness that are 
experienced by humans and chickens, not what their capacities are.  
To think about average magnitudes, we should instead ask the following question, 
assuming we are as happy as the average meat eater: “how happy am I during an 
average hour of my life, how unhappy do I think a factory-farmed chicken is during 
an average hour of its life, and what is the relative difference of these two states?” 
That may still seem hard to answer. So, here are a couple of alternative 
formulations: “assuming how I feel right now is average, do I think I’m happier than 
an average factory-farmed chicken is unhappy right now, and if so, by what 
proportion?” and, alternatively, “how many chickens, living in a factory farm for an 
hour, would it take to experience the same amount of unhappiness as I experience 
happiness in an average hour of my life?” 
 
16  Mill (1861) Ch2; Parfit (1986) 
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While I sometimes experience great elation, the majority of my waking hours only 
feel mildly good. This isn’t because I think I’m suffering from some problem, either 
mental or physical, it is just that my daily life doesn’t come with very strong 
emotions. Given how much time most of us spend working, how we feel during an 
average working moment is not far off the mean average happiness across our whole 
lives. 
By contrast, the average moment a chicken spends in a factory farm is believably at 
least as bad as I feel good now. From the footage I have seen of chickens in factory 
farms, that experience seems to be one of cacophonous chaos: animals packed into 
tiny spaces, pushing past each other to acquire food.17 The descriptions of life as a 
broiler are arresting: 
Chickens have been bred to grow at grossly accelerated rates, causing a 
number of skeletal and cardiovascular problems. At the ends of their lives, 
they live at densities of around a square foot per bird, and 90% cannot walk 
properly, due to skeletal disorders.18 
Quoting Singer’s writing: 
Chickens, reared in sheds that hold 20,000 birds, now are bred to grow so 
fast that most of them develop leg problems because their immature bones 
cannot bear the weight of their bodies. Professor John Webster of the 
University of Bristol’s School of Veterinary Science said: “Broilers are the 
only livestock that are in chronic pain for the last 20 per cent of their lives. 
 
17 E.g. Mercy for Animals (2011). I assume, for advocacy purposes, they have shown the worst 
conditions. For a video produced by the agricultural industry, see US Poultry (2014). 
18  Matheny and Chan (2005) p582 
27 
 
They don’t move around, not because they are overstocked, but because it 
hurts their joints so much”19 
Regarding this last period of life, it is difficult to believe I experience more happiness 
than another creature experiencing chronic pain—I do not experience chronic 
pleasure. 
Intuitions will differ, but HA is plausibly around 1. Given the earlier number that 
one year of human life creates around 10 years of chicken life, this means meat 
eaters are causing around ten times more unhappiness to animals than they 
experience happiness themselves. Note, we have reached this conclusion not by 
claiming chickens have terrible, torturous lives and humans have wonderful, elated 
ones, but instead by thinking that much of human life is only mildly happy, whereas 
life in factory farms seems to be at best stressful, and for considerable periods, 
painful. 
I consider four objections. 
First, quantifying average human happiness and comparing it to average animal 
unhappiness is too nonsensically speculative to even attempt. 
This objection is not available to those who hold the Weak Carnism Thesis. 
Concluding that this is true requires, at least implicitly, quantifying the happiness 
that individuals get from eating meat, comparing that to how much those animals 
suffer, and then concluding that imposing such suffering is impermissible. Hence, 
the conjunction of the Weak Carnism Thesis with this objection would be 
motivationally unstable. 
 
19  Singer (2006). The quote from Prof. Webster is from (The Guardian. 1991). 
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An additional problem with the objection is that if humans’ and non-human 
animals’ levels of happiness are practically incomparable, it is likely the Principle of 
Easy Rescue would be abandoned anyway. Consider: 
Incomparability Thesis: if two options are incomparable in value, both are 
permissible. 
Suppose once accepts this plausible thesis. It, combined with the Weak Carnism 
Thesis, entails that we are permitted to either save or not save the stranger in the 
Shallow Pond. Yet the Principle of Easy Rescue holds you are required to do so. 
Inconsistency strikes. 
Second, we should be very uncertain about what HA is. Although I’ve listed this as 
an objection, it is not specific to this problem and has an uncontroversial solution: 
we should proceed as we do in other cases of uncertainty, by making a probabilistic 
estimate. We are quite happy to think that the average score of a fair six-sided die is 
3.5. 
Third, we could object that the meat eaters cause less animal impact, relative to the 
individual value of their lives, than I’ve claimed. There seem to be four different 
ways of pressing this, which I raise and address in turn. I call these discounting 
objections. 
First, someone could claim that, when they think about it, HA seems to be a lot 
larger than I supposed. 
I have nothing further to say on what HA seems to be. What I will say is the 
following. For the objection to work, i.e. to show that the meat eater experiences 
more happiness than they cause unhappiness via their diet, it can’t be just that HA 
is a bit higher than 1 (assuming all else is equal). If the meat eater creates 10 chicken-
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years for each 1 of their own, HA needs to be fully 10 times higher and that, for the 
reasons given earlier, seems implausible. 
The second discounting objection is to point out that the only value I’ve accounted 
for is happiness, that hedonistic welfarism (the view that well-being consists in 
happiness and well-being is the only thing of intrinsic value) is false and, when we 
account for these non-happiness and/or non-well-being values, this increases the 
individual value of the meat eater’s life. There are different ways to be a non-
hedonistic welfarist (i.e. one who rejects hedonistic welfarism). One could endorse 
the objective list as the correct account of well-being and claim human lives can 
contain things on this list, such as friendship or knowledge, which animals’ lives 
cannot. Or, you could be a perfectionist, that is, hold that certain goods, possibly art 
and scientific achievement, can be valuable even if they have no impact on well-
being.20 Perfectionists could also then claim humans can produce such goods while 
non-human animals cannot.21 
We can pose the same reply as before: are these discounts believably big enough to 
make a difference? Suppose the objective list is true and, for concreteness, well-
being consists only in happiness, knowledge, friendship, autonomy and health. To 
make it better to save the meat eater, assuming HA is 1, someone would need to 
think something like the following: “the average person’s life contains some 
happiness, knowledge, friendship, autonomy and health and these all contribute to 
their well-being. The contribution of non-happiness components is 9 times larger 
 
20  Parfit (1986) p161 discusses the ‘best things in life’.  
21 I omit discussion of preference satisfactionism, the view that well-being consists in one’s 
preferences being satisfied, in the sense that what one prefers to be the case, is the case. This is both 
because it’s unclear how to weigh the preference of the meat eater to live against the preferences of 
the animals not to be brought into a bad existence and because the view seems implausible.  
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than that of the happiness components.” Remember, we’re considering an average 
person here, not a genius scientist, someone with lots of friends, exceptional health, 
etc. Consider the following case: 
Happiness or other goods: you have two options. Either (A), 9 people have 
their happiness reduced to the neutral-point, where they feel neither happy 
or unhappy or (B), 1 person has their knowledge, friendship, autonomy and 
health reduced to their respective neutral points (whatever these are).  
If we think the non-happiness items on the objective list contribute nine times more 
well-being to someone’s life than their happiness does, we would be indifferent 
between A and B. However, it is hard to believe these non-happiness components 
could be of such relative importance. This remains the case even if we add additional 
non-happiness items to the objective list.22 
The third version would be to claim we should apply a pure species discount, that 
is, hold it is more valuable to give the same well-being increase to humans than to 
non-human animals.  
We can make the same reply: if HA is 1 then, unless the chickens’ well-being is 
discounted by at least 90%, we would still conclude it would be better not to save 
the human. I’m unaware of any living philosophers advocating such a large 
 
22 We can set up an equivalent case for perfectionist goods: if we think happiness and say, scientific 
knowledge, both have intrinsic value, to change the result we’d need to put an implausibly large value 
on the per-person value of scientific knowledge. 
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discount.23 Shelly Kagan, who thinks such a discount might be justified, supposes it 
would only be small.24 
A further problem for a steep pure species discount is that, however this is justified, 
it seems likely to generate unacceptable results in ‘marginal cases’. Suppose the 
discount is based on the superior rationality of humans. Very young children won’t 
have this, which implies their suffering is unimportant. We might avoid this by 
saying that the potential for rationality is what matters, not whether one has it at 
present. However, it now follows that humans with serious cognitive disorders—and 
thus who will never develop these rational capacities—should have their suffering 
severely discounted, even though their abilities to experience pain would be just as 
strong as those of other humans; this is counter-intuitive. Finding a suitable 
rationale for this discount is not straightforward. 
The fourth and final discount is based on the idea that meat eaters will soon switch 
to ‘clean meat’, where animal cells are grown in a laboratory. Assuming no animals 
suffer in this process then, prima facie, the advent of clean meat will end the 
unhappiness that meat eating causes. Further, if the transition to clean meat—the 
‘transition’ for short—happens soon, the Strong Carnism Thesis will certainly be 
false as the individual value of meat eaters’ lives will be greater than their (negative) 
animal impact. 
 
23  Kant (1798) seemed to think we should give no weight to the interests of animals at all: 
“[the human being] is a being altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational 
animals, with which one may deal and dispose at one’s discretion.” Leaving aside how implausible 
this is, the target of this essay is not those—such as Kant—who would reject the Weak Carnism Thesis 
anyway.  
24 In print, Kagan (2016) claims a discount might—and also might not—be justifiable does not offer 
an account of big it might be. At his 2016 Uehiro lectures at the University of Oxford, Kagan 




I raise three issues for this discount. First, the transition won’t certainly happen and, 
if it did, wouldn’t remove all meat eater-caused animal suffering: it might not be 
technologically possible to make meat cheap enough that consumers switch; 
presumably, not all consumers will switch even if it were possible; it will only apply 
to some products, e.g. one can already buy soy and rice milk, but people consume 
cow milk. 
Second, even if we charitably assume the transition removes all the animal suffering 
that meat eaters cause, it is hard to believe it could happen soon enough. Suppose, 
for simplicity, the transition happens overnight and everyone switches. Let’s say 
that Tim is the average stranger we’re considering saving. Tim is median age, 30, 
and might expect to live about 40 more years. If HA is 10, then in 4 years, Tim will 
have caused as much animal unhappiness and he will experience happiness for the 
rest of his life. Hence, the transition would need to happen within 4 years, which is 
implausibly fast.25 
Third, notice that the peculiarity of whether we should save strangers or not turns 
on how quickly a previously seemingly irrelevant technological development occurs. 
Relatedly, even if we thought the transition would occur quickly enough in the 
future, there is still the odd result that saving meat eaters lives in the past few years  
would have been bad.  
To summarise, taken individually, the discounting objections would need to be 
implausibly steep to make it better to save the meat eater. 
 
25 Shallow Pond supposes we’re saving a child. Suppose this child is 10. For the same reasons as 
above, the transition would need to happen in 8 years to make it better to save the child. Again, this 
seems implausibly near. 
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However, the discounting objections could be pressed again: we should apply 
multiple discounts but apply each modestly. Perhaps the pure species discount is 
50% rather than 90%, HA is 3 rather than 1, we give some weight to goods besides 
happiness, and the transition is 20 years away. Now it’s slightly better to save the 
meat eater. 
To be clear, while applying multiple discounts is not ad hoc, it would be ad hoc to 
adjust the strengths of the various discounts solely in order to avoid the Strong 
Carnism Thesis. I concede that some will accept that Weak Carnism Thesis is true, 
but, after giving careful consideration of the facts, including the discounts, conclude 
that the Strong Carnism Thesis is false. I did not claim I could prove the Strong 
Carnism Thesis beyond reasonable doubt. There is not space to discuss whether the 
Strong Carnism Thesis holds on various different combinations of discounts; I leave 
the interested reader to conduct their own analysis.  
A final point on this objection. Only some philosophers will be able to apply all four 
discounts, given their preferred theoretical machinery. For instance, Peter Singer 
has argued against a pure species discount and is (now) a classical utilitarian (i.e. 
the right action is the one that maximises the sum total of happiness).26 Therefore, 
the only way Singer could avoid the conclusion would be by claiming (a) HA is much 
higher than I supposed, (b) the transition will occur soon or (c) some combination 
of (a) and (b). For concreteness, if the transition occurred in 20 years in the manner 
stated, then HA would need to be 5, i.e. humans are 5 times happier than chickens 
are unhappy, to make it better to save Tim (on the analysis so far).27 Given his 
 
26  Pertaining to discounts, see Singer (1975).  




writing on the suffering caused in meat production, I presume Singer would find it 
hard to believe humans are that much happier.  
2.2 Factoring in the other parts of other-regarding impact 
Animal impact is one of the other-regarding impacts of saving a life. The three 
others are: (1) the grief caused to friends and family from a bereavement, (2) on 
wider human society, (3) on wild animals. One might argue that, when we account 
for these impacts, it becomes more valuable to save lives—if they make it less 
valuable, that supports the Strong Carnism Thesis.  
(1) is likely to be small, relative to the individual value of the life; I doubt many think 
the former is even 10% of the size of the latter. We should we consider (1) 
counterfactually and when we do, it will be smaller still: people are generally sad 
whenever someone dies, hence the disvalue of grief is the difference between the 
badness now and the badness later. Therefore, (1) seems to be a relatively minor 
consideration. 
(2) and (3) could be substantial considerations but it is not clear that they are, or in 
which direction they point. Regarding (2), many think overpopulation is a serious 
issue, but it is not obvious that we are overpopulated—a point I will return to in 
chapter 2.7. Regarding (3), some think extra humans destroy nature and this is 
bad—as nature is valuable intrinsically and animals are happy—others think this is 
good—there is net suffering in nature, but this view is controversial.28 These other-
regarding impacts are too complicated to discuss here. As such, I am forced to set 
them to one side and proceed on the basis of a restricted analysis. I note, as I did 
 
28 E.g. Tomasik (2015) argues there is net suffering in the wild. 
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with clean meat, it would be odd if the Strong Carnism Thesis were false only once 
we had accounted for these facts, facts we do not normally consider when assessing 
the value of saving lives. 
2.3 Adjusting the fact not all people are meat eaters 
This analysis has considered whether saving a random meat eater would be bad. 
The Strong Carnism Thesis concerns whether meat eaters have a sufficiently large 
negative impact via their diet that the value of saving the life of an average person 
is bad in expectation. Adjusting the analysis to refer to a randomly-selected person, 
rather than meat eater, is unlikely to make much difference, at least in the developed 
world. As noted, 95% of people in America are meat eaters and 99% of animal 
products come from factory farms.29 Hence this too is a minor consideration and 
unlikely to be decisive for the Strong Carnism Thesis.  
To summarise the analysis in section 2 as a whole, if the Weak Carnism Thesis is 
true then the Strong Carnism Thesis is certainly plausible, although not obviously 
true. 
3. Is NRAGE the problem? 
Let’s now suppose the Strong Carnism Thesis is true. The Strong Carnism Thesis, 
NRAGE and the Principle of Easy Rescue are inconsistent, so one or both of the 
latter two must be reformulated. For many—consequentialists and some non-
consequentialists—NRAGE is impossible to deny. This section is addressed at those 
non-consequentialists who wish to reject NRAGE (presumably in order to hold onto 
the Principle of Easy Rescue). Recall:   
 
29 See footnote 18. 
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The No Requirement to cause Acts of Greater Evil (‘NRAGE’) Principle: 
you are not required to prevent something bad from happening if, in so 
doing, this will bring about an even worse outcome. 
I argue that abandoning NRAGE does not straightforwardly rescue the Principle of 
Easy Rescue. I discuss the two most promising ways to modify NRAGE and show 
these alternatives, when supplemented with a modified Strong Carnism thesis, 
regenerate an inconsistency with the Principle of Easy Rescue.30 
One way we might be tempted to give up on NRAGE is by attempting to draw a 
distinction between the direct and indirect impacts of our actions. It’s not clear 
exactly how this should be drawn, but the sense is that direct impacts are those we 
personally cause to individuals via our actions; indirect impacts, then, and those 
that result via the agency of someone we directly impact. Consider: 
Surgeon: we can either save 5 people with a drug or use that drug to save a 
surgeon who will save 100 different people.31  
Kamm argues that “we should not ignore the 100 [whom the surgeon] could save. 
But we should also not give them their full weight as 100 individuals versus the 5 
who need our resource to live” (emphasis added).32  
The application here is that we directly save the stranger, but the suffering they 
cause to animals is an indirect impact, which has less weight. This makes it 
relatively easier to say we are required to save the stranger.  
 
30 Here are two ways to reject NRAGE I do not discuss: appealing to retributive justice or liability-
based justifications for harm, on which it can be right, respectively, to punish or harm someone even 
if this produces worse consequences. Arguably, meat eaters are liable for their harm to animals and 
deserve to be punished. For discussion of liability, see McMahan (2002) and of retributive justice 
see Walen (2016) 
31  Kamm (1998) 
32  Kamm (1998) p108 
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However, appealing to the direct/indirect distinction is unlikely to make much 
difference. Even Kamm seems to think we should discount indirectly impact only 
slightly (“not give them their full weight”). We could thus qualify NRAGE by adding 
“once the appropriate discount for indirect effects has been applied”. For 
concreteness, say we weight indirect impacts 10% less. To regenerate the 
inconsistency, we would only need to believe a slightly stronger version of the Strong 
Carnism Thesis on which the other-regarding disvalue of saving the stranger’s life 
is only 10% greater than the individual value. 
Second, one could reject NRAGE by rejecting unrestricted aggregation, the idea 
that many small goods(/bads) can ever be morally equivalent to a substantial 
good(/bad). Quoting Voorhoeve: 
Many believe both that we ought to save a large number from being 
permanently bedridden rather than save one from death and that we ought 
to save one from death rather than save a multitude of people (who would be 
well off in any case) from very minor harms, no matter how large this 
multitude.33 
In Voorhoeve’s terminology, we should aggregate only ‘relevant’ claims. Advocates 
of restricted aggregation, such as Voorhoeve, will not accept NRAGE as there will 
be cases when you are required to bring about the worse set of consequences 
(impartially viewed). One might claim that we should save one human life over any 
number of suffering chicken lives—the harms caused to the latter are not relevantly 
large enough to be aggregated against the loss to the former. 
 
33  Voorhoeve (2014) p64. 
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To evaluate this objection, we need two pieces of information. First, a method which 
tells us when claims are and are not relevant. Second, a clearer sense of the relative 
size of the human’s and the chickens’ claims. Let’s look at these in turn. Voorhoeve 
proposes:  
[a] person’s weaker claim is irrelevant in the face of another’s stronger 
competing claim just in case, in a one-to-one comparison of these claims, the 
stronger claim ought to take priority from every person’s point of view34 
Common-sense morality judges it is permissible for you to let the stranger suffer, 
even when the stranger would suffer a smaller harm than you would have received, 
but only up to a point: 
If you face a very minor harm (such as an illness that will leave you bedridden 
for a day) and can either prevent this harm to yourself or prevent the death 
of a stranger, then it holds that you must save the stranger.35 
Voorhoeve’s test is that a claim is relevant compared to another when someone is 
permitted to prevent the smaller harm from happening to themselves instead of 
preventing the larger harm befalling another.  
We turn to the second piece of information. The problem, as discussed in section 
2.1, is that individuals will differ on the relative value of a human life compared to a 
chicken life. To find the upper limit of the chicken’s value, we could take HA as 1, 
count happiness as the only value and deny a pure species discount. In this case, the 
life of a chicken consists of 7 weeks of unhappiness of the same magnitude as the 
average human experiences net happiness over 7 weeks. 
 
34  Voorhoeve (2014) 
35  Ibid p71. 
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What could the lower limit be? For our purposes, the lower limit would be the least 
amount of disvalue that the average chicken’s life could have, relative to the meat 
eater’s, given the Strong Carnism Thesis is true. If someone thinks the Strong 
Carnism Thesis is false, then they will, presumably, think they are required to save 
the stranger in the Shallow Pond anyway. In 2.2, I suggested that if the transition 
to clean meat would come in 20 years, then HA could be around 5. This would mean 
the 7-week life of a chicken has the same total of unhappiness as the average human 
experiences net happiness in 10 days.36 
Next, we pose the following question: if you were facing a threat of having all your 
happiness removed for those periods, taking you to a neutral hedonic level for 
either, (a) 7 weeks or (b) 10 days, and you could either prevent this harm to yourself 
or prevent the death of a stranger, would you be permitted to let the stranger die? If 
we find this thought experiment unintuitive, we might ask: if faced with the prospect 
of being put into a coma for 7 weeks(/10 days), could we permissibly prevent the 
coma-experience from happening to ourselves rather than prevent the death of a 
stranger?37 
Intuitively, it would be clearly permissible in the case of (a) and borderline in the 
case of (b). By comparison, Voorhoeve’s example of a borderline case is the choice 
between losing your finger and saving a stranger. He adds: “[m]oreover, if your loss 
were moderately greater (several fingers, say) it would be quite clear that you could 
permissibly save yourself”.38 It strikes me that the severance of one finger and losing 
all your net happiness from 10 days of life are on a par: having one less finger 
 
36 49 (days)/5 is 9.8, which I rounded up to 10. 
37 These analogies are rough: if you were in a neutral state for 2 weeks you could carry on with your 
normal life. You could not do this if you were in a coma.  
38 Ibid p81 
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wouldn’t stop you doing anything, the pain would be temporary, and you might dine 
out on the story for years to come. If we appeal to common-sense morality, it seems 
more likely it is permissible rather than impermissible that one could prevent 
oneself being in a coma for 10 days at the cost of someone else’s life. If this is correct, 
then the chickens’ lives are relevant compared to the human’s life even at the lower 
bound and, therefore, we can aggregate the former against the latter. Assuming the 
Strong Carnism Thesis is true, then it still follows that we’re not required to save 
strangers in rescue cases, which is inconsistent with the Principle of Easy Rescue.  
I concede I do not have a decisive argument here that the lives of chickens can be 
aggregated against the lives of humans. There is no canonical criterion for deciding 
how it applies in a particular case, and the case at hand is not clear cut.39 This 
problems run the other way too: I do not expect there to be a decisive argument 
available that demonstrates the lives of chickens and humans cannot be aggregated. 
This concludes the analysis of whether abandoning NRAGE makes it easier to hold 
the Principle of Easy Rescue, given that we accept the Strong Carnism Thesis. It is 
unlikely that appealing to the direct/indirect distinction changes matters and not 
obvious that restricting aggregation does either. 
4. Can we save the Principle of Easy Rescue? 
If we accept the Strong Carnism Thesis and NRAGE, then we must abandon the 
Principle of Easy Rescue. That we are not required to save lives when we can do so 
 
39  Voorhoeve, ibid p80 notes that none of Taurek (1977); Nagel (1995); Kamm (2001) provide precise 




easily will strike many as counter-intuitive. I propose that, on reflection, we should 
not find it very counter-intuitive.  
What might explain our attachment to the Principle of Easy Rescue? The intuitive 
pull in Shallow Pond seems to be based largely on two assumptions: (1) saving lives 
is overall very good and (2) we have a duty to promote the good when we can do so 
easily. If we discover saving lives is bad, as it is in Drowning Dictator, the intuitive 
pull disappears. It seemed obvious, prior to accounting for animal impact, that 
rescuing the person in Shallow Pond was very good. Now that we’ve accounted for 
the impact meat eaters have on animals, the analysis changes. 
What should replace the Principle of Easy Rescue? Given the worry is about animal 
suffering, it seems it should be: 
The Anti-Carnist Principle of Easy Rescue: in rescue cases, we are not 
required to save the lives of strangers. However, in the unlikely event that 
we are confident the person is not a meat eater (e.g. they are vegetarian or 
vegan), we are required to save them. 
Few of us are perturbed by the idea that we are not required to save the life in 
Dictator Drowning; if the Strong Carnism Thesis is true, then this case is much 
more analogous to Shallow Pond than we would have thought. 
5. Further implications 
I note two important implications of the argument. 
If the Strong Carnism Thesis is true, saving lives is bad. Thus, for consequentialists 
and non-consequentialists who hold we are (at least sometimes) required to do the 
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lesser evil, that implies we’re required not to save lives in cases of easy rescue.40 
Singer is pushed to say it is wrong to save the drowning child in Shallow Pond. 
Second, suppose that we (i.e. private individuals) are trying to use our spare money 
to do as much good as possible. Two obvious options are to give to organisations in 
the developing world that save lives or reduce poverty. However, the longer people 
live and the richer they become, the more meat they eat and the more suffering they 
will cause as a result. Regarding poverty, studies show very consistently that, as 
people get wealthier, they consume more meat.41 Hence accounting for human-
caused animal impact will reduce the value of both of these by some amount—it 
won’t necessarily make such actions negative, not least when we consider that those 
in the developing world eat much less meat. Crucially, this reduction does not rely 
on the truth of the Strong Carnism Thesis: just so long as we think humans have 
some animal impact, it applies. 
6. Conclusion 
Can we believe both that it’s wrong to be a meat eater and that we are required to 
save lives when we can do so easily? I’ve argued that these two popular, intuitive 
views are likely to be incompatible, given further assumptions. If it is wrong to eat 
meat (on animal suffering grounds), then it is certainly plausible meat eaters will 
cause enough suffering that, on different ways of spelling out ‘enough’, we are not 
required to save lives. I closed by arguing that accounting for animals’ suffering has 
further practical implications. 
 
40  As an example of a non-consequential who believes we are required to the lesser evil, see Frowe 
(2018). 
41  Delgado (2003) 
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Chapter 2: Saving lives, averting lives, and population size 
0. Abstract  
Many people seem to accept what I will call the ‘Intuitive View’, that saving lives is 
good and—as the Earth is overpopulated—averting new lives is good too. Although 
it is not widely recognised, the Intuitive View is in tension: population size would 
also be reduced by not saving lives. I develop Greaves’ earlier analysis—which 
looked at how the Intuitive View could be true—and investigate how probable the 
Intuitive View is and what the practical implications would be if it were true. I do 
this first by assuming Totalism and second assuming a Person-Affecting View. I 
argue that the Intuitive View is distinctly unlikely on Totalism and, further, were it 
true, the value of each of saving and averting lives would be surprisingly small. This 
raises problems for Peter Singer’ position: he seems to hold the Intuitive View, 
Totalism, and that life-saving and life-averting charities are among the most cost-
effective giving opportunities. On a Person-Affecting view, by contrast, the Intuitive 
View is far more likely. If it were true, the values of saving and averting lives would 
be in large range—for instance, the value of saving a life is between, roughly the 
additional lifetime welfare the saved person would get if saved and zero value. As 
such, without further information about how overpopulated the world is, we can say 
little about the value of either intervention. The general problem the argument 
makes salient is that we don’t know the values of saving or averting lives unless we 
know how under- or overpopulated the world is. I close by briefly arguing that it’s 
not obvious where the world is in relation to its optimum population size on either 




Many people believe the Earth is overpopulated: there is a limited amount of food, 
water, space, and resources available, and the number of humans is now such that 
it reduces the quality of life for those presently living and those yet to come.1 Because 
of this, some people believe it would be better, all things considered, if fewer people 
were born. Hence interventions that avert lives, such as family planning and birth 
control, are, in general, good.2 
Hilary Greaves notes that many of the same people who believe the Earth is 
overpopulated also believe that it is good to save lives.3 Few, if any, seem to publicly 
argue saving lives is bad (they may privately think this), even though the premature 
deaths of existing people would also reduce population size. As such, many accept 
what I’ll call the ‘Intuitive View’, the simultaneous belief that both (1) saving lives 
is, in general, good and (2) averting lives is, in general, good. Peter Singer is a 
consequentialist who recommends both life-saving and family planning (i.e. life-
averting) interventions, implying not only that he accepts the Intuitive View, but 
that he thinks financing both types of interventions are among the most good 
individuals can do.4 
 
 
1  For instance, Population Matters is a modern group that campaigns for a ‘sustainable population 
size’. Historical concerns stretch back to Malthus (1798) and more recently, Ehrlich (1978). 
2 By ‘avert lives’ I mean prevent lives from ever having started. I am not interested in the question of 
when exactly life starts and nothing in this essay turns on a particular understanding of this topic. 
3  Greaves (2015) 
4  Singer’s charitable organisation, The Life You Can Save (2019) recommends both charities that 
save lives, e.g. the Against Malaria Foundation, and those that avert lives through family planning, 
e.g. Population Services International. For a statement of concern about overpopulation see Singer, 
Kissling and Musinguzi (2018). In writing, Singer advocates saving lives on multiple occasions, e.g. 
Singer (1972), (2009), (2015). 
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Greaves observes the tension within (what I call) the Intuitive View and raises the 
question of how it could be true.5 Greaves investigates the matter assuming 
Totalism—the population axiology on which the value of a state of affairs is the sum 
of lifetime well-being of everyone who will ever live—and makes some illuminating 
conceptual clarifications.6 While Greaves does not seem to explicitly answer the 
question she raises, an answer can be inferred from what she writes: the Intuitive 
View can be true when Earth is at or slightly above its ‘optimum population’, in 
which case the value of saving a life just consists in what she calls ‘transition factors’, 
the (dis)value associated with the loss of an existing person; I return to and explain 
these terms later. 
In this chapter, I develop Greaves’ analysis in two ways. First, I extend it: I address 
two further questions that are provoked by reflecting on the Intuitive View but not 
discussed by her. Labelling Greaves’ question, ‘how could the Intuitive View be 
true?’ as (1), I also consider (2) ‘how likely is it that the Intuitive View is true?’ (3) 
‘what are the practical implications of accounting for population size when 
considering the values of saving and averting lives?’ Second, I broaden it: in addition 
to addressing these questions from a Totalist perspective, I also do so assuming a 
Person-Affecting View (hereafter ‘PAV’). On this PAV, the only people who matter 
when aggregating individuals’ lifetime well-being in order to determine the value of 
a state of affairs, are those who presently exist and will exist whatever we choose to 
 
5 All references to Greaves in this paragraph are to Greaves (2015). 
6 A population axiology is a ranking of states of affairs in terms of their overall betterness where the 
number, identities and lifetime well-being individuals of individuals within that state of affairs 
varies. I am only concerned with axiology (the value of states of affairs) in this chapter.  
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do.7 The spirit of such views is captured by ‘Narveson’s Dictum’: “morality is in 
favour of making people happy but neutral about making happy people.”8  
At this point, it will help to observe that the overall value of creating/ending lives is 
a combination of their self-regarding value, the value solely related to the person 
whose life it is, and their other-regarding value, the impact that life has on everyone 
else. Clearly, both views (Totalism and PAV) hold there can be other-regarding value 
in creating/ending lives: births and deaths can impact others. I take it that both 
views assume there can be self-regarding value in saving lives: it is good if people 
live longer, assuming they would live happily.9 For our purposes, the important 
difference between Totalism and PAV is that Totalists hold that there is self-
regarding value in creating happy/unhappy lives, whereas PAV holds there is no 
self-regarding value in creating happy lives. Advocates of PAV tend to say there is 
self-regarding (dis)value in creating unhappy lives, but I postpone the discussion of 
this issue until the penultimate section—until then, we are only concerned with 
creating happy lives in any case. Given this difference in the value of creating lives, 
the two views will approach the question of optimum population size differently 
and, as many are sympathetic to PAV, it is valuable to broaden the analysis. 
 
7 This conception of Person-Affecting Views, though imprecise, is sufficient for our purposes; it is 
borrowed from Bostrom (2003) at pp. 311-312. (“Suppose instead that we adopt a ‘person-affecting’ 
version of utilitarianism, according to which our obligations are primarily towards currently existing 
persons and to those persons that will come to exist”). As Greaves (2017) section 5 points out, there 
are a variety of different Person-Affecting Views, all motivated by the intuition there is no value in 
creating happy lives, that is, lives with positive lifetime well-being (in this context ‘happiness’ is 
synonymous with ‘well-being’). For summaries of the views and debates in population ethics see the 
Greaves article just cited and (Arrhenius, unpublished) . I provide a further clarification of different 
types of Person-Affecting Views in footnote 26 in chapter 3.3. 
8 Narveson (1973) p70. 
9 I assume that lifetime well-being is the sum of all the instances of momentary well-being within a 
person’s life. This specification is the Deprivationist View of the badness of death, where death’s 
badness consists in the goods of life it deprives someone of. Alternative views of the badness of death 
are discussed in chapter 3; their inclusion here would complicate matters substantially without 
altering the thrust of the analysis. 
47 
 
It has to be the case that, whichever population axiology one uses, the more valuable 
averting lives is (due to other-regarding concerns about overpopulation), the less 
valuable saving lives is. I argue that, on Totalism, it is very unlikely the Intuitive 
View is actually true. The axiological machinery of Totalism, as it holds there is self-
regarding value in saving happy lives and self-regarding disvalue in averting happy 
lives, simply does not allow much ‘room for manoeuvre’, such that both saving and 
averting lives can be, in general, good. This presents an initial problem for Singer as 
he seems to accept the Intuitive View and Totalism.10 If the Intuitive View is true, 
the overall values of both saving and averting lives will be very small (compared to 
the self-regarding value of saving a life). The practical implication then, if Totalism 
and the Intuitive View are true, is that neither saving lives nor averting lives seem 
very promising opportunities to do good. This creates a further challenge for Singer 
because, as noted, he recommends life-saving and life-averting organisations as 
being among the most effective giving opportunities.  
On PAV, by contrast, it is far easier for the Intuitive View to be true and, if it is, it 
puts the value of each of saving lives and averting lives somewhere in a large range 
(I specify this later). Thus, if the PAV advocate knew the Intuitive View was true, but 
not exactly how overpopulated the Earth is, they would not know much about the 
relative importance of saving lives or averting lives; they would still know that the 
more valuable one is, the less valuable the other is. 
What emerges from this discussion is that we need to know whether, and to what 
extent, the Earth is under- or overpopulated to know how valuable it is to save and 
 
10  Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014) presents arguments for and against Totalism and conclude on p. 
373 that there are deep difficulties in the way of any defensible view on this question. However, in 
personal conversations (in 2018 and 2019), Singer has stated that, with reservations, he thinks 
Totalism is correct.  
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avert lives. In the final part of the chapter, I observe that how one approaches the 
question of where the world actually is in relation to optimum population will 
depend on which population axiology one uses: it matters whether we are concerned 
about the ‘near-term’, i.e. only this generation, or with the ‘long-term’, i.e. this and 
all future generations. However, I then go on to show that determining the reality, 
on either timescale, of where the Earth is in relation to optimum population is a 
complex, non-obvious empirical matter. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces Greaves’ distinction of the 
different factors impacting the value of a life and lists some of these factors. Sections 
3 to 5 assume, where such definiteness is needed, Totalism. Section 3 defines 
optimum population (and related terms) and explains the nature of the tri-partite 
relationship between saving lives, averting lives, and population size. Section 4 gives 
the answers to questions (1) to (3) stated above. Section 5 anticipates five objections 
one could make against the argument that, if the Intuitive View is true, the value of 
saving and averting lives is as small as I claim it is. Section 6 answers questions (1) 
to (3) on the PAV. Section 7 discusses whether Earth is actually under- or 
overpopulated. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Factors affecting the overall value of life 
Greaves draws a helpful distinction between the absence and transition factors of 
the overall value of saving a life. Transition factors are defined as those that result 
from the loss of an existing person. Absence factors are defined as those that result 
from the absence of the latter part of a person’s life. The key difference “is that 
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deprivation [absence] factors but not transition factors would still be present if the 
person in question had never been born at all”.11 
Greaves provides a list of such factors. It is not important to discuss these in great 
depth, so I will merely paraphrase Greaves’ list, labelling absence factors ‘A’ and 
transition factors ‘T’, and noting whether they seem to be positive or negative in 
value. A4 and A5 are my additions to the list. I note that A1 captures the self-
regarding value of saving a life and the others are factors comprising the other-
regarding value of doing so. I do not claim this list is exhaustive. 
A1 The benefit to the saved person associated with that person living longer.  
A2 The positive increase in economic output that results from there being 
an extra person in society. 
A3 The negative environment costs associated with there being an extra 
person who consumes resources.  
A4 The negative impact on non-human animals caused by the consumption 
of animal products. 
A5 The impact on wild animals (i.e. not farmed animals) due to there being 
an extra person. The thought is that extra humans reduce wild animal 
habitats, and this will be bad(/good) if the wild animals have, on aggregate, 
positive(/negative) well-being. It’s unclear to me if this factor is positive or 
negative.  
T1 The negative emotional reaction on friends and family as a result of 
bereavement. 
T2 The negative financial loss of having a ‘breadwinner’ die, where relevant. 
 
11  Greaves (2015) p8 
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T3 The negative impact on friends and family, once the bereavement effects 
have subsided, of not being able to socialise with the deceased. As Greaves 
notes, the counterfactual impact of this is likely to be small and people 
socialise with others instead. 
Armed with these distinctions, we can say that the overall value of saving a life is a 
combination of (1) the self-regarding value (A1), (2) the other-regarding absence 
factors (A2-A5), and (3) the value of the other-regarding transition factors (T1-T3).12 
For conciseness, I will refer to (2) and (3) as ‘absence value’ and ‘transition value’, 
omitting reference to the fact they are comprised of other-regarding factors. We can 
write the value of saving (an existing) life as follows: 
Value of saving a life = self-regarding value + absence value + transition 
value 
We can also write the value of averting a new life as follows: 
Value of averting a life = - (self-regarding value + absence value) 
This is negative, relative to the value of saving a life, as this is the difference in the 
value of an outcome where we prevent a new person from existing vs they do exist: 
averting a life means there is one less person’s worth of self-regarding value and 
other-regarding absence impact in the world. Note, importantly, that averting lives 
lacks the transition value as (by stipulation) that refers to the badness of someone 
dying once they are alive, which is not applicable to new lives. 
 
12 Given the list not exhaustive, further factors would included in one of (1) – (3). 
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3. Relating optimum population to saving and averting lives 
In this section, I define optimum population (and related terms), set out the value 
of saving and averting lives on Totalism at optimum population, and explain what 
the relationship is between population size, saving lives, and averting lives.  
At this point, we should think of what it might mean for the planet to be at optimum 
population. Greaves proposes the following:  
Suppose further, merely for illustrative purposes, that the world is currently 
at optimum population, in the following sense: on average, the difference in 
value between the actual state of affairs and a state of affairs in which a 
randomly selected actual person does not exist and others’ lives go as they 
would have if the person in question had not existed is zero. [emphasis in 
original]13 
The last part of this is vague: what does it mean for ‘other’s lives to go as they would 
have if the person had not existed’? That their lives would have the same lifetime 
well-being? That they would (implausibly) have led exactly the same lives: had the 
same jobs, walked down the same streets, and so on? 
I suggest alternative, simpler definitions: the world is at axiological optimum 
population when adding new a life has, on average, neutral value. Relatedly then, it 
is axiologically overpopulated when adding a new life is, on average, bad, and 
axiologically underpopulated when this is, on average, good.14  
 
13  Greaves p10. 
14 These claims should account for our expectations of the world’s population trajectory, how many 
will live now and at different points in the future. Note that the Totalist is ultimately concerned with 
how things go for the ‘timeless’ population (all those who will ever live) rather than just with how 
things go for the current population (those alive now). Hence a Totalist making a claim about the 
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The definitions proposed are ‘thin’ in the sense that they are compatible with any 
account of population axiology, as opposed to being tied to Totalism in any way: the 
idea being that, if you, for example, say the Earth is axiologically overpopulated, you 
have reached the conclusion, however you think about value, that extra people 
would be, on average, bad.15 
Defining overpopulated in axiological terms is somewhat revisionary but essential 
for our purposes. Sometimes, particularly in environmentalist contexts, discussion 
of overpopulation is linked to the notion that we (i.e. humans) our exceeding the 
Earth’s ‘carrying capacity’; roughly, we are consuming more resources than the 
Earth can sustainably produce (for a given explication of ‘sustainably’).16 Let’s call 
overpopulation in the carrying capacity sense ecological overpopulation.  
To talk in terms of ecological overpopulation would obscure the issue at hand. For 
reasons that I give later in section 7, someone could hold the world is ecologically 
overpopulated but axiologically underpopulated. Such a person would not hold the 
Intuitive View at all.17  
One might alternatively object to the definitions on the grounds that when we say 
the Earth is overpopulated, we are not claiming that creating new lives is, on average 
bad, only that the effects new lives have on others is negative; in our terminology, 
 
world being axiologically overpopulated will consider how adding a life affects the timeless 
population and not only the current one. 
15 We could distinguish optimum population for the world from optimum population for some sub-
region of it. One might claim the world is overpopulated, adding that a random life is bad; but (say) 
Japan is underpopulated, then adding a random life in Japan is good. This doesn’t remove the 
challenge of reconciling the parts of the Intuitive View: we can still inquire, for a given sub-region, 
whether saving and averting lives are both good there.  
16  Dhondt (1988) identifies various notions of carrying capacity. These need not detain us here.  
17 To someone who says, ‘I think the Earth is ecologically overpopulated but that saving lives and 
creating lives are good,’ we can generate the problematic Intuitive View by replying that ‘suppose the 
Earth is sufficiently ecologically overpopulated that creating lives is bad. How likely is it, in that case, 
that saving lives is good?’  
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that the (other-regarding) absence value is negative. To distinguish this term from 
‘axiological overpopulation’, let’s say there is ‘social overpopulation’ when the 
absence value of adding new lives is negative. We can write this and social 
underpopulation as follows: 
 Social overpopulation: absence value < 0 
 Social underpopulation: absence value > 0 
And when social absence impact is zero, we are at the social optimum population: 
Social optimum population: absence value = 0 
Why not define axiological overpopulation in this way? Because it can still be good, 
on average, to add lives to a world which is socially overpopulated. On Totalism, 
there can be self-regarding value in adding lives. Presumably, the self-regarding 
value of new lives is, on average, positive—people tend to live happy lives. If the 
world is socially overpopulated—the absence value of extra lives is negative—but 
the magnitude of the (positive) self-regarding value is greater than the magnitude 
of the (negative) other-regarding absence value, then adding lives is nevertheless 
good overall. Hence this alternative definition has the same problem as the last one: 
it doesn’t capture the important idea that, when we say the world is axiologically 
overpopulated, we mean that adding lives is, in general, bad. To show the difference 
between social overpopulation and axiological overpopulation, we can spell out the 
mechanics of the latter on Totalism, stated with respect to the value of adding a 
life18: 
 
18 Axiological overpopulation (and cognates) will function identically to social overpopulation (and 
cognates) on PAV if the view holds there is no value creating happy or unhappy lives. 
54 
 
Axiological Overpopulation: self-regarding value + absence value < 0 
 Axiological Underpopulation: self-regarding value + absence value > 0 
At Optimum population the overall value of adding a life is zero: 
 Axiological Optimum population: self-regarding value + absence value = 019 
Having distinguished the ‘social’ and ‘axiological’ versions of these terms, I will 
generally drop the prefix ‘axiological’ hereafter for stylistic reasons. 
If we are at optimum population, what follows regarding the value of saving and 
averting lives, given Totalism?  
At optimum population, adding a new life has zero value. This is because the self-
regarding and absence values of adding a life must be equal and opposite at 
optimum population. As averting a life is just preventing the addition of a life, 
averting lives also has zero value. 
It also follows that the self-regarding value and absence value of saving lives will be 
equal and opposite. At least this follows if we assume those values are constant the 
same through each period of life, which I assume for now and will revisit later. The 
result is that the value of saving a life, at optimum population, will just be the 
transition value, i.e. the effect of the loss of an existing person has on other people.20 
Noting, 
At optimum population: self-regarding value + other-regarding absence 
impact = 0 
 
19 For simplicity, let us assume there is only one population size that has maximum value (i.e. there 
not local maxima). 
20 I assume the self-regarding value and social absence impact are constant each year. I raise an 




Value of saving a life = self-regarding value + absence impact + transition 
impact 
As the self-regarding value and other-regarding absence impact cancel out, thus: 
Value of saving a life at optimum population = transition impact 
There are two points to make here before we move on to the discussion of the 
Intuitive View in the next section.  
First, the transition impact will be very small relative to the self-regarding value of 
the life (unless we are considering saving very old people). To make this comparison, 
suppose we are saving some 10-year-old, Xenia, who would live another 80 years. 
For what follows, it will help to state the self-regarding value of saving a life in ‘Well-
being Adjusted Life-Years’ (WALYs). One WALY equates to the sum total of well-
being from one person living for one year at well-being level one. To simplify, I 
assume all humans we are concerned with live at well-being level one. Thus, the self-
regarding value of saving Xenia is 80 WALYs.  
In chapter 1.2.2, I supposed that few people consider the transition impact—i.e. 
mainly the sadness associated with bereavement—to be as much as 10% of the self-
regarding value of saving the life. 10% is intuitively too high, as it implies the grief 
impact is 8 WALYs, i.e. equivalent to 8 years’ worth of (net) well-being. In chapter 
1.2.2, I also noted that we should assess the transition impact counterfactually: 
people are generally sad whenever someone dies, hence the disvalue of grief is the 
difference between the badness now and the badness later. Taking these together, it 
seems unlikely the transition impact could be more than two WALYs on average. In 
fact, we can estimate this WALY loss empirically and, on it, two WALYs seems to be 
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an upper bound; as explaining this estimate is inessential to the argument, I have 
confined it to a lengthy footnote for the interested reader.21  
Note that, at optimum population, the value of saving Xenia is just the transition 
impact, which is two WALYs. The two WALYs figure is 1/40th of the 80 WALY self-
regarding value of saving her, which is the component we normally use to judge the 
badness of a death, and hence it is substantially smaller.22 
Second, a further concept it will help us to have is ‘strong axiological overpopulation’ 
(I use this synonymously with ‘strongly axiologically overpopulated’). This occurs 
when the world is such that the value of saving the life of a randomly-selected 
person is, on average, bad. Thus:  
Strong axiological overpopulation: self-regarding value + other-regarding 
absence impact + other-regarding transition impact < 0 
Or: 
 
21 Let’s suppose that self-reported life satisfaction is a reasonable measure of well-being – I defend 
that it is a reasonable proxy for happiness in chapter 4. Clark et al. (2018) p81 shows the loss of a 
spouse causes a roughly 2-point loss of life satisfaction on a 10-point scale over a total of five years – 
after five years, people seem to have adapted and returned to their pre-loss level of life satisfaction. 
Hence, the loss is equivalent to someone going from 7/10 to 5/10 for a single year. Oswald and 
Powdthavee (2008) find the loss of a child is about half as bad, in terms of life satisfaction, as the 
loss of a spouse. Suppose that, on a 0-10 life satisfaction scale, the ‘neutral point’ equivalent to non-
existence is 5. If we assume that an average person has 7/10 life satisfaction, which is about the 
average score in the developed world, then each year their ‘net’ life satisfaction score is 2 points (7 – 
5). As 1 WALY is equivalent to someone’s net well-being for the year, it follows 1 WALY is equivalent 
to increasing someone’s life satisfaction by two points for a year. Hence, the death of a child to one 
parent has roughly a 0.5 WALYs cost to those parents. We might suppose that the pre-counterfactual 
loss is about 4 life satisfaction points and thus 2 WALYs – the two parents lose a life satisfaction 
point overall and some other persons are sad, but less so. When we account for the counterfactuals, 
this 2 WALYs figure will decrease by some uncertain amount. Claiming that the neutral point on the 
life satisfaction scale is 5/10 is contentious (I discuss this in chapter 7.3). Arguably, it’s much lower. 
However, if it is lower, that reduces the transition impact. Why is this? Suppose the neutral point is 
0, then supposing people have 7/10 life satisfaction, then the net annual life satisfaction score, which 
is equivalent to one WALY, is 7. The resulting 1-point life satisfaction drop parents experience as a 
result of bereavement is then 0.14 WALYs (1/7) rather 0.5 WALYs, (1/2) and hence the transition 
value would be around 3.5 times smaller. Hence assuming the neutral point is 5 is the assumption 
most generous to creating a high estimate of the transition impact. 
22  Greaves (2015) observes the dominant approach to determining the value of a life is to focus 
exclusively on the self-regarding value of that life.  
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Strong axiological overpopulation: self-regarding value + other-regarding 
transition impact < other-regarding absence impact 
I take this randomly-selected person to be of median age, which means they will 
have fewer remaining years left to live than the average averted person would have 
had, a consideration which will become relevant later.  
4. Examining the Intuitive View 
In this section I assess, from the Totalist perspective, questions (1) to (3), namely: 
can the Intuitive View be true? How likely is it? And what are the practical 
implications if it is true? I’ll show how the Intuitive View is possible, argue it’s 
unlikely that it is true, then demonstrate that, if it is true, saving lives and averting 
lives each do very little good, relative to the self-regarding value of saving a life, and 
are thus they are unpromising ways to do the most good. In the subsequent section, 
I consider four objections that an advocate of the Intuitive View could make to show 
the value of saving and averting lives is higher than I claim here. 
On one of our earlier definitions, the Intuitive View is true if and only if the actual 
world is currently above optimum population and below strong overpopulation. It’s 
easy to see why: if the world were not overpopulated it would either be 
underpopulated or at optimum population, thus averting births would be bad or 
neutral, respectively. If the world were strongly overpopulated, then it is better not 
to save lives. I take it no one wants to claim (at least openly and in writing), that it 
is good not to save lives, not least because it would imply they have a pro tanto 
reason to stop themselves existing. 




The problem is, as I will demonstrate, that the difference between a world at 
optimum population and one where there is strong overpopulation is rather small. 
Suppose we are considering Tim, who is 30—the world median age—and will live 
another 40 years—world life expectancy is close to 70. At optimum population, the 
self-regarding value of saving his life is 40 WALYs and thus the other-regarding 
absence impact balances it at -40 WALYs. Someone who holds the Intuitive View 
and believes we are experiencing overall overpopulation must (by definition) believe 
the absence (dis)value of Tim’s life is already greater than the self-regarding value 
of his life. To move from optimum population to strong overpopulation only 
requires the absence value of a life to decrease by the value of the transition value. 
Given the transition value is 2 WALYs, then the world would be strongly 
overpopulated if the absence value of the rest of Tim’s life was -42 WALYs instead.  
Whilst it might seem outrageous that the Earth could ever be so overpopulated that 
saving lives is bad, it should be clear that Totalists who believe we are at optimum 
population should believe, if the absence (dis)value of a life were only slightly 
larger—on these numbers 5% larger—the Earth would be strongly overpopulated. 
I’ve provided a partial representation of the individual and other-regarding value of 
saving lives at different population sizes below, in figure 2.1. I’ve changed the sign 
of the absence value so it is easier to see where it intersects with optimum 





Figure 2.1. Population size vs individual, absence and transition values of saving a 
median-age life 
I return to the question of how under- or overpopulated the Earth actually is later, 
but it is important to recognise at this juncture how unlikely it is that the Intuitive 
View is true on Totalism. It would be a striking coincidence if the Earth were in some 
‘goldilocks’ zone: a little overpopulated, such that averting lives is good, but not so 
overpopulated that saving lives is bad. It seems much more likely that Earth is either 
sufficiently overpopulated to make saving lives bad or insufficiently overpopulated 
to make averting lives bad. Thus, Singer’s position—endorsing Totalism and the 
Intuitive View—is theoretically possible but rather unlikely. 
Let’s consider what the practical implications would be if the Intuitive View were 
true. The significant result is that the overall value of both saving and averting lives 
will be far smaller than their self-regarding value and, moreover, those values will 
be in tension. 
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Earlier, we specified the values of saving and averting lives as follows: 
Value of saving a life = self-regarding value + absence value + transition 
value 
Value of averting a life = - (self-regarding value + absence value) 
For our first-pass analysis, we can assume the life we save and the life we avert are 
of the same length. If we combine this with our earlier assumption that the self-
regarding and absence values are constant each year, then the self-regarding value 
and other-regarding absence values exactly cancel out we are left with: 
Value of life saved + value of birth averted = transition value 
As the transition value is 2 WALYs, what follows is that saving and averting lives are 
together worth 2 WALYs and, further, that the more valuable one is, the less 
valuable the other becomes. Thus, if both of them are doing some good, the amount 
of good they each do is rather small compared to the self-regarding value of saving 
(randomly selected) lives.  
In fact, matters are slightly more complicated. We’re talking about saving lives of 
median age, but averting new lives; the latter will be longer than the former. 
Adjusting for this complicates matters and makes a small difference on Totalism; 
however, it makes a relatively large difference on PAV and, as it is easier to introduce 
the analysis now, I will do so.  
We can say (using the same numbers as above): 
Value of saving a median life = self-regarding value + absence value + 
transition value  
= 40 + X + 2 
= 42 + X 
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Where X represents the absence value, which changes depending on how under- or 
overpopulated the Earth is. If the Intuitive View is true, then X must be between -
40 WALYs (optimum population) and -42 WALYs (strong overpopulation). The 
value of averting a new life, relative to the value of saving the median life is: 
Value of averting a life, relative to value of saving a median life = - (self-
regarding value of saving median life + absence value of saving median life) 
* (life expectancy of new lives/ life expectancy of median age person) 
This accounts for the fact the new life would live proportionally more years than the 
median life. Plugging in the numbers in this case, assuming a new person lives to 
70: 
Value of averting a life, relative to value of saving a random life = (70/40) * 
-(40 + X)  
= - (70 + 1.75X) 
We can combine the two equations to show what the value of saving one random life 
and averting one life would be: 
Value of saving a random life and value of averting a life = 42+ X – (70 + 
1.75X) 
= -28 + 0.75X 
At optimum population (i.e. X is 40), the value of saving a random life is 0 WALYs, 
the value of averting a life is 2 WALYs. At strong overpopulation (i.e. X is 42), the 
value of saving a life is 0 and the value of averting a life is 3.5 WALYs. Hence, the 
value of saving one life and averting one life is not just equal to the 2 WALYs 
transition value of saving a life, but it isn’t far off (given the Intuitive View). Figure 
2.2 plots the values of saving a median life and averting a life for different absence 
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Figure 2.2 Population size vs value of saving or averting lives on Totalism 
Now that we have shown the value of saving and averting lives is small, relative to 
the self-regarding value of saving a life, we can indicate a further problem for 
Singer’s position, given that he recommends life-saving and life-averting charities 
as being among the most cost-effective.23  
As far as I can tell, Singer has not stated that his recommendations to save lives take 
account of his (elsewhere mentioned) concerns about overpopulation. Let’s assume 
 
23  See footnote 4. 
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Singer’s suggestions have not accounted for absence (dis)value.24 Incorporating 
these concerns make a big difference. To see this, we can suppose a child saved by 
the Against Malaria Foundation—a charity Singer endorses and which provides 
anti-malarial bednets—would live 60 more years, and thus the overall value of 
saving that life, ignoring the absence value, would be 62 WALYs—60 for self-
regarding value and 2 for transition value. Let’s assume the Earth is at optimum 
population and we now incorporate the absence value of that life, which will be -60 
WALYs. When we do this, the overall value of saving the life drops to just 2 WALYs—
the transition value—which is over 30 times smaller than the self-regarding value of 
doing so and what I assume Singer’s recommendations were based on. Thus, unless 
we already thought that saving lives in this way was 30 times more cost-effective 
than the next-best altruistic options—e.g. alleviating poverty, treating mental 
illness, reducing factory farming, etc.—saving lives would not to be the most good 
we could do. 
In fact, the value of saving lives will be less than this if the Intuitive View is true, as 
the Intuitive View doesn’t entail that the Earth is at optimum population, but that 
it is somewhere above optimum population and below strong overpopulation. This 
means the value of saving that life is between 0 and 2 WALYs – even lower than the 
figure used above of 2 WALYs.25  
Therefore, it does not seem credible, if Totalism and the Intuitive View are true, to 
hold that either (a) saving lives or (b) averting lives will be the most good one could 
do. At least, it is not credible for someone to hold this unless (1) they have 
 
24 The other less probable explanation would be that Singer has factored in concerns about 
population size but not mentioned them anywhere. 
25 I won’t give an example, but I note that life-averting interventions, whatever we thought their value 
was before, will be between 0 and 3.5 WALYs each and thus are still relatively small. 
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acknowledged how much smaller the value of saving and averting lives would be 
once the absence value is accounted for and (2) they show that, even including this 
reduction, the value of one of saving or averting lives is still better than the 
alternatives.  
It might seem that I am being unreasonably critical of Singer’s position. It’s worth 
adding the Intuitive View poses something of a trilemma for Totalists. Option (1), 
the one I’ve discussed, is that the Intuitive View is true. As noted, this seems unlikely 
to be the case and, if it is, neither saving nor averting lives would be particularly 
valuable. Option (2) is that the Intuitive View is false because saving lives is, in 
general, bad, i.e. the Earth is not merely overpopulated, but strongly overpopulated; 
this would make averting lives more valuable but is, presumably, an unwelcome 
result. Option (3) is that the Intuitive View is false because averting lives is, in 
general, bad; this would mean saving lives is relatively more valuable but also that 
the Earth is underpopulated. If the Earth is underpopulated then, at least prima 
facie, it would be better, inter alia, if government stopped funding family planning 
(i.e. contraceptives) and encouraged people to have larger families instead. 
Therefore, all the options available to the Totalist are at least somewhat counter-
intuitive. To state the obvious, the question of how under- or overpopulated the 
Earth is, once one’s axiological machinery is specified, is an empirical question, and 
it would be ad hoc to decide how under/overpopulated the world is based on what 
seems to have the least counter-intuitive implications. 
5. Five ways to increase the value of saving/averting lives, given the 
Intuitive View 
I imagine those attracted to the Intuitive View will think this has all been too quick. 
I’ll now consider five ways someone could respond if they found the Intuitive View 
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plausible but thought that the value of saving and averting lives were both positive 
and could be larger than I claimed. For concreteness, I’ll suppose the aim is to hold 
the Intuitive View and restore the idea that the overall value of saving a life is 
roughly the same as the self-regarding value of doing so. I argue that none of the 
responses succeeds in achieving this aim. 
5.1 Claim the transition costs are higher 
The first move is to claim the transition value—the badness to the living of losing 
someone once they exist—is much higher than I estimated. As the value of saving a 
life and averting a birth is together is a function of the transition value of saving a 
life, if this value is much higher, that gives those tempted by the Intuitive View more 
‘room for manoeuvre’. 
For this objection to succeed, the transition value would need not just to be a bit 
higher than I suggested, but as large the self-regarding value of saving a life. This 
doesn’t seem plausible: generally, when we think about the badness of someone 
dying, we assume the loss to them is going to be far greater than the sadness we’ll 
feel at losing them.26 Further, even if the transition value were higher, at say 10 
WALYs, then the argument of the previous section—that the Intuitive View is 
unlikely on Totalism—stands.  
 
26 The most promising way to make this claim would be to hold the preference-satisfactionist of 
theory of well-being. On this, well-being consists in one’s preferences being satisfied, in the sense 
that what one prefers to be the case, is the case. One could then argue that losing one’s child, partner 




5.2 Claim Earth is only socially overpopulated 
The second move is to drop the claim that the Earth is axiologically overpopulated 
to the more modest one that it is socially overpopulated. As such, there would still 
be absence disvalue associated with lives, but this is of a smaller magnitude than the 
self-regarding value. Suppose the absence value that Tim, our median man, causes 
by living 40 more years is equivalent to -20 WALYs instead of -40 WALYs. This 
allows advocates of the Intuitive View to retain their belief that there is in some 
sense too many people whilst increasing the value of saving lives, in this case, from 
2 to 22 WALYs.  
The problem with this objection is that, if the Earth is now axiologically 
underpopulated, the Intuitive View is false. 
5.3 Claim averted lives have lower well-being than saved lives 
Earlier, I assumed that saved and averted lives would have the same well-being. 
However, one might object that this is mistaken on the grounds that the averted 
lives would generally have lower average well-being than average lives (in a given 
country). The rationale is that parents who would, on the provision of family 
planning services, choose not to have children make such a choice, at least in part, 
because they think that their prospective child would be born in unfortunate 
circumstances and they wish to avoid this.27 As such, someone could hold the 
Intuitive View and clarify they think saving and averting average lives is good. They 
could then claim that (a) life-averting interventions are quite valuable in reality as 
 
27 If averting lives occurred through coercion, e.g. forced sterilisation, it would no longer be plausible 
those averted children would have lower well-being.   
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the averted lives would be of unusually unhappy people and (b) life-saving 
interventions, in contrast, will reach people of average well-being. 
Two comments. First, while one way to reduce the number of new births is to 
provide contraceptives to prevent unwanted children, the other obvious option is to 
reduce the number of children people want through, e.g. educating women and girls 
and changing their preferences regarding an ideal family size. Suppose some 
parents had wanted five children but then decided they would prefer to have three; 
it’s not clear whether the ‘extra’ three children would have had particularly worse 
lives than the first two. It’s just that the parents, considering their own interests, 
changed their minds. Hence, it’s not clear, from the armchair, whether the lives 
averted in practice would have lower average well-being than average new lives. 
Second, even if averted lives would, in practice, have lower well-being than average 
lives, presumably this difference is slight. Suppose averted lives have 10% lower 
average well-being. In this case, the value of averting a 70-year life, at optimum 
population, would be 7 WALYs rather than 0 WALYs (the figure of averted lives had 
average well-being); thus, this makes the Intuitive View more likely, but still 
unlikely.28 Moreover, the averted lives would need to have net zero (or net negative) 
value to make it the case that the overall value of saving/averting lives is around the 
self-regarding value of saving a life; this seems implausible. 
5.4 Claim saving lives reduces population size 
The third option is to point out that saving lives can often cause people to have fewer 
children. We call this the ‘save lives to avert lives’, or ‘SLAL’, approach. This would 
 
28 The self-regarding value is 0.9*70 = 63 WALYs.   
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seem to be a two-for-one bargain for advocates of the Intuitive View: you get to save 
lives while averting lives, both of which the view holds are good. The explanation for 
how SLAL works is that parents, at least in the developing world, have more children 
than their ideal family size in the expectation some will not survive to maturity. 
Therefore, if lifesaving interventions are provided, and parents see these working, 
either on their own children or in the community, they will opt to have fewer 
children instead.29 We can call this phenomenon the ‘reduction effect’ and use the 
term ‘reduction rate’—hereafter ‘RR’—to refer to the number of births averted per 
life saved.30  
I will explain how SLAL works, then give two reasons why this doesn’t increase the 
value of saving lives substantially above their transition value. To do this, it will help 
to represent how SLAL works mathematically: 
Value of the reduction effect: value of saving a life + (RR)(value of averting 
a birth) 
Expanding the component terms, we can say the value of the reduction effect is 
positive when: 
Self-regarding value + absence value + transition value – (RR)(self-
regarding value + absence value) > 0 
For simplicity, I’ll assume the saved and averted life are the same length.31 We can 
combine these values and rewrite it as: 
 
29  Doepke (2005) 
30 It’s worth noting that philosophers have debated the moral value of replacement compared to life 
extension, e.g. (Arrhenius, 2008). Outside philosophy, Melinda Gates of the Gates Foundation has 
offered this as a rationale of why saving lives is good but doesn’t cause overpopulation Gates (2014). 
31 As noted earlier (footnote 22), this isn’t very distortionary on Totalism, even if the saved life is of 
median age. It’s even less distortionary in this case as we’re mainly considering saving the lives of 
young children, whose life expectancy will be only a couple of years more than that of new lives.   
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(1 – RR)(self-regarding value + absence value) + transition value > 0 
Let’s plug in some numbers to illustrate this. Suppose RR is 2, i.e. one life saved 
averts two births, then the self-regarding value of saving a life is 40 WALYs, the 
transition value is 2 WALYs, and the absence value is -42 WALYs, i.e. we are on the 
cusp of strong overpopulation. This means: 
= (1 – 2)(40 – 42) + 2 
= (-1)(-1) + 2 
= 2 + 2 
= 4 
Saving one life and averting two lives is good in this case and has an overall value of 
4 WALYs. 
The first reason invoking SLAL doesn’t make much difference, as the above equation 
shows. This reason is that if RR is one, then the value of saving each life is just the 
transition value. As a matter of fact, RR might be around one: GiveWell estimate 
that for each life the donors to their charities are able to save, about one less person 
is born.32  
The second reason is that if the Intuitive View is true, the maximum value for each 
life averted will be the transition value: at strong overpopulation, the value of 
averting a life is equal to the transition value of saving a life. Thus, even in the 
implausible scenario that saving one life averts four lives, the value of doing this 
would only be 10 WALYs, five times the transition value of 2 WALYs. Of course, 
SLAL would be more valuable if the Earth were strongly overpopulated, but then 
 
32  GiveWell (2014) 
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the Intuitive View would be false: if the Earth is strongly overpopulated, then saving 
lives outside SLAL scenarios would be bad. 
5.5 Claim value of a life varies with age 
Fourth, we could reject my simplifying assumption that the annual absence value of 
a life is constant for each year of life. Thinking economically, people are a cost in the 
first part of their life because society invests in their education, healthcare, etc. 
People are economically productive thereafter and stop being so when they retire. 
Hence, one might claim if the world were at optimum population, even though 
creating a new life would have (in expectation) no value, saving the life of an existing 
20-year-old’s life is more valuable and could be far more valuable than just the 
transition value. The value of a life at different ages might vary roughly along the 
lines represented below in figure 2.3.  
 




This implies it’s good to save someone’s life up until the point they retire (I’ve 
marked that to be around 70) as the counterfactual difference between those 
negative values (e.g. death at 25) and zero (e.g. death at 100) is positive. It also 
implies it’s good if people die just after retirement and it’s good to let young people 
die if they aren’t going to live long enough to be productive (i.e. it’s bad to save a 10-
year old who would die at 20).  
While it is plausible that the value of lives varies with age, the problem is knowing 
what to put on the y-axis, which I’ve intentionally left blank. Is someone’s working 
life from age 25 until their death worth 1 WALY to others? 10? 100? As I discuss in 
section 7, the sign and magnitude of the other-regarding impact of lives are unclear. 
Hence, it’s not obvious how strong this objection is. It would be ad hoc to, without 
further investigation, put a number on this. 
To sum up, none of these five objections succeeds in restoring the idea that the 
overall value of saving or averting lives can be large—specifically, as large as the self-
regarding value of saving a life—if one accepts Totalism and the Intuitive View. 
6. PAV and the Intuitive View 
In this section, I tackle the same questions as I did in section 4, this time from the 
perspective of the PAV. It would be tedious and unnecessary to repeat the earlier 
analysis at length because, as noted in section 2, the only difference between PAV 
and Totalism is that the latter holds there can be value in creating new lives, and the 
former holds there cannot be value in creating happy lives. This section continues 
to assume that all the lives we are considering creating would be happy. 
The Intuitive View will be true on PAV under the same description—when the Earth 
is above optimum population but below strong overpopulation. The difference is 
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that, on PAV, as there is no self-regarding value in adding lives, the world is 
overpopulated if the absence value of adding a life is negative. Thus, when we 
consider which factors they incorporate, denoting the population axiology with a 
subscript, axiological overpopulation for the two views are to be understood as 
follows: 
Axiological OverpopulationTotalism: self-regarding value + absence value < 0 
Axiological OverpopulationPAV: absence value < 0 
As such, on PAV, axiological overpopulation functions identically to, but is 
conceptually distinct from, social overpopulation.  
Regarding the Intuitive View, what follows is that it is much easier on PAV for the 
Intuitive View to be true.  
Let’s return to Tim, our imaginary median-age person, who is 30 and has 40 years 
to live. The self-regarding value of saving him would be 40 WALYs in self-regarding 
value and 2 WALYs in transition value. At optimum population, the absence value 
of the remaining 40 years of Dan’s life must be 0 WALYs. Thus, saving him is worth 
42 WALYs. To get to the point of strong overpopulation, the absence value of saving 
Dan would need to decrease from 0 WALYs to -42 WALYs. Recall, by contrast, that 
in order to get from optimum population to strong overpopulation on Totalism, 
Tim’s absence value had to decrease by 2 WALYs, from -40 to -42. Hence, as a 
proportion of his self-regarding value, Tim’s absence value needs to increase by 5% 
on Totalism, but 105% on PAV, for the world to move from optimum population to 
strong overpopulation. Thus, to state what is transparent, it is far more likely for the 
Intuitive View to be true on PAV. This is not to say the Intuitive View is necessarily 
true: the world could still be underpopulated or strongly overpopulated. 
73 
 
What are the practical implications of this on PAV if the Intuitive View is true? What 
remains the same is that the more valuable saving lives is, the less valuable averting 
lives is (and vice versa); what changes is that the values of saving and averting lives 
are in quite a large range. Therefore, if a PAV-advocate knew that the Intuitive View 
is true, but not how overpopulated the world is, they would not know enough about 
the value of saving or averting lives to conclude which of those two options was 
better. 
Slightly adjusting the analysis from section 4, let’s state the value of saving a median 
life and averting a life. 
Value of saving a median lifePAv = 40 + X + 2 
= 42 + X 
Where X represents the absence value. If the Intuitive View is true, X is between 0 
WALYs (optimum population) and -42 WALYs (strong overpopulation). The value 
of averting a new life, relative to the value of saving the median life is: 
Value of averting a life relative to the value of saving a random lifePAV = - 
(absence value of saving median life) * (life expectancy of new 
lives/expected remaining life expectancy of median person) 
Note this is different from the Totalism’s equivalent as, on PAV, there is a self-
regarding value in averting lives. 
Plugging in the numbers in this case, assuming a new person lives to 70: 
Value of averting a life relative to the value of saving a random lifePAV = -(X) 
* (70/40) 
= - 1.75X 
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We can combine the two equations to show what the value of saving one random life 
and averting one life would be: 
Value saving a random life and value of averting a lifePAV = 42+ X + (-1.75X) 
= 42 - 0.75X 
If X is 0 (i.e. at optimum population), the value of saving a random life is 42 WALYs 
and the value of averting a life is 0. If X is -42 (i.e. at strong overpopulation) and the 
value of saving a life is 0 and the value of averting a life is 73.5 WALYs. Thus, the 
value of averting a life at strong overpopulation is much larger than that of saving a 
life at optimum population; this is a result of the fact the averted life would live 
much longer than the saved life would. This is shown in figure 4; note the trade-off 
between the value of saving and averting lives remains. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Population size vs value of saving and averting lives on PAV; 
note the identical gradients but different scales to those in figure 2.2. 
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Suppose someone advocates PAV, endorses the Intuitive View, and recommends 
that either saving lives or averting lives is the most good one can do. Suppose, 
further, that such a person has not yet factored in the absence value of lives. 
Factoring this in would necessarily reduce the value of saving lives and increase the 
value of averting lives. By what proportion would this reduce the overall value of 
saving lives? 10%? 50%? 90%? It is important to realise that if one endorses the 
Intuitive View but cannot say with any precision how overpopulated the Earth is, 
one would not know which of saving or averting lives is better: on the Intuitive View, 
the value of one of saving or averting lives (but not both) could be zero. The more 
general point is that, regardless of whether one accepts the Intuitive View, unless 
we know the absence value of lives, we do know how valuable saving or averting 
lives is. 
A temptation here would be for such a person, in the absence of any further 
evidence, to arbitrarily pick some reduction. Perhaps they would assume we are 
halfway between optimum population and strong overpopulation. To state the 
obvious: to do this, without evidence, would be ad hoc. The prudent move would be 
to try to form some empirical-informed estimate, which is what we discuss and fail 
to do in the next section.33 
 
33 Regarding the five objections in section five, the only one that functions differently between 
Totalism and PAV, and is thus worth mentioning, is number three, the ‘SLAL’ approach. On PAV, 
SLAL is rather more appealing as it doesn’t count it as bad that the averted persons don’t get to live 
happy lives. The formula for the value of the reduction effect is as follows: 
Value of the reduction effect: value of saving a life + (RR)(value of averting a birth) 
= Self-regarding value + absence value + transition value – (RR)(absence value) 
= Self-regarding value + transition value + (1-RR)(absence value) 
If RR is 1, then the value of saving a life and averting a life is equal to the self-regarding value and 
transition value of saving one life, i.e. equal to the overall value of saving a life at optimum 
population. Again, this assumes that the saved and averted lives are of the same length. 
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7. Optimum population and population ethics 
The preceding sections have demonstrated that much turns on whether, and to what 
extent, the world is in fact under- or overpopulated. In this section, I argue (perhaps 
disappointingly) that determining this is complicated—too complicated to tackle 
here—and it is not at all clear what the reality is. There are two parts to this claim. 
First, I show how the relevant time span to consider, when we are thinking about 
population size, turns on which theory of population ethics is correct. Second, I 
sketch some ways of assessing optimum population and show it is non-obvious what 
the reality is from either a near- or long-term perspective.  
How optimum population is assessed will depend on which population axiology is 
used. Totalists hold all possible lives matter and are therefore concerned in principle 
about the ‘long-term’, i.e. effects on this and all future generations. By contrast, on 
PAV, at least prima facie, we are concerned only about the people who currently 
exist and those future persons that will exist, whatever we do.34 On the plausible 
assumption that our actions now will eventually change the identities of everyone 
who ever lives, and that the number of people who will exist ‘whatever we do’ is 
relatively small compared to those who currently exist, PAV is, in effect, primarily 
focused on the ‘near-term’, i.e. the effects on the current generation.35 
 
34 I note this is not the only type of PAV to choose from and not all will be concerned only with the 
‘near-term’. In addition to the considerations given below, see the next chapter, particularly section 
3. 
35  Derek Parfit (1984) at ch. 16 (convincingly) argues that the people who will get born will be altered 
if the parents meet and have children at even slightly different times – a different sperm and egg 
combination will meet and so a genetically different person will be born. Clearly, you would be 
someone else if you had different genetics. Even small changes will ‘ripple’ through society and 
eventually change all future identities. To aid the disbelievers he offers (on p. 361) the following: 
parenthetic remark “It may help to think about this question: how many of us could truly claim, ‘Even 
if railways and motor cars had never been invented, I would still have been born’?” 
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I say ‘prima facie’ regarding PAV because, as noted, many advocates of PAV endorse 
the ‘procreative asymmetry’, according to which the addition of unhappy lives 
makes the world worse (the ‘first conjunct’), while the addition of happy lives does 
not make the world better (the ‘second conjunct’).36 An ‘asymmetric’ PAV is one 
which accepts both conjuncts of the procreative asymmetry; a ‘symmetric’ PAV 
rejects the first conjunct, i.e. adding lives (happy or unhappy) does not make the 
world go better or worse. Totalism is an example of a view which rejects the second 
conjunct.  
While symmetric PAVs will focus on the near-term, this is not necessarily true for 
asymmetric PAVs. What complicates matters is there are two ways of cashing out 
the procreative asymmetry when it comes to adding a ‘mixed bag’ of lives, i.e. where 
some will be happy and others unhappy. On the ‘strict’ version of the asymmetry, 
we ignore the happy lives in this mixed bag and count the unhappy lives. Parfit 
argued this would lead to what he called the ‘Absurd Conclusion’ that it would count 
it as bad to add a billion happy lives and one unhappy life to the world; the strict 
view is remarkably, indeed implausibly, strict.37 There could be many unhappy lives 
there could be in the future—particularly if we expand our thinking to include non-
human animals as well as animal. The strict view will hold all these unhappy lives 
matter. Hence what happens over the long-term is very important on the strict view 
(just as it is on Totalism). The difference is the strict view will aim just at reducing 
the quantity and increasing the quality of the unhappy future lives.  
 
36  For discussion see e.g. McMahan (2009). 
37  Parfit (1984) pp. 132.   
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On a ‘neutralising’ version of the asymmetry, when we add a mixed bag of lives, the 
happy lives can ‘cancel out’ the unhappy lives, in the sense that the happy lives 
reduce the extent to which the unhappy lives make the world go worse.38 We can 
suppose, for definiteness, this works as follows: if the sum of well-being of the 
additional lives is neutral or positive, adding them is neutral in value; if the sum of 
well-being of the additional lives is negative, adding them is negative in value (and 
further, the negative value is equal to the sum of (negative) well-being). Thus, the 
addition of a billion happy lives and one unhappy life would be counted as neutral 
in value (unless the unhappy life was a billion or more times worse than the average 
happy life was good).  
What does this view imply? Suppose you expect the future to be sufficiently good 
that, whatever you do, you cannot reduce the sum of well-being of the additional 
lives to such an extent that it becomes negative. In this case, you are axiologically 
impotent regarding additional lives—you cannot make things go better or worse as 
it pertains to them.39 The neutralising asymmetric PAV would then function, in 
practice, identically to a symmetric PAV—the focus, insofar as one aims to do good, 
is on lives in the near-term. If, on the other hand, the value of the additional lives is 
negative and you can do something to reduce the sum of negative well-being, then 
you will not only be concerned with the near-term. I take no stand on what the 
future looks like or whether we can affect it: my point is only to observe that, on the 
neutralising version of the procreative asymmetry, the time-frame that is relevant 
is sensitive to such further considerations. 
 
38 Frick (2017) endorses such a view, calling it the ‘principle of holistic neutrality’. 
39 A perverse implication of this is that it would count as neutral to reduce the sum of well-being in 
the mixed bag by e.g. swapping some good lives for bad lives, so long as the overall bag was not 
negative in well-being.  
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We now come to the second part of the section—whether and to what extent the 
Earth is under or overpopulated, given one is taking a near- or long-term 
perspective. When faced with a tricky problem, a standard way to make progress is 
to make some simplifying assumptions and see where that gets us. What I do here 
is to introduce a couple of relatively simple models for assessing this question and 
show it’s unclear on either of these where we are in relation to optimum population 
(from either the near- or long-term perspective). I then point out the second model 
is still far too simple—it omits various important considerations and their inclusion 
does not make the answer to the question at hand any clearer. 
If we want to get our teeth stuck into the issue of optimum population, a reasonable 
place to start is by assuming that the Earth is overpopulated if and when it exceeds 
its ‘carrying capacity’: the maximum population size (of a given species) that an 
environment can support indefinitely (or, at least, for the foreseeable future). If the 
limit is exceeded, the death rate must eventually increase by, for example, famine 
or war to bring the numbers back down.40 Given the suffering involved, we might 
expect a wide consensus on different ethical views that it is best that the Earth’s 
population avoids going over this limit (assuming it is not already above it). 
As Greaves points out, citing a survey by Cohen, the issue with appealing to the 
carrying capacity arguments is that there is a distinct lack of consensus on what the 
carrying capacity is: of Cohen’s survey of 65 estimates, half lie in the 5-14 billion 
people range, and a third are above 20 billion.41 Of course, if one expects the Earth’s 
population to grow ad infinitum, one would worry we will eventually hit this 
 
40 A further issue is whether exceeding carrying capacity does or does not lead a permanent reduction 
in the maximum number of lives supportable by the environment. For simplicity, I set this to one 
side.  
41  (Greaves, forthcoming) at 3.1 cites Cohen (1995) Ch 11. and Appendix 3. 
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‘ceiling’, whatever it is. However, it seems unlikely that the Earth’s population will 
increase very dramatically. As countries develop, people have fewer children. In all 
European countries, fertility is now below the long-term replacement rate—the 
number of children per woman required to maintain population levels—of around 
2.1 children per woman; in many European countries it has been below this rate for 
decades.42 While 21% of the world’s population was in societies with below 
replacement fertility rates in 1975-80, this figure is estimated to be 69% by 2045-
50.43 Extrapolating this suggests that the population will eventually stabilise and 
then decline, rather than increase indefinitely. From UN estimates, it seems that the 
world’s population will probably come close to its peak around 2100 at just over 11 
billion people.44  
Hence, to make the case we are or will crash into the carrying capacity ceiling, one 
would need to get ‘into the weeds’ of the estimates and show a lower estimate that 
is more plausible. As Greaves also points out, making sensible arguments here is 
tricky. This is because, as she notes, carrying capacity is not fixed, at least for 
humans, but depends instead on the ability of technology to support a larger 
population by, e.g. developing a more efficient farming method to avoid famine. 
While one might think that technological development is independent of population 
size, on a ‘Boserupian’ view of innovation—named after the economist Ester 
Boserup—a larger population size causally leads to improved technology.45 On this 
view, necessity is the mother of invention, and it is exactly the pressures that larger 
populations put on society which cause the inventions that allow carrying capacity 
 
42  United Nation Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2017) at p6. 
43 Ibid, p7. 
44 Ibid, figure 2 at p2. 
45  E.g. Boserup (1981). 
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to increase. Accounting for the Boserupian view implies carrying capacity is higher 
that we would naively expect; however, it does not mean we should ignore the 
environmental degradation larger populations cause or that there is no limit to 
carrying capacity. 
Leaving aside these complexities, even if we could nail down the Earth’s carrying 
capacity, this is, at most, only one part of the puzzle. Near-termists won’t necessarily 
mind that we are or will be hitting the ceiling—the problems may befall later 
generations who are deemed to be morally unimportant. Equally, long-termists 
could have reasons for exceeding carrying capacity—perhaps a larger population 
means a larger economy which, in turn, makes it easier to colonise the galaxy, 
something that is plausibly of enormous value. More generally, both near- and long-
termists will care not just about the quantity of supportable lives—which is what 
carrying capacity refers to—but the combined quantity and quality of those lives. 
This brings us to our second type of model, an economic one that accounts for the 
relationship between population size and well-being levels. To get this going, let’s 
grant or note the following. First, well-being is a function of (at least) 
consumption.46 Second, individuals produce and consume resources (and 
consumption is a function of production). Third, the average resources produced 
per head follows something like an inverted-U shape. To explain the third 
assumption, the idea is that at low levels of population, economics of scale are not 
possible—a certain population size is needed to support valuable specialised 
professionals, e.g. doctors, engineers, metaphysicians, etc. However, at very high 
levels of population, diseconomies of scale emerge: certain resources, such as land, 
 
46 It need not be a function only of consumption, but assuming this would further simplify things. 
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run out; pollution and congestion become problematic; and so on. What follows is 
that each additional person produces some resources, consumes some resources, 
and (presumably) experiences positive well-being. Maximum well-being among the 
‘momentary’ population (those existing over a given ‘short’ timeframe) will be 
reached when these factors balance—the additional person converts the resources 
they consume into the same sum of well-being that this person removes for others 
by reducing their average consumption. (Recalling the earlier discussion, this is 
merely a different way of saying the self-regarding value of the life and the absence 
value are both equal and opposite.) 
While it is not necessary to get into the details here, it’s possible to construct a 
mathematical model using these assumptions on which, if one knows (a) the 
‘production function’, the relationship between population size and production and 
(b) the ‘consumption function’, one can assess the relationship between 
consumption and well-being, these numbers can be crunched to determine which 
population would be optimal to maximise the total well-being of the momentary 
population.47 The major problem here is that we need to supply the production and 
consumption functions as inputs to the model. Determining what these are is a 
complicated empirical question, one that, as far as I know, no one has yet tried to 
tackle and I am unable to undertake here. I note that tackling it involves assessing 
some of the problems raised in the previous model about how population size affects 
the environment and technological development. 
 
47 See (Greaves, forthcoming) footnote 14 for such number crunching. The population that 
maximised average well-being could also be calculated, but that is not our concern here. 
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Even this model does not capture all the considerations that seem relevant to long-
termists. It captures the momentary optimum population, when what is wanted is a 
model of optimum population across all generations. Long-termists will likely want 
to ensure that (a) humanity does not become extinct and (b) it colonises space.48 It 
is not clear how one would connect the economic model of population size to (a) or 
(b) or, if one did, whether a larger or smaller population would be better.49  
Where does this leave us? In short, it’s unclear whether the Earth is under or over-
populated on either a near or long-term perspective. 
At least, this is the case if we only count the impact that humans have only on other 
humans. What’s been left out of the analysis so far is the impacts humans have on 
non-human animals, notably those that are caused to exist in factory farms by the 
demand for meat and may well have unhappy lives—this was the subject of the 
previous chapter. 50 Given how difficult it is to estimate the sign and magnitude of 
the effect of humans on humans, a temptation is to ignore this and consider the 
easier-to-estimate impacts on animals. While this is tempting, doing so would leave 
us open to accusations of quantification bias, as illustrated by the old joke about the 
person looking for her keys under the lamppost, not because that’s where she lost 
them, but because that’s where the light is (and thus the only place she can look). 
It’s unclear how reasonable it is to ignore factors which we accept might be very 
 
48 For an expression of such a view, see Bostrom (2003), Greaves and Ord (2017), (Beckstead, 2013). 
49 Let’s illustrate this regarding space colonisation. A smaller population would seem on the one hand 
to be better: it would cause less environmental strain and allow us to survive within Earth’s ecological 
limits for longer, and provide us with more time to perfect space-faring technology; on the other 
hand, a larger population would mean a larger economy, and thus more resources would be available 
for space-faring projects. 
50 There’s also the question of the well-being of wild animals, which is too complicated to discuss 
here. For a discussion of this, see e.g. Tomasik (2015) who argues there is large net negative well-
being in nature. 
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large but we know neither the sign nor magnitude of, and just account instead for 
factors we believe are potentially rather small. It seems we should invest our 
resources in trying to understand the effects that humans have on other humans—
increasing how far the lamppost’s light shines, as it were. 
While making progress on this question is complicated, it does not seem vastly more 
complicated than other complex modelling exercises, for instance in macro-
economics or climate science. This seems (yet) another case where further detailed 
research is required. As Greaves notes at the end of her analysis of optimum 
population, the ‘more research, please’ cliché is at least slightly more interesting in 
this case than it normally is: participants in debates on population size either take 
it to be obvious that the Earth is overpopulated or regard discussions of this issue to 
be morally inappropriate.51 In fact, the answer here isn’t clear and we would very 
much like one to make progress on important practical questions, such as how 
valuable it is to save or avert lives.  
8. Conclusion 
This chapter began with the observation that many people hold what I called the 
Intuitive View—saving lives is good and, as the Earth is overpopulated, averting lives 
is also good—and that the Intuitive View is in internal tension. I expanded Greaves’ 
work on this topic. I argued that, on Totalism, the Intuitive View is unlikely to be 
true and, if it is, neither saving lives nor averting lives would seem to be a high 
priority if we want to do the most good. I then argued that, on PAV, the Intuitive 
View is far more likely to be true and that, if it is, the values of saving lives and 
averting lives are in fact wide ranging. The obvious question to ask, given the 
 
51 (Greaves, forthcoming) at section 4. 
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importance of the effects of population size, is whether and to what extent the Earth 
is under- or overpopulated. I conclude, following Greaves and adding further 
reasons, that it’s not obvious what the sign or magnitude of the other-regarding 
effects of extra human lives is. Further work is required here.
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Chapter 3: Are you sure saving lives is the most good you can do? 
0. Abstract 
Many people believe that, if we want to do as much good as possible with our money, 
we should donate to effective charities that save lives. I set out four commonly-held 
but not exhaustive views of the value of creating and ending lives (such accounts are 
a combination of a population axiology with an account of the badness of death). 
For each view, I argue that, if we look just the self-regarding value of saving lives—
and thus ignore the other-regarding impact of doing so—it is not obvious that saving 
lives is the best option. This non-obviousness results either from there being an 
alternative to saving lives that seems, at the first pass, to be more cost-effective, or 
because making comparisons is not straightforward. The overall conclusion is that, 
despite the intuitive appeal of saving lives, there are probably not many people who, 
if they reflected further on the empirical facts, would conclude, by the light of their 
own axiology, that it is the most good they can do. 
1. Introduction 
If we want to do as much good as possible with our money, one plausible thought is 
we should be using it to save lives. More specifically, the suggestion is that we should 
give to charities that provide cheap, effective health interventions in the developing 
world which primarily prevent the deaths of young children. I will use ‘saving 
children’ to refer to this specific method of preventing premature deaths, and 
‘saving lives’, to denote to preventing premature deaths in general.1 Singer and 
MacAskill emphasise the opportunity to save children, suggesting it is a leading 
 
1 To illustrate, an approach to saving lives that I do not have in mind is donating to charities that 
provide more swimming pool lifeguards. 
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altruistic option.2 Singer even called a recent book The Life You Can Save.3 For 
many years, GiveWell, a charity evaluator, claimed the Against Malaria Foundation 
(‘AMF’) was the world’s top charity; AMF provides bednets that stop very young 
children (mostly under-5s) dying from malaria.4 According to GiveWell, by giving 
to AMF, donors can save a (statistical) life for about $4,500.5 GiveWell estimate 
that, of the roughly $100m or so of donor money they moved towards their top 
recommendations in 2017, $57m was spent on life-saving charities.6 Presumably 
many, if not most, of these donors choose to save children because they think it is 
where their money can have the greatest positive impact. 
Furthermore, not only do many people seem to think it is true that saving lives (one 
way or another) is the most good you can do, they also seem to think this is obviously 
true. I have been surprised at how often, if I suggest something might be more 
valuable than saving lives, I encounter what David Lewis called ‘the incredulous 
stare’, followed by words to the effect, “Hold on. Surely it’s better to save lives.”7 
The last two chapters serve to indicate saving lives is not obviously good, let alone 
obviously the most you can do, when we account for other-regarding effects of 
saving lives—the impact this has on everyone apart from the saved individual; 
specifically, the attention in the previous chapters was on the potentially negative 
impact that humans have on non-human animals (through creating unhappy 
 
2  Singer (2015) MacAskill (2015) 
3  Singer (2009) Admittedly, this may be a matter of marketing – Promoting the Good would have 
been a much less emotive title.  
4  In the period 2011 to 2016. See GiveWell (2019c) 
5  See GiveWell (2019b), ‘Nets’ tab. 
6  GiveWell (2018b) 
7 Lewis (1986) This reaction is more plausible if we suppose it is capturing a normative, deontological 
intuition that we ought to save lives, even when we could bring about an alternative option that was 
more valuable (in terms of consequences).  
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animals for food) and on other humans in wider society (by putting pressure on 
available resources, i.e. what is normally referred to as a worry about 
‘overpopulation’).8 However, presumably those who do think saving lives is the most 
cost-effective option were focusing primarily on the self-regarding value of saving 
lives—the value solely related to the person whose life it is. They may also consider 
the loss to the ‘near and dear’, such as parents, suffer when a child dies—which is an 
other-regarding effect—a reason to save lives too. I suppose this provides the far 
weaker reason to save lives: the loss to the child seems far greater than the loss to 
everyone else combined (a point discussed in both of the previous chapters). 
The next natural question to investigate, then, is whether saving lives—specifically, 
saving children—is the top beneficent option on what we might call the 
‘conventional analysis’ of the issue; that is, if we just consider the self-regarding 
value of saving the children. As such, the conventional analysis leaves out all other-
regarding effects. Investigating this question is of both theoretical interest and 
practical importance. Even if we thought accounting for various other-regarding 
considerations meant saving lives could not be the best option, it would still be 
intriguing and surprising if saving children turned out not to be the most good on 
the conventional analysis. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, the sign and 
magnitude of the other-regarding effects are not only unclear but hard to ascertain. 
Hence, unless and until we are confident the other-regarding effects were large and 
negative enough to rule out saving lives as a possible top option, this question is still 
relevant for practical purposes.  
 
8 I note considerations of optimum population need not refer just to the impact humans have on 
other humans, although this seems to be what is normally referred to.  
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In this chapter, I set out what seems to be the four most commonly held views that 
one might take of the value of creating and saving lives, or what I’ll call, for lack of 
a better term, a ‘view of life-value’.9 A view of life-value combines two things (1) a 
population axiology, a ranking of the value of states of affairs in terms of overall 
betterness (this is determined by specifying both (a) whose lifetime well-being 
matters and (b) how that lifetime well-being is to be aggregated) with (2) an account 
of the badness of death, a way of assigning lifetime well-being levels of individuals 
where the possible length of their life varies.10 For each view of life-value—for 
brevity, I will usually just say ‘view’—I argue it is not obvious that saving children is 
the best (i.e. most cost-effective) option. For three of the four upcoming views, this 
is because there is an alternative to saving children that seems, at first pass, at least 
to be roughly as cost-effective; for the remaining view, further specification is 
needed before it is straightforward to determine the cost-effectiveness. As noted, 
these comparisons ignore some of the other-regarding effects of saving lives, effects 
which are potentially large.11 I make an exception when considering the fourth and 
final view, where it seems relevant to briefly assess how comparatively cost-effective 
it is to save children if one were to do so solely to prevent the grief that the family 
and friends would suffer from someone dying. 
 
9 I state the views later; stating them all first, and then discussing alternatives to saving children on 
them would make the paper less readable.  
10 It would be more accurate to call this an ‘account of lifetime well-being’, rather than an ‘account of 
the badness of death’: the way I’ve stated what such an account is prejudges certain issues in the 
literature on the ‘badness of death’, such as whether the badness of death is solely in how it affects 
lifetime well-being levels. For instance, Kamm (2019) outlines three factors that might make death 
bad besides the deprivation of future goods (and thus how the deprivation of such goods would 
reduce lifetime well-being). However, as the three accounts of the badness of death that I discuss 
here are standardly called ‘accounts of the badness of death’ in the literature, I use the more familiar 
(but less accurate) locution; see e.g. Gamlund and Solberg (2019) for a representative sample of this 
literature. I am here only interested in how death affects lifetime well-being as I am trying to connect 
the analysis of the badness of death with population axiologies (where lifetime well-being is 
standardly taken as the unit of aggregation). 
11 See chapter 2.  
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I suppose that the vast majority of people will think one of the four views, or at least 
something like them, is correct. The overall, surprising conclusion is this: despite 
the intuitive appeal of saving children, there are probably not many people who, by 
the lights of their own axiology, if they reflected further on the empirical facts, would 
conclude that it is the most good they can do. As such, individuals who do currently 
focus on saving children should consider if they can do more good by putting their 
resources towards something else.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Sections 2 to 4 each introduce a view of the 
life-value and ask if saving children is the best option. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Totalist Deprivationism (TD) 
The first view of life-value combines the Totalism about population axiology with 
Deprivationism about the badness of death.12 On Totalism, the value of a state of 
affairs is the sum of lifetime well-being of everyone who will ever live.13 Importantly, 
Totalists hold creating a new life can be good/bad, and the value of doing so is equal 
to the well-being of the person who is created (assuming effects on others are equal). 
This contrasts with the other three views I discuss, which hold there is no value in 
creating new lives.14 On Deprivationism, the badness of your death is the sum of 
well-being you would have had, had you lived.15 Deprivationists will hold it’s more 
 
12 While, for simplicity, I refer only to Totalism, what I say this in section could, I think, be said of all 
population axiologies that give weight to all possible lives, i.e. Critical Level views, Variable value 
views and Averagism. For a summary of the different population axiologies see Greaves (2017) 
13 Population axiologies can (of course) include goods besides well-being. I follow the simplifying 
norm in the literature and restrict the analysis to well-being.  
14 Or, at least, no value in creating happy lives, those with net positive lifetime well-being. I return to 
this later. 
15 If more explanation is required: I take Deprivationism to hold that lifetime well-being is the 
unweighted sum of all the individual instances of momentary well-being (i.e. well-being at a time). 
As such, Deprivationism uses the same aggregation method to get from momentary well-being to 
lifetime well-being that Totalism uses to get from lifetime well-being to overall betterness. I note that 
Bramble (2018) argues there is no such thing as momentary well-being and lifetime well-being is the 
only genuine kind of well-being.  
91 
 
valuable to save a 20-year-old than the 60-year-old as the former is deprived of 
more well-being than the latter, and this is more valuable by exactly the difference 
in the sums of well-being lost. I will (unimaginatively) call this Totalist 
Deprivationism (‘TD’) 
It is not obvious, however, that saving children is the best way to do good on this 
view. One alternative is that, as TDs value all possible lives (not just the present 
generation), they should instead be putting their efforts towards preventing 
existential risks, that is, risks “that threate[n] the premature extinction of Earth-
originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential 
for desirable future development.”16 Beckstead summarises the steps in Bostrom’s 
Astronomical Waste argument as follows: 
1. The expected size of humanity's future influence is astronomically great. 
2. If the expected size of humanity's future influence is astronomically great, 
then the expected value of the future is astronomically great. 
3. If the expected value of the future is astronomically great, then what matters 
most is that we maximize humanity’s long-term potential. 
4. Some of our actions are expected to reduce existential risk in not-
ridiculously-small ways. 
5. If what matters most is that we maximize humanity’s future potential and 
some of our actions are expected to reduce existential risk in not-
ridiculously-small ways, what it is best to do is primarily determined by how 
our actions are expected to reduce existential risk. 
 
16  Bostrom (2003) Not existential risks are not the same as extinction risks: the former are a wider 
category that includes concern for non-extinction outcomes that could reduce ‘future development’. 
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6. Therefore, what it is best to do is primarily determined by how our actions 
are expected to reduce existential risk. 17 
To make the expected value of the future plain, here’s a quote from Bostrom: 
Suppose that about 10^10 biological humans could be sustained around an 
average star. Then the Virgo Supercluster could contain 10^23 biological 
humans. This corresponds to a loss of potential equal to about 10^14 potential 
human lives per second of delayed colonization.18 
Bostrom’s particular concern is the threat that emerging technologies, such as 
artificial intelligence, pose to sentient life.19 As such, so the thinking goes, those who 
care about all possible lives should focus their efforts on reducing existential risks, 
rather than anywhere else, and that includes saving children. 
To make the scenario both more concrete and less reliant on lives in the very far 
future, let’s look at the value of saving humanity if it lives only 100,000 years longer 
(a fraction of the time it could exist for). Assuming there are 7 billion people per 
century, then means 7 trillion people’s lives are at stake. Suppose there is a 1% risk 
of extinction over this century (i.e. the risk this year is 0.0001, the same the next, 
etc.), and none thereafter.20 Assume that there is some project that would cost $1bn 
per year, such as an asteroid tracking and deflection programme, and this would 
reduce the risk proportionally by 1%, thus, if we spent a billion each year this 
century, the cumulative probability of extinction declines from 1% to 0.99%.21 If we 
spent $1bn this year, that would lead to the existence of 70 million more lives in 
 
17  (Beckstead, 2013) 
18  Bostrom (2003)  
19  Bostrom (2014) 
20 This model is partially adapted from one proposed by Lewis (2018) 
21 (Beckstead, 2013) ch.3 argues asteroid deflection would be more valuable that ‘proximate benefits’ 
e.g. saving children, but does not offer a quantified comparison. 
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expectation. Assuming that the expected value of financial contributions is linear, 
then, if we scale the numbers down, $10,000 put towards an existential risk 
reduction organisation would create 700 lives, in expectation. 
According to GiveWell, the Against Malaria Foundation saves, in expectation, 
slightly more than 2 lives of under-5-year-olds for $10,000.22 Let’s assume for 
simplicity this save two lives and saving these lives is as good, in terms of the 
individual value related to those lives, as creating 2 new people that live their entire 
lives. Assuming, again for simplicity, all human lives now and in the future have the 
same lifetime well-being, then preventing existential risks—‘saving humanity’—
seems to be over 300 times more cost-effective than saving children. 
At the first pass, then, saving children does not seem the most cost-effective option 
on this view. That suffices for our purposes, hence a longer discussion is outside the 
scope of this analysis.23 
3. Person-affecting deprivationism 
In this section, I assess the importance of saving children on a view that combines a 
Person-Affecting View about population axiology with Deprivationism (about the 
badness of death). Call this combined view Person-Affecting Deprivationism 
 
22  GiveWell (2019a) 
23 Briefly though, I note that advocates of saving children would need to take issue with premises (1) 
or (4) from Beckstead’s summary. If the value of the future is very small – say, we expect future 
lifetime well-being to be on average zero after this generation – or we think we are powerless to 
change the value of the future, the, we should focus on doing good in the near-time, i.e. the lifetimes 
of humans alive today; saving children may well be the best candidate here, although this still isn’t 
obvious, as I discuss in the next sections. If we can make substantial changes in the value of the 
future, it seems Totalists will think they should do that, even if the expected value of the future looks 
very bad. A further option would be to suggest we should revise our use of expected value in situations 
where there are low probabilities of very high stakes effects, so-called ‘Pascal’s Mugging’ scenarios. 
For discussion of these, see e.g. Bostrom (2009) 
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(‘PAD’). I’ll explain what this view is and then compare the cost-effectiveness of 
saving children to saving (non-human) animals. 
Person-Affecting Views that hold, when evaluating states of affairs in terms of their 
overall betterness, a subset of all possible people are deemed ‘extra’, in the sense 
that their welfare does not matter (or matters for less) when assessing overall 
betterness. Different Person-Affecting Views are characterised by who counts as 
‘extra’.24 I will drop the inverted commas from ‘extra’ hereafter. 
Prominent examples of Person-Affecting Views are Presentism (only presently 
existing people matter), Actualism (only actually existing, as opposed to merely 
possible, people matter), and Necessitarianism (the only people who matter when 
deciding between outcomes are those who exist whatever we choose to do). Each of 
those three views, as stated, has the important implication that there is no value in 
creating new lives: a hypothetical person we are considering creating does not 
presently exist, will not actually exist (if they are not created), and does not (given 
the choice context) necessarily exist. 
The following analysis is not sensitive to a choice between the three examples above, 
so I will simply use talk of a ‘Person-Affecting View(/s)’ without specifying any of 
three.25 
 
24 This conception of Person-Affecting Views and the use of the word ‘extra’ is taken from (Beckstead, 
2013).  
25  The ‘Harm-minimisation’ theories are another type of Person-Affecting View. The basic idea is 
that, when considering different possible states of affairs, the amount of (comparative) harm an 
individual suffers in a given state of affairs is equal to how much worse off they are in that state than 
the one where they had maximum well-being. The best state of affairs is the one where there is the 
lowest comparative harm, which is summed over all the people who exist in that state of affairs. Such 
views function along the lines of the asymmetric Person-Affecting View that I mention momentarily 
in the text. For simplicity, I do not discuss them separately. See Greaves (2017) at section 5.3 for a 
brief, (critical) discussion and further references. 
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Person-Affecting Views can be as asymmetric, on which people who have lives that 
would not be worth living are not considered extra. Symmetric Person-Affecting 
Views hold that whether a life is worth living or not does not affect whether it is 
extra or not.26  
We need to attach a theory of the badness of death to our (generic) Person-Affecting 
View. In this section, we combine a Person-Affecting View with Deprivationism 
about the badness of death to get Person-Affecting Deprivationism (PAD). In the 
next two sections, we combine Person-Affecting Views with different accounts of the 
badness of death, which I will explain when we get there. 
What might be better than donating to saving children on PAD? I consider two 
options (1) reducing extinction risks, (2) saving animals. These are, of course, not 
the only alternatives.  
 
26 There are further distinctions to draw. The following two seem standard and are used by e.g. 
(Beckstead, 2013) at p. 75. First, between views that are strict (extra people do not matter) versus 
moderate (extra people carry some weight, but less than those who ‘matter’ fully). Second, between 
narrow vs wide versions of Person-Affecting Views, where on the latter, extra people are not 
discounted. This standard distinction doesn’t seem right; there seems to be no relevant distinction 
between strict and narrow views – in both, extra people do not matter. Hence, the distinction should 
be between strict/narrow views, moderate views, and wide/(loose?) views, where the views can be 
understood as points on a spectrum of how much extra people matter, which ranges from ‘not at all’ 
to ‘fully’.  
The other issue is we have not drawn a distinction between views that hold, when discussing which 
people matter, and whether ‘people’ refers to the people de re or the people de dicto. This is crucial 
for Necessitarianism. For a ‘de re Necessitarian’, the people who matter are the specific individuals 
who will exist whatever choice is made. In effect, for reasons discussed later in section 3.2, only 
present people matter. For a ‘de dicto Necessitarian, the people who matter are those who will exist, 
whoever they happen to be. While de dicto Necessitarians will not think creating new people matters, 
they will want to increase the well-being of the future people, whomsoever they are, and will think 
that what matters is what happens to future generations. Importantly, a de dicto Necessitarian is 
different from a Wide (version) Necessitarian – only the latter of the two holds that creating new 
people matters. I am not aware this distinction has been made before. Note that the de re/de dicto 
distinction makes little sense on Presentism (the de dicto and de re present people as the same set of 
individuals) or Actualism (the actual people de dicto are the same as the possible people). To clarify, 
for simplicity, I will be using strict, de re Person-Affecting Views. (Bader, forthcoming) advances 




3.1 Existential risks 
Given reducing extinction seems more cost-effective than saving children on TD, a 
natural thought is whether this is also the case for PAD. The argument for the 
importance of extinction risk reduction on TD was based on the huge value that 
results in future generations existing. On Person-Affecting Views, what happens to 
these future generations is of no concern—they consist in non-present, 
(presumably) non-necessary and, if they do not exist, non-actual people.27 However, 
on PAD, it would be bad if everyone died now from some catastrophe, as that would 
deprive the current generation of the goods of life. Is extinction risk reduction a 
plausibly cost-effective alternative to saving children on PAD? 
I am only aware of one attempt to crunch the numbers on this, which is by Gregory 
Lewis.28 Lewis’ model takes as inputs the fact there are 7.6 billion people on Earth, 
the worldwide mean age is 38 and worldwide life expectancy is 70.5. Thus, he states 
the ‘naïve’ loss if everyone died tomorrow would be 32.5 years per person on 
average, meaning the total loss is 247 billion life-years. He uses the same numbers 
as we had before regarding the risk of extinction (1% this century, uniform by year) 
and the tractability of existential risk reduction ($1bn a year over a century reduces 
the existential risk from 1% to 0.99%).29 On his model, the ‘cost per life-year’ is 
$9,200.30  
 
27 At least, this is the case on strict de re Person-Affecting View. For instance, wide Person-Affecting 
View will care about future generations. See 26 for further explanation.  
28  Lewis (2018) 
29 These are identical as I used Lewis’ numbers for my earlier estimate. 
30 In fact, matters are more complicated for a theoretically interesting but practically unimportant 
reason. Lewis models the cost-effectiveness of the intervention as being the same each year, i.e. 1 
year from now, 10 years from now, etc. However, on Person-Affecting Views, only a subset of all 
possible matter: the present, necessary, or actual people. The further away an event occurs from 
now, the fewer of these people will exist; hence, the further in the future in event occurs, the less 
valuable it will be, ceteris paribus, as the ‘pool’ of people who matter shrinks. This is easiest to see 
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By comparison, AMF is estimated to save an under 5-year-old child’s life for about 
$4,500.31 Assuming such a child is 2.5 and would live a further 60 years, the ‘cost 
per life-year’ for AMF is $75. 
Lewis concludes that while existential risk reduction “compares unfavourably to 
best global health interventions, it is still a good buy: it compares favourably to 
marginal cost effectiveness for rich country healthcare spending” (emphasis in the 
original).32 For comparison, the UK’s National Health Service is prepared to spend 
between £20k - £30k per QALY.33  This seems sufficient to say that saving children 
is obviously better than reducing extinction risks on PAD. 
3.2 Saving animals 
A more promising alternative to saving children on PAD is ‘saving’ animals.34 Most 
of those sympathetic to Person-Affecting Views opt for the asymmetric version. On 
the asymmetric version, preventing the existence of bad lives lived by non-animals 
will be valuable. Plausibly, the great majority of animals in factory farms live bad 
lives. Arguably, these animals could be helped very cheaply. 
 
with Presentism. Suppose money I spend now prevents an asteroid strike in 1,000 years. Given none 
of the people who presently exist now will exist then, this has no value on presentism. Suppose money 
I spend now prevents an asteroid strike in 30 years. Presentism only values the effect this has on the 
people under who will then be age 30 or old. And so on. We can see how Person-Affecting Views 
imply what we can call contingent time discounting (‘CTD’). CTD functions a bit like pure time 
discounting (‘PTD’), idea that we should reduce the value of future events by N% for every year it is 
further in the future, solely on the basis it is further in the future. I call CTD ‘contingent’ as the 
discount occurs over time but is not justified merely on the grounds time has passed. This isn’t 
practically important here saving children is already many time more cost-effective than preventing 
extinction on PAD. I intend to explore CTD in future work. 
31  GiveWell (2019b) set ‘Nets’ table. The precise figure is $4,388. 
32  Lewis (2018) 
33  McCabe, Claxton and Culyer (2008) 
34 The scare quotes reference the fact it’s questionable whether preventing something from ever 
existing counts as ‘saving’ it.  
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The Human League runs campaigns for individuals and organisations to adopt 
behaviours that reduce farmed animal suffering. According to Animal Charity 
Evaluators (ACE), The Human League spares 0.56 farmed animal life-years per 
dollar.35 These estimates are admittedly uncertain—ACE’s 90% subjective 
confidence intervals are that $1 spares between -0.84 and 6.9 life-years per dollar. 
The estimates are also quite complicated, more complicated than it would be useful 
to unpack here. Nevertheless, suppose we are prepared to take the figures at face 
value, then the same sized donation to the Human League spares about 150 animal 
years for every 1 human year that AMF saves (i.e. $0.5 vs $75 per life-year). Without 
wishing to repeat the analysis in chapter one, assuming the humans live happy lives 
and the farmed animals live unhappy ones, unless one thinks the human’s positive 
well-being is 120 times greater in magnitude than the farmed animal’s negative well-
being, the saving of animals looks to be more cost-effective.36 There is at least a case 
to be made that money spent on the animals does more good than saving children. 
What if one held a symmetric Person-Affecting View? On this, roughly speaking, the 
well-being of future entities, human or non-human, does not count. Why would this 
be the case? Suppose one donated to the Human League’s campaigns. Given the 
short life-span of many farmed animals—broiler chickens live only seven weeks—
your money would not plausibly increase the welfare of the specific animals that 
presently exist. A successful campaign would (presumably) cause different 
particular animals to be created, hence you do not help any that exist necessarily.37 
 
35 Animal Charity Evaluators (2018b) at footnote 84 provide a link to ACE’s Guesstimate (cost-
effectiveness) model of The Humane League. 
36 Or one values goods besides well-being and/or applies a pure-species and the combined change 
the ordering of cost-effectiveness. See the ‘discounting’ objections in chapter 1.2.1. 
37 This would not be the case on a de dicto Necessitarian view. See footnote 26 for an explanation.  
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That accounts for presentism and necessitarianism. According to actualism, the 
betterness relation between two alternatives depends on which outcome is actual; 
here, as you are choosing which lives become actual, actualism provides no guidance 
with respect to betterness.38 As such, on a symmetric Person-Affecting View, 
funding efforts to spare factory-farmed animals does not look valuable.  
Arguably, however, on a symmetric Person-Affecting View, it would be better to 
donate to animal shelters rather than save children. The symmetric PAD will hold 
that animals which currently exist matter.39 Donating to animal shelters to help, e.g. 
cats and dogs find homes instead of being put down, will count as valuable and, 
given Deprivationism, will hold that the value is the sum of well-being the animals 
would have if they lived.  
Now for some numbers. ACE estimates that $1,000 given to animal shelters saves 
seven animal lives.40 Let’s suppose the animals in question are dogs and cats and 
would live 8 more years if they were re-homed. For $3,500 then, it seems you’d 
saved 196 years of animal life. Compare this to AMF, which for $4,500, we supposed 
saved 60 years of human life. Echoing the analysis about farmed animals, someone 
who thought that cats/dogs had levels of well-being not much lower than that of 
 
38 The actualism violates the condition of ‘axiological invariance’ condition: that the betterness 
relations between two alternatives should not depend on which alternative is actual. This is indeed 
puzzling and many philosophers have taken this as being a decisive reason to reject actualism. For 
discussion of this (and the related condition of ‘normative invariance’) see Broome (2004) p.74 and 
Bykvist (2008) 
39 Present lives are also necessarily both necessary and actual lives.  
40 According to Animal Charity Evaluators (2018a) this is the cost for an animal shelter to rescue a 
cat or a dog. It’s not clear what the counterfactual of these costs not being met is—would the animal 
die on the streets, be put down, or perhaps something? I looked at the website of several animal 
shelters they all claimed they did not put animals down. This case may be merely hypothetical (“If 
one could donate to an animal shelter which would otherwise destroy the animal, then …”) but it is 
nevertheless an interesting hypothetical.   
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humans could reach the conclusion it’s better to donate to animal shelters. 41 This 
analysis is interesting because many animal advocates argue that, if you want to help 
animals, you should focus on factory farming rather than giving to animal shelters 
(in reality, the latter gets enormously more resources).42 However, on this particular 
view, animal shelters would be more cost-effective than factory farming, and maybe 
even than saving children.  
4. The Person-Affecting Time-Relative Interest Account (PATRIA) 
The third view of life-value is also a Person-Affecting View but swaps a 
Deprivationist account of the badness of death for the Time-Relative Interest 
Account (TRIA). I will refer to this combined view as ‘PATRIA’. I’ll motivate and 
explain the Time-Relative Interest Account and say why making cost-effectiveness 
comparisons on this view is problematically arbitrary. 
On TRIA, the badness of death is a function of (a) the well-being that a person would 
have had if they’d lived (as with Deprivationism) and (b) the strength of the 
psychological connection that person has to their later self.43 Whilst Deprivationism 
and TRIA agree it’s better to save a 20-year old than an 80-year old, they disagree 
on whether it’s better to save a foetus or a 20-year old. On TRIA, it’s better to save 
the 20-year old, despite the fact the foetus will (all else being equal) have 20 years 
more life to live, as that foetus will be greatly psychologically different from its later 
self.44 As Nils Holtug explains: 
 
41 The dogs I’ve known seem happier than the average human, but not the cats. I note that proponents 
of Mill's (1861) higher/lower pleasures distinguish may well think it is “better to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied” but it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this topic.  
42  Animal Charity Evaluators (2016) 
43  See Liao (2007), McMahan, (2002, 2015) 
44 It is an open question as to exactly which of the psychological relations matter: it could be memory, 
personality, or something else. 
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After all, foetuses and infants usually have rather simple psychologies and 
thus few of the preferences, memories and character traits they will acquire 
later in life. Assuming an appropriately large discount rate, then, the Time-
relative Interest Account implies that the 20-year-old will actually have a 
stronger interest in survival than the infant or foetus has.45 
There are questions both about how exactly this view is formulated, and whether it 
should be understood as a view of the badness of death. As Greaves states, when 
deciding how valuable saving a life is on TRIA, we need to know: 
precisely which person-stages [i.e. the moments of a person’s life] count? 
Are the relevant time-relative interests, for instance, only those of present 
person-stages (‘presentism’)? All actual person-stages (‘actualism’)? All 
person-stages who will exist regardless of how one resolves one’s decision 
(‘necessitarianism’)? All person-stages who would exist given some 
resolution of one’s decision (‘possibilism’)? Or something else again? 
(emphasis in original).46  
Greaves goes on to argue that both the presentist and actualist person-stage 
versions of TRIA are implausible (for reasons that need not detain us here) and 
suggests TRIA is not capturing the axiological badness of death, i.e. how bad it is in 
terms of final value, but rather our emotional reaction to how bad it seems when 
someone dies at different ages. This strikes me as correct.  
However, even if this view is somehow confused, it is still useful to try to understand 
the implications it would have on the question to hand. Many people, when thinking 
 
45  Holtug (2011) 
46  Greaves (2019) 
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about the value of saving children, discount the value of saving children’s lives 
relative to those of adults, because of TRIA-like reasoning. GiveWell, a charity 
evaluator, explicitly includes a discount for saving those under-5 vs over-5 years old 
in their cost-effectiveness model in.47 So we will push on. For our purposes, it is 
sufficient to use the present-stage version of the view. 
 
Figure 3.1. Value on TRIA of saving lives at different ages 
Schematically then, on TRIA, the value of saving lives that are presently of different 
ages looks something like the curve that is represented in figure 3.1. It is more 
important to save those in their 20s/30s. Younger people will not be so 
psychologically connected to their later selves; older people will have relatively 
greater psychological stability but have less time left to live. 
 
47 See GiveWell (2019a) at the ‘Moral Weights’ tab. Different GiveWell staff members have confirmed 
(personal conversation) that members of their organisation value saving under-5s less than over-5s 
as a result of TRIA-type concerns as well as the larger other-regarding effects of older deaths, e.g. the 
greater grief felt by parents.  
Value of 
saving a life 
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Two observations. First, as is already salient, TRIA discounts the value of saving 
children—they have a lesser psychological relation to their later selves than mature 
people do. Hence, saving children is far less valuable on TRIA that it is on the 
Deprivationist view.48 Of course, thoughtful TRIA-advocates who choose to save 
children will already have incorporated this; I am not claiming anything surprising 
here. 
Second, while we know saving 20-year-olds is better than saving 2-year-olds on 
TRIA (as that is the intuition the view is meant to capture), it’s unclear precisely 
how much better the former is than the latter. 10% better? Twice as good? 10 times 
as good? There seems to be plenty of room for disagreement about what the shape 
of the curve should be, and such questions need to be (somehow) settled before the 
TRIA-advocate could work how to do the most good.49 
In the previous section on PAD, we compared saving animals to saving children and 
said the former looked perhaps to be competitive with the latter. The natural 
question to ask is whether this is still the case on PATRIA. As saving children is less 
valuable than saving adults on PATRIA, we might think that saving animals’ lives is 
 
48 Hilary Greaves raises the question of whether such intertheoretic comparisons make sense, not 
intertheoretic comparison are deemed problematic in the moral uncertainty literature – e.g. see 
Bykvist (2017) There doesn’t seem a problem here: to determine the badness of death, both 
Deprivationist and TRIA take as inputs the (sum of momentary) well-being the person doesn’t 
experience by dying early. The only difference is TRIA additional applies a psychological discounting 
before determining the axiological badness of the death. Hence, it’s easier to see how, if one switched 
from being a Deprivationist to being a TRIA advocate, it would be a simple matter to rescale the value 
of different outcomes.  
49 For examples of such a disagreement, see Norheim (2019) who argues an ‘extreme’ version of 
TRIA. which holds we should save adults over children is untenable, although a more a ‘moderate’ 
one is acceptable. McMahan (2019), writing in the same volume, accepts the ‘extreme’ version. A 
further issue is that, as TRIA discounts the value of future well-being by how psychologically 
connected the present self is to that later person, this we also need the later lives of those who have 
reached adulthood: adults are not psychologically identical to their later selves either, whatever 
account of psychological connection we use (personality, memories, etc.). Hence, TRIA requires a 
further discount. As accounting for this complicates matters without changes the result, I leave it to 
the side.  
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even better on PATRIA than on PAD. In fact, matters are more complicated. As 
McMahan observes, many people think, for TRIA-like reasons, that while 
preventing animal suffering is important, altering the lengths of animals lives’ is not 
important because:  
They [i.e. animals] are not self-conscious, or are self-conscious only to a 
rudimentary degree, they are incapable of contemplating or caring about 
any-thing more than the immediate future. They do not, therefore, have 
desires or intentions or ambitions for the future that would be frustrated by 
death.50  
What seems to follow is that if one had an asymmetric Person-Affecting View and 
combined that with TRIA, sparing animals from living in factory farms would look 
relatively more cost-effective, compared to saving children, than it did on the 
asymmetric Person-Affecting View combined with Deprivationism. This is because 
saving children gets discounted but sparing bad animal lives does not. 
Matters are (even) less clear on a symmetric Person-Affecting View that is combined 
with TRIA. Those who this  view will want to discount donating to animal shelters—
there is little value in extending the lives of presently existing animals. As both 
donating to animal shelters and saving children are discounted, it is not clear, 
without specifying further details of the view (and empirical matters), which is 
supposed to be more cost-effective. 
The reader may wonder why I have not attempted a more obvious comparison 
between saving children and an alternative that improves lives by increasing the 
 
50  McMahan (2008) 
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well-being of individuals whilst they are still alive.51 In chapter 7, I compare saving 
children against treating mental health. I do so assuming Deprivationism and using 
subjective well-being (SWB) scores, where individuals say how satisfied they are 
with their life on a 0-10 scale. The issue with the comparison, as I discuss there 
(chapter 7.3.2) is whether the life-saving or life-improving interventions are more 
cost-effective (as measured by their subjective well-being impact). This is highly 
sensitive to currently arbitrary decision about where to place the ‘neutral point’ 
equivalent to non-existence on the 0-10 scale. If it’s at 5 (it’s hard to believe it could 
be any higher) then treating mental health is more cost-effective.52 If the neutral 
point is 0, saving children is perhaps seven times more cost-effective. This analysis 
is in terms of Deprivationism, and saving children is less valuable on TRIA. It’s not 
clear saving children is seven times less valuable on TRIA, and hence the saving 
children-treating mental health cost-effectiveness comparison still turns on where 
the neutral point is. 
I propose to leave matters here. I take the foregoing analysis to be sufficient to show 
it is not obvious whether saving children is the best option on PATRIA-type views. 
5. Person-Affecting Epicureanism 
The fourth and final view we can momentarily consider conjoins a Person-Affecting 
View with Epicureanism about the badness of death—we can call this ‘Person-
Affecting Epicureanism’. Named after the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus, 
Epicureanism is the position that death is not better, worse, or equally as good as 
 
51 I note I am using ‘improves lives’ here differently from how I standardly use it in the thesis. On my 
typical usage, improving lives refers to increasing happiness during a life. 
52 In fact, saving children would then be bad, given that average life satisfaction in target countries is 
sometimes below 5: see Helliwell, Layard and Sachs (2018). 
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living is for a person, regardless of how much well-being they would have had if 
they’d lived; there is no value in living a longer (or shorter) life.53 As such, what 
Epicureans will say about adding person-stages is analogous to what Person-
Affecting Views will say about adding lives to a population, which is that, in each 
case, doing so does not matter in the appropriate sense—for the former, adding 
person-stages does not contribute to lifetime well-being levels; for the latter, adding 
lives does not contribute to the overall betterness of a state of affairs. 
Without getting into the possible mechanics of this view, it’s clear that Person-
Affecting Epicureans will not think saving lives is a promising way to do good if they 
are doing the ‘conventional analysis’ of just considering the self-regarding value of 
saving lives.54 Of course, Epicureans will still hold that dying, rather than being 
dead, can be bad for me, as dying happens while I am still alive; and they will allow 
that my death can be bad for others. Epicureans will more naturally focus on 
improving lives. 
One might wonder if saving children could be the most cost-effective option for 
Person-Affecting Epicureanism, solely because it prevents bereavement-based 
suffering among the living. I propose to quickly check this with figures that I mostly 
calculate and explain elsewhere in the thesis. In footnote 23 in chapter 2.3, I 
estimate the loss of a child is at most, 4 life satisfaction point-years (‘LSPs’), where 
1 LSP is equivalent to an increase of one person’s self-reported life satisfaction by 1 
point for a year on a 0-10 scale. (I argue in chapter 4 that self-reported life 
 
53  Epicurus (2019)  
54 Epicureans seem to have analogous choice points about which person-stage matter as Person-
Affecting Views have about which persons matter – the present, necessary, or actual person-
stages/persons. The (psychologically) consistent thing for Person-Affecting Epicureans to do would 
be to make the same choice at both places, e.g. only necessary people matter and, what’s more, only 
the necessary person-stages of those people matter. 
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satisfaction scores are a reasonably proxy for happiness). Averting this loss through 
AMF would cost around $4,500. Hence the cost-effectiveness is 1.1 LSPs/$1,000. In 
chapter 7.2, I estimate that the provision of mental health treatment via 
StrongMinds, a charity working in low-income countries, is 7.4 LSPs/$1,000. 
Hence, saving children for the sake of averting bereavement-grief seems less cost-
effective than simply treating unhappy people directly via improving their mental 
health. 
Hence, (unsurprisingly) saving children does not seem to be the most cost-effective 
option on Person-Affecting Epicureanism either. 
6. Conclusion 
I’ve specified four views of life-value and suggested it is not obvious that saving 
children is the most good you can do on any of them. This is either because 
something else seems more cost-effective or as it is not straightforward to assess the 
cost-effectiveness of an alternative. I note I was only examining the self-regarding 
value of saving children–apart from in section 3.5–which was a deliberate limitation 
of the analysis. This survey does not cover all possible views of life-value, but I 
suspect the vast majority of people will think these views—or ones very much like 
them—are correct. It’s possible there is some view of life-value I have not considered 
on which saving children would be the highest impact option, but I cannot think 
what it would be. What follows is that, for most people, saving children is not (or at 
least, not obviously) the most good they can do by the light of their own views of life-
value. Hence, if they currently put their resources towards that aim, they should 




Chapter 4: Happiness for moral philosophers 
0. Abstract 
The last few decades have seen an explosion of research in the social sciences into 
‘subjective well-being’ (SWB)—self-reported measures of happiness and life 
satisfaction. Moral philosophers seem not to have taken much notice of this. 
Although MacAskill and Singer seem to both to hold well-being consists in 
happiness and draw on SWB studies in their 2015 books on effective altruism, they 
ultimately justify their charity and career recommendations by appealing to more 
conventional proxies for well-being—income and health metrics, such as Quality-
Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). I suggest four possible objections to using self-reports, 
rather than of any other metric(s), to determine what increases happiness: (1) 
happiness can’t be measured through self-reports; (2) individuals’ happiness scores 
cannot be meaningfully compared; (3) there isn’t yet enough data on self-reported 
happiness to guide our decision-making; (4) using self-reported measures is 
unnecessary as it wouldn’t change our priorities. In this chapter, I meet the first 
objection fully and the latter three partially.  
1. Introduction 
I start with some preliminary general remarks, whose relevance will shortly become 
clear. I think these are—or should be—uncontroversial. 
When we disagree about how to do the most good, the source of this disagreement 
could be over which axiology is correct—an axiology is a method of ranking 
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outcomes in terms of their final value.1 Alternatively, the source could be over ‘the 
facts’—the non-evaluative considerations of how the world is and how it will be. Of 
course, we could disagree about both. Importantly, once we’ve settled on which 
axiology we’re using, we can only disagree about the facts. For instance, imagine two 
classical utilitarians disagree about whether it would be better to do A or B. They 
agree the value of an outcome is the unweighted sum of happiness in it. Suppose, 
further, they agree that happiness is defined in a particular way as well as the 
method by which to determine which actions are better. As they entirely agree on 
matters of value, they can only be disagreeing about matters of fact. 
Suppose we haven’t measured the quantities of happiness in A or B. In this case, our 
assessment of which has more is a subjective judgement of fact, and not (as we 
might have suspected) an axiological judgement. The situation is analogous to the 
one where we’re trying to guess whether giraffes or buffaloes weigh more—it is just 
a (tricky) subjective judgement of the facts.  
It might seem odd to say that the amount of happiness there is in different outcomes 
is a factual claim, rather an axiological one. To see that it is merely a factual claim, 
note that we can try to assess how much happiness there is in various outcomes 
while at the same time holding that happiness has no value at all. There’s nothing 
 
1 We could disagree over the component parts of an axiology, namely, (a) which thing of things are 
intrinsically valuable and constitute the good(s) (e.g. well-being, equality, justice, etc.), (b) how to 
aggregate the goods to determine the overall value of a state of affairs (unweighted sum, priority-
weight sum, ‘maximin’, etc.), and (c) who the value-bearers of these goods are (e.g. all possible 
people, present people, necessary people, etc.). The first two components are individually necessary 
and jointly sufficient for a fixed-population axiology. That is ranking outcomes where the number of 
people is invariant. The addition of the third component yields for a variable-population axiology, 




special about happiness here—the same would apply whichever possible intrinsic 
good was being considered.2  
If we are disagreeing about matters of fact and we can measure (or test) those facts, 
then we should take that measurement (or test) as authoritative over our subjective 
judgements. If we could weigh the buffalo and giraffe on a set of working scales, we 
would, I presume, defer to the scales. 
We now turn to the subject of this chapter, which is happiness and its measurement.  
While there is a long-running suspicion, primarily arising from economics, that 
happiness cannot be measured, this hasn’t stopped some social scientists from 
trying. Happiness research, sometimes called ‘subjective well-being’ (SWB) 
research, terms I explain shortly, is now a major enterprise with about 170,000 
books and articles published in the last 15 years.3 Policymakers are starting to take 
note: the UK government has been measuring SWB since 2010; the OECD, an 
economic organisation comprising mostly wealthy countries, suggested in 2013 that 
its member-states should do likewise.4 This increasing interest is driven, at least in 
part, by the belief among advocates that measuring happiness is serious science. 
While philosophers generally believe that increasing happiness is good (intrinsically 
or instrumentally), they have taken little interest in this burgeoning field of 
happiness research so far. A few philosophers of science have written a few pieces 
on whether happiness can be measured.5 The response from moral philosophers has 
 
2 Assuming the good can be quantified.  
3  Diener, Lucas and Oishi (2018) 
4 ONS (2018), OECD (2013) 




been even more muted.6 In their recent books on effective altruism, William 
MacAskill and Peter Singer claim (or imply) that happiness is the only intrinsic good 
and draw on SWB studies.7  However, both primarily justify their suggestion that 
global poverty is the priority by appealing to more established proxies for happiness, 
such as standardised health metrics, e.g. Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs) and 
income.8 Their particular charitable recommendations are largely drawn from the 
research of GiveWell, a charity evaluator, which also largely relies on these same 
‘conventional’ metrics (as opposed to research on SWB).  
In light of what has been said so far, it should be clear that the question of what 
increases happiness is factual, once axiological matters are settled. If it were solely 
an axiological question, philosophers could (perhaps) safely ignore the social 
scientists’ activities.9 As it is, if the social scientists are correct about the facts, then 
moral philosophers, insofar as they want to make recommendations about how to 
increase happiness, should base their recommendations on that evidence, assuming 
it is practically feasible. Of course, if the social scientists are mistaken, then their 
efforts to collect and use such evidence are misguided (and someone should let them 
know). 
 
6 It’s unclear if moral philosophers have written on this topic at all. 
7 Singer (2015) p98 writes “something is a sacrifice if it causes you to have a lower level of well-being 
or, in a word, be less happy”. MacAskill (2015) p45 seems to equate well-being with subjective well-
being, of which happiness a component. I return to subject well-being in section 2. In personal 
communication (2017-2019) and in a public lecture (Oxford, 22nd May 2017) Singer has commented 
he is now a hedonist; MacAskill (personal communication) states he is very sympathetic to 
hedonism, although does not have 100% credence in the view. 
8 For use of happiness studies, see Singer (2015) p98 and MacAskill (2015) p27. MacAskill, op. cit. 
p44 says he will mainly use QALYs as a metric for well-being. Singer, op. cit. pp. 130 uses QALYs and 
Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) to make various trade-offs.   
9 Angner (2013a) argues that Fred Feldman holds the view that empirical research is not relevant to 
philosophical conclusions and that Feldman is both mistaken and an outlier in this regard.  
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What objections might someone raise to relying solely (or, at least, primarily) on the 
subjective well-being research to determine what would increase happiness? There 
seem to be four.  
First, the measures of happiness used in social science are not valid, that is, they do 
not succeed in capturing the underlying phenomenon they aim to capture. A slightly 
weaker version of this objection is that they are valid only sometimes and hence 
cannot be fully relied on. 
Second, individuals’ self-reported happiness score cannot be meaningfully 
compared or aggregated. Hence, we can’t use self-reports to tell us what increases 
the sum of happiness and have to turn instead to other methods. More technically, 
the concern is about whether the scales are interpersonally cardinal—that a one-
point increase on a (say) ten-point scale for one person represents the same increase 
in SWB for anyone else. 
Third, there isn’t enough available evidence on happiness to work out what the 
practical implications are even if we wanted to, hence we must rely on other proxies. 
Fourth, it’s unnecessary to start using the empirical happiness research because it 
wouldn’t change our priorities anyway. 
Neither Singer nor MacAskill explain why they draw on SWB data but don’t 
ultimately base their suggestions on them. Hence, it’s unclear which of the 
objections they find plausible. I suspect the truth of the matter—and the most 
charitable conclusion, is that some combination of the four is at play. Angner 
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suggests the objection among philosophers more broadly is that philosophers do not 
think happiness is measurable.10  
In this chapter, I aim to meet the first objection entirely the latter three partially. 
Here is the prospectus. Section 2 sets out the relationship between happiness and 
SWB and proposes, in light of the comparative scarcity of evidence on more 
theoretical ideal measures of happiness, that measures of life satisfaction are a 
suitable proxy for happiness—this helps respond to the third objection.  
Section 3 and 4 draw us into the philosophy of science. Section 3 argues that the 
social scientists have been getting it right—they are succeeding in measuring 
happiness. I explain and defend the background theory in the philosophy of science, 
‘construct validation’, on which SWB can, in theory, be measured. I then present the 
evidence demonstrating that current SWB measures are, in fact, ‘valid’, that is they 
succeed in measuring what they aim to measure. My reasoning here is not original. 
I will be restating arguments made by philosophers of science and social scientists. 
However, these arguments are usually made in isolation: philosophers tend to say 
why happiness could, in theory, be measured without offering the evidence that 
supports the claim that our current measures are, in fact, satisfactory;11 social 
scientists tend to do the reverse, offering the supporting facts without fully 
explaining their relevance.12 My aim is to conjoin these arguments to give a 
comprehensive, but brief, account of why happiness can be and is being measured. 
 
10  Angner (2013b) 
11  Examples of this see Angner (2013b) and (Alexandrova, 2016) 
12  And for examples see Dolan and White (2007) and Diener, Inglehart and Tay (2013) 
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Section 4 addresses the concern about interpersonal cardinality of the self-reports; 
this topic does not seem to have attracted much discussion. I identify six conditions 
which are jointly sufficient for interpreting the ‘raw’ SWB scores as ‘universally’ 
interpersonally cardinal—I explain the words in inverted commas in the section 
itself. I then offer an initial assessment of each condition. Some of these seem highly 
plausible. For others, we cannot put all our doubts to rest and I identify what further 
work is needed. I follow this up by arguing that, if the raw scores are not cardinal, 
we can make them cardinal by applying the appropriate mathematical 
transformation. Hence, if there is a lack of cardinality this is not, in principle, a 
problem. I propose we should assume the raw scores are cardinal unless and until 
new evidence suggests they are not—they seem at least roughly cardinal and there 
doesn’t seem to be a particular transformation we could apply that would take the 
raw scores closer to cardinality. 
Section 5 takes the initial steps required to reply to the third and fourth objections 
and launches us from the philosophy of science into applied ethics. I observe that, 
if we look at the evidence on happiness, mental health suddenly stands out as a 
major problem; one not mentioned by Singer or MacAskill or, indeed, effective 
altruists more broadly. I suggest this result is somewhat unsurprising when we 
consider how QALYs underweight the badness of mental illness. That a potentially 
major problem seems to have been missed seems good cause to re-evaluate what 
our priorities are if we want to do the most good and the means we should use to 
determine them. The next two chapters pick up the issue of prioritisation 
methodology. 
Section 6 concludes.  
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2. Happiness, subjective well-being, and measurement 
In this section, I distinguish between happiness and SWB, discuss how those 
concepts are usually measured, and explain why life satisfaction scores are a suitable 
(if not theoretically ideal) proxy measure of happiness. 
I define happiness as a net balance of pleasant over unpleasant experience and, as 
such, understand it in a familiar Bethamite way.13 I follow Crisp in holding that 
happiness is uni-dimensional, in that all sensations can be put on a single scale of 
pleasantness.14 I assume there are no higher/lower pleasures.15 Hence, the only two 
components to happiness are intensity (how pleasant/unpleasant something feels) 
and duration (how long the sensation lasts). Following Edgeworth, I think that a 
theoretically ideal measure of happiness would be the ‘hedonimeter’, which would 
measure the pleasantness of the subject’s moment by moment experiences.16 If we 
could plot a person’s happiness at each moment, their total lifetime happiness 
would be the sum of all the individual moments.17  
Philosophers have offered other definitions of happiness. The alternatives seem to 
be life satisfaction18 (happiness consists in having a favourable attitude towards 
one’s life as a whole), the emotional state view19 (roughly, happiness consists in a 
propensity for being in a good mood), and ‘pro-attitudes’20 (roughly, happiness 
 
13  Bentham (1789) 
14   See Crisp (2006) For criticism of uni-dimensionality, see e.g. Nussbaum (2012).  
15  Mill (1861) is the original advocate the higher/lower pleasures distinction. 
16  Edgeworth (1881) 
17 This rules out, for instance, weighting the moments of your death more heavily than earlier 
moments of your life, or supposing that later moments of your life can retrospectively reduce how 
much happiness you experienced earlier. 
18 Sumner (1996) If happiness did consists in life satisfaction, the later claim—self-reported life 
satisfaction being a good proxy for happiness—would be almost trivially true.  
19  Haybron (2016) 
20  Feldman (2010b) 
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consists in a cognitive endorsement of various aspects of one’s life, rather than in 
net pleasant experiences). It is beyond the scope of the chapter to evaluate these 
alternatives. For the sake of argument, I assume the view I stated. That said, it is 
unclear if choosing an alternative definition of happiness would alter the practical 
conclusions discussed in section 5. 
‘Subjective well-being’ (SWB) is a term used in social science—primarily, economics 
and psychology—as an umbrella phrase to refer to ‘ratings of thoughts and feelings 
about life’ and it comprises distinct components.21 An important distinction is 
typically made between evaluative measures of SWB— judgements made  by the 
respondent about how their life (or some part of it) is going —and hedonic measures 
of affect—these capture respondents’ (non-evaluative reports of their) feelings or 
emotional states. Affect is sometimes split into positive affect and negative affect, 
which can each be measured separately and have different determinants.22 The 
former refers to pleasant emotions, such as joy, contentment and elation, the latter 
to unpleasant emotions, such as sadness, fear and anxiety. A further distinction is 
sometimes made between, on the one hand, evaluative and affect measures, and, on 
the other, eudaimonic measures, which capture a sense of meaning and purpose in 
life, or psychological functioning.23 In what follows, I will only discuss the first two 
more standard measures—evaluative and hedonic. A number of different measures 
for each of these components have been proposed, some of which are mentioned 
momentarily; a fuller discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter.24  
 
21  Dolan and White (2007) 
22  Diener et al. (1999) 
23 E.g. see Dolan and White (2007), OECD (2013). Distinguishing the eudaimonic component of SWB 
from the other two is somewhat tricky. After all, you could judge your life as meaningful as well as 
feel a sense of meaning. 
24  See OECD (2013) Annex A for a list.  
117 
 
What is the relationship between SWB and happiness? Often, the terms ‘SWB’ and 
‘happiness’ are used interchangeably. This is not only technically incorrect but also 
misleading. On the earlier understanding of happiness, happiness consists in 
affect.25 However, the evaluative component of SWB captures a judgement, namely 
of how people feel about their lives, rather than an experience. Hence SWB 
comprises both the experiences of happiness and evaluations of life. I will use SWB 
when referring to both the affective and evaluative components; otherwise, I refer 
to specific components or measures by their names. 
The ‘gold standard’ for measuring the affective component of SWB—i.e. happiness—
which seems the closest currently available instrument to Edgeworth’s 
hedonimeter, is the experience sampling method (ESM).26 On this, participants are 
prompted to record how good/bad they are feeling at that particular moment one or 
more times a day and what they are doing. An alternative affective measure is the 
day reconstruction method (DRM), where participants break their previous day into 
episodes—a bit like scenes in a movie—and state their feelings and activities in each 
one.27 The theoretical advantage of the ESM over the DRM is that it does not require 
participants to remember how they felt, which is significant in light of research 
showing how error-prone our memories are.28 
 
25 More specifically, the pleasantness part of affect—affect is often split into ‘valence’ (i.e. 
pleasantness), ‘arousal’ (i.e. excitement), and motivational intensity (the urge to move to/from a 
stimulus). Harmon-Jones, Gable and Price (2013) 
26 Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1987) Potentially, at some future stage, happiness could be 
measured via brainwaves, which would be closer than ESM to Edgeworth’s hopes for a hedonimeter. 
27  Kahneman et al. (2004) 
28 Kahneman et al. (1993) famously demonstrated the ‘peak-end’ rule, demonstrating we do not 
remember the average intensity of experiences, and memories are skewed by the most intense and 
final moments. See Kahneman et al. (1993). 
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Most of the literature on SWB has focused on life evaluations, more specifically on 
measures of overall life satisfaction.29 Life satisfaction is usually found by asking, 
“How satisfied are you with your life nowadays?” on a scale from 0 “not at all” to 10 
“completely”. There are two explanations behind the greater comparative focus on 
life evaluation measures. The first is practical: it is simply much easier to collect data 
on life evaluations than on experiences. Participants usually answer questions about 
life satisfaction in less than 30 seconds and it can easily be included in existing 
population surveys.30 By comparison, the ESM and DRM require more work from 
respondents—the former is intrusive and the latter takes respondents about 40 
minutes to complete.31 The second reason is moral. Life evaluations are sometimes 
thought by economists to be a measure of ‘decision utility’ (what people choose to 
do). Economists have historically taken this to be of greater moral importance than 
‘experienced utility’ (how life is experienced, i.e. happiness).32  
There is now a wealth of data on life satisfaction. It has recently become possible to 
say (a point that I return to in section 5) to what extent various outcomes tend to 
cause an absolute increase in life satisfaction on a 0-10 scale, which is what we need 
in order to determine cost-effectiveness.33 By contrast, to the best of my knowledge, 
there is insufficient research on affect measures to draw the same conclusions. 
In light of this, my suggestion is to use life satisfaction scores as a ‘proxy’ for 
happiness. A proxy measure is one that is thought to track the item of interest that 
can be used when a more direct measure is unavailable. For a measure to be a good 
 
29 Boarini et al. (2012) p8. 
30  ONS (2011) 
31  Kahneman et al. (2004) 
32 The terms ‘decision utility’ and ‘experienced utility’ are from Kahneman and Krueger (2006) 
33 See Clark et al. (2018) If all we knew what that outcome X increase happiness, but not by how 
much it increases happiness, we cannot undertake cost-effectiveness.  
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proxy, it must have a close correlation with an item of interest. Use of proxies is 
standard and uncontroversial: for instance, it has been common to use GDP-per-
capita or health metrics, such as Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs), as proxies 
for well-being. As noted earlier, Singer and MacAskill rely on such proxies.34 
The question of how life satisfaction compares to income and health metrics as a 
proxy for happiness is postponed until section 5. Here, I set out some evidence that 
life satisfaction is a reasonable proxy for happiness.  
Across countries, Diener et al. find a medium correlation (0.55-0.62) between life 
evaluation between affect balance using two different life evaluation measures.35 At 
the individual level, Kahneman and Krueger find a moderate correlation (0.38) 
between life satisfaction and net affect.36  
Boarini et al. find that affect measures have the same broad set of drivers as 
measures of life satisfaction—for instance, both are positively correlated with 
income, being employed, being in better health, being more educated, being 
married, having friends to count on, and feeling safe walking alone.37 However, the 
relative importance of some factors changes. For instance, a given change in income 
has 40% of the impact on affect than it has on life satisfaction and feeling safe 
walking alone has twice as big an impact on affect as life satisfaction. These findings 
are broadly consistent with other analyses of the difference between the 
determinants of life evaluation and affect.38 
 
34 See footnotes 7 and 8. 
35 These are life satisfaction and the Cantril Ladder, see Diener, Kahneman, et al. (2010). 
36  Kahneman and Krueger (2006) 
37  Boarini et al. (2012) 
38 E.g. Diener, Kahneman, et al. (2010); Kahneman and Deaton (2010) 
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Deaton and Stone identify some cases where the measures are at odds, noting that 
the affect measures vary on the days of the week, improve with age, and respond to 
income only up to a threshold.39 However, evaluative measures are correlated with 
income, even at high levels of income, are often U-shaped with age, and do not vary 
over the days of the week. 
What the above demonstrates is that affect and life satisfaction measures do 
generally go together. Hence, we can use the latter as a substitute for the former. 
However, some caution is still needed: the measures differ in the degree to which 
different things matter and sometimes whether those things are positive or negative. 
Therefore, if we use life satisfaction as our proxy for happiness when making cost-
effectiveness assessments, we need to keep in mind whether, and to what extent, the 
proxy will foreseeably send us ‘off course’ and then correct for that accordingly. 
3. Measuring happiness 
There are long-standing doubts in economics about whether happiness can be or 
needs to be measured. According to Layard: 
In the eighteenth century Bentham and others proposed that the object of 
public policy should be to maximise the sum of happiness in society. So 
economics evolved as the study of utility or happiness, which was assumed 
to be in principle measurable and comparable across people […] All these 
assumptions were challenged by Lionel Robbins in his famous book On 
the Nature and Significance of Economic Science published in 1932.40 
 
39  Deaton and Stone (2013) 
40  Layard (2003) at p2. 
121 
 
Robbins argued that there is no way to measure the magnitude of different 
individual’s satisfaction with different outcomes. Even if introspection allows 
person A to say how they feel, “[i]ntrospection does not enable A to discover what is 
going on in B’s mind, nor B to discover what is going on in A’s.”41 Further, Robbins 
asserted that economics is the science of behaviour “imposed by the influence of 
scarcity” and in order to study that, it is only necessary to observe revealed 
behaviour and assume individuals have a stable set of preferences, not to measure 
how people feel.42 Hence, without the ability or need to measure happiness, 
happiness was out and preferences were in. 
Angner suggests philosophers have absorbed these historical doubts from 
economics and the idea that happiness cannot be measured has since then become 
widespread in philosophy.43  
However, as noted (section 1), despite these historical doubts, the last few decades 
have seen a cascade of research on SWB within the social sciences.  
This and the next section both discuss important methodological concerns about 
the measurability of happiness and draw us into the philosophy of science. In this 
section, I explain both the psychometric approach to measurement that proponents 
of SWB measures rely on and why SWB measures are deemed satisfactory, 
according to that approach. The next section focuses on whether the SWB measures 
have interpersonal cardinality. My arguments in this section are largely unoriginal, 
as the measurement of SWB is now an extremely well-trodden terrain and I am able 
 
41 Robbins (1932) at p. 124  
42 Robbins (1932) at p. 16. 
43 Angner (2013b) cites Crisp and Chappell (1998) and Fehige and Wessels (1998) as representatives 
of this view. 
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to draw on an extensive literature. Nevertheless, this is normally an argument of 
two halves: philosophers of science tend to say why SWB can, in theory, be 
measured but do not explain the evidence supporting the conclusion that it is, in 
fact, being measured; social scientists tend to marshal the evidence without 
explaining why this shows happiness is successfully being measured. Although 
happiness is the item of primary interest, I will generally talk about SWB (happiness 
and life satisfaction) as the same concerns about measurement apply to both. 
As Alexandrova (a philosopher of science) observes, social scientists, when pushed 
by philosophers of science on why they think SWB can be measured, will appeal to 
construct validation.44 On the psychometric approach to measurement, you assume 
there are various constructs, which are particular attributes or phenomenon, such 
as intelligence, personality, or well-being. These constructs are latent, i.e. not 
directly observable. You also assume that there are measures, which are ways to 
elicit the observable indicators of the construct. To check if the measures are valid— 
that is, successfully measure the underlying constructs—social scientists engage in 
a process of construct validation, where the measure of the construct is tested to 
ensure that it behaves in the way we think it should, given the researchers’ existing 
understanding of the topic. Alexandrova notes that social scientists do not just 
declare their measures to be valid: it is obligatory to subject their measures to a 
battery of tests to validate them—more on this shortly.45 The results need to be 
looked at in the round: it is too hasty to discard a measure if it has some counter-
intuitive results but the measure, in general, behaves sensibly—perhaps there was a 
measurement error or, on further reflection, the counter-intuitive result is correct. 
 
44 Alexandrova (2017) at p. xliv.  
45 Anna Alexandrova (2016) p. 133. 
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This is perhaps analogous to philosophers accepting that true theories can have 
counterintuitive implications. 
Angner suggests the suspicion among philosophers and economists about the 
measurability of happiness rests on the fact happiness is not directly observable.46 
However, he points out that latent constructs can be measured on the psychometric 
approach, so this does not provide an objection, in principle, to measuring 
happiness. Angner does not offer an argument for the psychometric approach, 
saying: 
It is of course in principle possible that these psychologists, economists, and 
medical personnel are all mistaken, and that things like attitudes, preference 
satisfaction, and blood pressure are impossible to measure even in principle, 
but I take this possibility to be too remote to be worth considering.47 
As far as I can tell, philosophers of science have no in principle objection to the 
construct validation approach on which the psychometric theory of measurement 
relies.  For instance, Alexandrova and Haybron claim is it a defensible approach to 
measurement: “[it] follows a coherentist spirit according to which measures are 
valid to the extent that they cohere with theoretical and empirical knowledge about 
the states being measured”.48 
Philosophers of science have raised different concerns. I’ll briefly mention these 
worries and argue they are not particularly problematic for our purposes. 
 
46  Angner (2013b) 
47  Ibid. at p. 232. 
48 Alexandrova and Haybron (2016) at p. 1099. 
124 
 
Angner raises the objection that well-being might not consist in SWB, but in 
something more Aristotelian in character, and hence it is mistaken to say measures 
of SWB measure well-being.49 This is not an issue here: we are trying to answer the 
question of whether purported measures of happiness do measure happiness, which 
is distinct from the question of what well-being consists in. While I am very 
sympathetic to hedonism (well-being consists in happiness) and welfarism (well-
being is the only intrinsic good), I do not argue for those here, nor is doing so 
necessary for the point at hand. It’s worth noting that a great many non-hedonists 
will, in practice, want to increase happiness; this is because either they consider it 
is one of—although not the only—constituent of well-being or it is deemed 
instrumentally valuable for increase well-being.  
Alexandrova and Haybron’s concern is that attempts to measure well-being are 
theory avoidant: they do not engage in enough philosophical theorising. They raise 
two specific concerns.50 First, that social scientists will often attempt to argue that 
A rather than B is a better measure of well-being because A correlates better with 
various factors, e.g. income or good governance, than B does. They object—quite 
correctly—that the question of which is the right measure of well-being should be 
settled with reference to our best theory of what well-being is, rather than by 
appealing to the evidence.51 This, similarly, is not a problem if we’ve already decided 
that we are focusing on happiness.   
Their second concern is that social scientists let statistics, not theory, determine 
what the correct measures are in the first place. For instance, PANAS, a popular, 
 
49  Angner (2013b) 
50  Alexandrova and Haybron (2016) 
51  Feldman (2010a) makes a similar point, citing several cases where social scientists have mistakenly 
taken empirical evidence to settle conceptual matters. 
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20-item affect questionnaire, asks subjects whether they feel enthusiastic, 
interested, excited, proud, alert, attentive, etc. This list was reached by factor 
analysis, a statistical method which sorts out how many different clusters of items—
‘factors’—account for variance in the data and then shrinks the list to the most 
central. They note that certain states which are presumably important for well-being 
are left off this list, e.g. ‘serenity’, whereas unimportant ones, e.g. feeling ‘alert’, are 
left on. They say the use of factor analysis allows investigators to avoid the “hard 
theoretical questions about […] which states are most relevant to well-being”.52 They 
don’t state this, but the implication is that social scientists should be prepared to 
stipulate what goes into the questions on the basis of axiological concerns, rather 
than let a statistical method (e.g. factor analysis) mechanically determine this.  
This concern is slightly problematic. It means that multi-item measures, which we 
might take as a measure of a given construct (i.e. happiness or life satisfaction) 
might not be as accurate as a more theoretically ‘finely-tuned’ multi-item measure. 
However, it is only slightly problematic. This is because it is not at all obvious that, 
if we wanted to maximise (a component of) SWB, these changes would be 
substantial enough to produce a different ranking of priorities (i.e. policy A is more 
cost-effective than policy B). Hence, while this is not altogether unimportant, is 
seems less crucial, as we shall see later, than, e.g. whether to use SWB data at all. .53 
What follows is that we can and should use SWB data, but be mindful of what might 
change if these measures were more theoretically finely tuned. We should not let the 
best be the enemy of the good. 
 
52 Alexandrova and Haybron (2016) at p. 1106.  
53 Also, as their concern is with factor analysis, this only applies to multi-item measures and not to 
single item measures. Hence, it wouldn’t apply to life satisfaction or affect measures, such as the 
ESM, where individuals are just asked to report how good/bad they feel.  
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Now we’ve accepted construct validation in principle, the next step is to marshal the 
evidence that advocates of SWB measures give for saying those measures are of high 
quality in practice. This topic has been extensively reviewed elsewhere and the aim 
here is just to convey the main points.54 
In assessing the quality of a measure, the two characteristics that need to be 
evaluated are validity, the extent to which a measure captures what it is supposed 
to measure, and reliability, the extent to which measures give consistent results in 
identical circumstances (i.e. have a high signal-to-noise ratio). Reliability is 
necessary but not sufficient for validity. If I have a set of bathroom scales that 
produces a random number every time I step on them, they are not a reliable 
measure of anything. Suppose, next, I have a working set of bathroom scales but 
use them instead as a measure of height. They will be reliable—they give the same 
scores, assuming my weight does not change—but are not valid—they do not 
measure height. Reliability is more straightforward to test as this can be done 
statistically. Validity, on the other hand, is an evaluative judgement with no single 
test: we have to assess whether the measure behaves in the way we expect it to; this 
is why we have to look at the sweep of evidence.55  
Before we turn to the relevant evidence, there are three more things to say about 
validity. First, it is evaluated for a particular measure. As we are interested in two 
constructs—affect and life evaluations—the aim is to show that measures of affect 
and life evaluation are valid measures of affect and life evaluation, respectively. 
Second, validity is not an all-or-nothing concept, but comes in degrees. Hence, 
 
54 See e.g. Diener, Lucas, et al. (2010); Diener, Inglehart and Tay (2013); OECD (2013) 
55  Diener, Lucas, et al. (2010) at p. 75 
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different measures of the same construct may differ with respect to their validity: 
we might think the experience sampling method has higher validity, as a measure 
of happiness, than the day reconstruction method. Third, assessing validity is an 
iterative process. To check validity, we start by testing the hypotheses that are most 
central to the measure. If the measure gives implausible results, we may declare the 
measure invalid. If it passes, we go on to test more peripheral matters. If the 
measure gives us unintuitive results here, it is no longer obvious whether we should 
revise our original theory or assume instead that our theory was correct and the 
measure invalid. Hence, we need to demonstrate that the measure gets intuitive, 
unsurprising results in central cases before we can rely on it to investigate other 
areas. 
Reliability is usually tested in two ways: by internal consistency—whether the items 
within a multi-item scale correlate, or different scales of the same measure correlate 
—and by test-retest reliability, where the same question is given to the same 
respondent more than once at different times. To illustrate the concept, imagine we 
have a hundred imperfect mercury thermometers, we think some are broken and 
want to know which ones. One thing we would do is find out which thermometers 
are giving the same score. Another is to see if they keep giving the same score when 
it’s equally hot (as opposed to, say, altering at random). Reliability is tested for 
statistically using correlations. Correlation is a matter of degree—it is between 0 and 
1—and whether correlation is sufficient is a matter of whether it measures the 
standards of social science. 0.7 is generally considered to be the acceptable level; 
although we would expect lower levels of reliability for affect, given we expect mood 
to change quite frequently.  
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Regarding life evaluations, Bjornshov finds a correlation of 0.75 between life 
satisfaction and the Cantril Ladder (an alternate measure of life evaluation) in a 
sample of more than 90 countries.56 Test-retest results for a single item life 
evaluation measure tends to yield correlations of between 0.5 and 0.7 for a time 
period of 1 day to 2 weeks.57 Michalos and Kahlke report that a single-item measure 
of life satisfaction had a correlation of 0.65 for a one-year period and 0.65 for a two-
year period.58  
Regarding affect measures, Diener et al. state that the positive, negative, and 
affective balance subscales of their Scale of Positive and Negative Experience 
(SPANE) have Cronbach’s alphas (a measure of internal correlation) of above 0.8.59 
Krueger and Schkade report test-retest correlations of 0.5 and 0.7 for a range of 
different measures of affect over a 2-week period.60  
Hence, the measures are deemed reliable enough—they are not just picking up 
‘noise’.61  
We turn to validity. Although this cannot be assessed by simple statistical tests, that 
does not mean we cannot sensibly evaluate it. As mentioned, we have to assess the 
evidence in light of our best theoretical understanding of the construct at hand. 
There is a number of different types of validity.62  
 
56  Bjørnskov (2010) 
57  Krueger and Schkade (2008) 
58  Michalos and Maurine Kahlke (2010) 
59  Diener, Wirtz, et al. (2010) 
60  Krueger and Schkade (2008) 
61  For example, OECD (2013) discusses the evidence and reached the conclusion (at p46) the 
measures are sufficiently reliable.  
62 OECD (2013) list three types at p47.  
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First, face validity—do respondents judge the questions as an appropriate way to 
measure the construct of interest? In the case of SWB measures, it is somewhat 
obvious this is the case, e.g. asking people whether they felt sad yesterday is a good 
way to assess whether they felt sad yesterday. Participants aren’t generally asked 
about face validity, but this can be tested by (a) response speed and (b) non-
response rates: if people either take a long time to respond or don’t answer, it 
suggests they don’t understand the question.63 Median response times for SWB 
questions are around 30 seconds for single item measures, suggesting the questions 
are not conceptually difficult.64 Non-response rates for life satisfaction and affect 
were about the same as for measures of educational attainment, marital and labour 
force status, suggesting that people find those questions to be as comprehensive as 
the ones about SWB.65  
Second, convergent validity—does the item correlate with other proxy measures for 
the same concept? Kahneman and Krueger list the following as correlates of both 
high life satisfaction and happiness: smiling frequency; smiling with the eyes (the 
“unfakeable smile”); rating of one’s happiness made by friends; frequent verbal 
expressions of positive emotions; the happiness of close relatives; self-reported 
health.66 An association between stress hormone cortisol and happiness has been 
found: those in bottom quintile of affect had 32% more cortisol than those in the top 
quintile.67 None of this is supposed to be surprising—these are the sort of things we 
would expect SWB to correlate with. 
 
63 OECD (2013) at p. 45-6. 
64  ONS (2011) 
65  OECD (2013)  
66  Kahneman and Krueger (2006) 
67  Steptoe, Wardle and Marmot (2005) 
130 
 
Third, discriminant validity—whether measures that are supposed to be capturing 
different things are, in fact, measuring the same construct. Our background theory 
is that life evaluations and affect are distinct concepts. Hence, if our measures of 
both gave the same results, we would conclude both measures were measuring the 
same construct (although we wouldn’t know which one). This was already discussed 
in section 2 when we assessed whether life satisfaction and affect have different 
correlates and noted they did: to give one example, people report higher affect on 
the weekend but not higher life satisfaction. This is what we might expect: people 
enjoy their weekends more, but this doesn’t change their evaluation of their life as a 
whole. 
Fourth, construct validity—whether the measure performs in the world the way 
theory would predict. This is the main test of validity. The previous three types of 
validity can be seen as preliminary steps to indicate the measure could be expected 
to capture the phenomenon of interest: for instance, affect measures could have face 
validity but nevertheless have entirely implausible associations. A range of facts 
supports construct validity for SWB measures. 
Kahneman and Krueger report that intimate relations, socialising, relaxing, eating 
and praying are all associated with higher levels of positive affect; conversely, 
commuting, working and childcare and housework are associated with low levels of 
net positive affect.68 Higher incomes are associated with higher life satisfaction and 
affect—up to a certain point—all around the world, at both the individual and 
country level.69 Health status, social contact, education and being in a stable 
 
68  Kahneman and Krueger (2006) 
69  Jebb et al. (2018) 
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relationship with a partner are all associated with higher levels of life satisfaction.70 
Life satisfaction successfully predicted suicidal ideation and suicide rates 20 years 
later in a Finnish survey.71  
Looking around the world, the countries’ life satisfaction is as we might expect. 
Stable, wealthy, well-governed countries come top: Finland, Denmark, and Norway 
lead the ranking with an average of around 7.5/10. War-torn poor states do badly: 
South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Afghanistan are the bottom three with 
an average of about 3/10.72  
Major life events, such as unemployment, marriage, divorce and widowhood, are all 
shown to result in long-term, substantial changes to SWB, as shown in figure 4.1. 
These data are found by tracking the individuals in a cohort over time and 
controlling for other variables. The changes are not permanent—with the exception 
of unemployment, individuals eventually seem to adapt and return to their pre-
event level of SWB.73 The thought is that, as we would expect, people eventually get 
used to most life events, but unemployment continues to feel bad because it is 
associated with lower status. 
 
70 Dolan, Peasgood and White (2008)  
71  Koivumaa-Honkanen et al. (2001) 
72  Helliwell, Layard and Sachs (2019) 




Figure 4.1. Lags and leads in life satisfaction in response to life events.74 
Figure 4.2. shows that individuals only adapt somewhat to disability.75 Prima facie, 
it is counter-intuitive for people to adapt even partially, and this is sometimes taken 
 
74 Reproduced from Clark et al. (2008) p. 235. 
75  Clark et al. (2018) 
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as an argument against the validity of the measures. On reflection, partial 
adaptation is not so surprising: becoming disabled (e.g. losing the ability to walk) is 
a major shock but the state of being disabled, while worse than being non-disabled, 
is not as bad at becoming disabled. This is because one’s aims, habits, and mindset 
adapt. One might doubt if individuals are adjusting how they use their scales while 
their actual SWB remains flat—this issue is picked up again in section 4. 
 
Figure 4.2. Adaptation to disability in different country datasets.76 
One finding that is often used to suggest that the SWB measures are invalid is the 
so-called ‘Easterlin Paradox’—the finding that while richer countries are more 
satisfied than poorer countries, and richer people in given countries are more 
satisfied, overall satisfaction seems to be broadly stable over time, at least in the 
developed world. This is displayed in figure 4.3. 
 




Figure 4.3. Change in subjective well-being and GDP/head over time.77 Dots are 
life satisfactions/happiness, lines are GDP/head   
A critical response to SWB measures could be made as follows: “the Easterlin 
Paradox shows increasing overall economic prosperity doesn’t increase SWB. But 
it’s obvious increasing overall economic should raise SWB. Therefore, the SWB 
measures must be wrong”. 
However, such a response is too quick. First, the debate contin ues over whether the 
Easterlin Paradox holds: Stevenson and Wolfers argue it does not, Easterlin et al. 
reply.78 Second, as Clark notes, a large body of research has found that individual 
SWB depends not just on the individual’s own income, but also their income relative 
 
77  Figure from Clark et al. (2018) at p. 41. 
78 Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), Easterlin (2016) 
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to that of the reference group they compared their income to.79 Thus, if I am 
wealthier than you, I should expect to have higher SWB. However, if my income 
rises, but the income of those I compare my income to also rises, these effects are 
cancelled out, leaving my SWB unchanged. Hence, when we apply some additional 
theoretical understanding—in this case accounting for social comparison—the 
results from the measures are no longer so counter-intuitive.80  
Overall, on the construct validation approach, the case that the two types of SWB 
measures—life evaluations and affect—do measure what they set out in a very 
compelling way. 
Before I moved on the comparability of SWB scores, it’s worth noting that even if 
the measures are generally good, it does not follow they are flawless. Further, the 
fact there are some measurement issues is not sufficient to declare the scales invalid: 
if your bathroom scales gave you an implausible result, you would not thereby 
conclude from this that measuring weight is impossible. Regarding SWB, much has 
been made of studies which have found that seemingly irrelevant factors—such as 
finding a coin, being asked about your love life or your satisfaction with politics right 
before reporting your SWB—affect the results.81 However, it’s important to point out 
that the impact of such factors is relatively limited and has not been borne out by 
the wider literature. Diener et al. state that 60-80% of variability in life satisfaction 
is associated with long-term factors and the remainder with occasion-specific issues 
 
79   Clark (2016) 
80 Peter Singer raises the question of whether, if the Easterlin Paradox holds, it implies governments 
should not try to increase GDP. Increasing GDP can be indirectly useful: governments can raise more 
in taxes and use them to fund well-being increasing services. What would follow from the Easterlin 
Paradox is that governments should not expect that increasing GDP will, by itself, increase well-
being.  
81 Schwarz and Strack (1999), Deaton (2012), Tourangeau, Rasinski and Bradburn (1991) 
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and measurement errors.82 When large populations are surveyed, random errors 
will wash out. Such issues can also be minimised through careful survey design, 
although discussion of this is outside the scope of this chapter.83 
4. Comparing happiness 
This section focuses on the issue of whether the scale on which SWB is measured 
can be assumed to be interpersonally cardinal; that is, whether a 1-point increase 
in SWB for anyone will be equivalent to a 1-point increase for anyone else.84 This 
topic is important because if our aim is to maximise SWB, we need to know how 
much better off we can make different people, which requires interpersonal cardinal 
comparisons of SWB. Despite the importance of this issue, as Kristoffersen 
observes, it rarely seems to be discussed explicitly: researchers tend to either treat 
the data as ordinal or cardinal and conduct different statistical tests as a result, 
without articulating their assumptions for doing so.85 At present, there seems to be 
confusion about exactly what one needs to believe in order to accept self-reported 
SWB scores are interpersonally cardinal.86,87 
To make progress, I do three things in this section. First, I set out the conditions 
which are jointly sufficient for the truth of: 
 
82  Diener, Inglehart and Tay (2013) 
83  See OECD (2013) and Pavot (2018) 
84 Equivalent in the sense of representing the same magnitude of change in the underlying 
psychological state being measured. 
85 Kristoffersen (2011) p103-4 provides a list of a dozen or so papers where the authors treat the 
scales as either cardinal or ordinal without specifying why. 
86 For instance, Van De Deijl (2017) conflates the discussion of two separate conditions—
intrapersonal interpersonal cardinality and interpersonal intercultural cardinality—in his 
discussion.  
87 To be clear, here, I am not concerned about whether well-being has a cardinal structure. I will be 
assuming the components of subject well-being have cardinal structure and asking, given this, 
whether the self-reported subjective well-being scores are interpersonally cardinally comparable. 
For a discussion of well-being cardinality, see e.g. Broome (2004) ch5. 
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The Raw, Universally Cardinality (RUC) thesis: ‘raw’ self-reported SWB 
scales are ‘universally’ interpersonally cardinal. 
By ‘raw’ scores I mean the unadjusted numbers that people give—I’ll come back to 
this in a moment. ‘Universally’ refers to the scales being comparable between people 
across different cultures and times. To explain this specification, note that one 
might think (say) that the scales are interpersonally cardinal in a given culture at a 
given time, but not across cultures or times. Whereas we might not need the scales 
to exhibit universal cardinality if we only wanted to make, e.g. intracultural 
comparisons. As it is the strongest version of cardinality that we would ever need, it 
is useful to see if it obtains. 
Second, having set out the conditions, I evaluate whether each condition is, in fact, 
met and thus if the RUC thesis is true. As noted previously, SWB itself is 
unobservable, which means we can’t directly test for cardinality. Nevertheless, we 
can shed light on the plausibility of each condition through theoretical arguments 
and empirical tests. I confess I am unable to show, as it were, beyond all reasonable 
doubt, that RUC is true. For two conditions, the relevant evidence seems missing 
and the best we can (currently) do is some less-than-fully-satisfactory armchair 
theorising. I suggest what further work is needed. 
Third, I consider what we should do if RUC is false. My proposal is that if one thinks 
the raw scores are not universally interpersonally cardinal, all one needs to do is 
perform the appropriate mathematical transformation such that the transformed 
scores will be universally interpersonally cardinal. Hence, worries about RUC are 
not, in principle, an objection against relying on SWB decision-making (assuming 
one would have used SWB data if RUC has been true). 
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Fourth, I suggest we assume RUC is true, at least until new evidence proves 
otherwise. RUC seems approximately true (for a given, not specified, value of 
‘approximately’), and there doesn’t seem to be a particular transformation we could 
apply that would take the raw scores closer to cardinality.  
In what follows, I first set out different types of measurement scales, and then, in 
turn, make the points mentioned above. As was the case in the last section, while we 
are primarily interested in happiness, rather than life satisfaction, as almost exactly 
the same concerns arise for both we can be ecumenical and refer just to ‘SWB’. 
4.1. Units of measurement 
Units of measurement are typically grouped according to their quantitative 
properties. The standard four-fold division is as follows.88 
Nominal scales are used for labelling variables without quantitative information, for 
instance, gender or hair colour.  
Ordinal scales contain variables which have a relative magnitude, such as the order 
that runners finish in a race—1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.—but lack information about the 
relative difference between those magnitudes. Ordinal variables cannot be 
meaningfully added or subtracted from one another.89 
Interval scales contain variables which have all the features of ordinal 
measurements but, further, the difference between measurements on the scale are 
equal-interval—this is the condition for cardinality. Celsius temperate is the classic 
 
88  Edwards (1964) 
89  In the sense that this does not tell you anything about the change in underlying quantity, e.g. how 




example—the difference between each one degree of temperature is the same in 
terms of the change in thermal motion. What interval scales lack is a non-arbitrary 
zero-point on the scale—a location where there is no underlying quantity of what 
the scale measures. Celsius is an interval scale because 0 degrees Celsius does not 
mean there is no thermal motion. Ratios are not meaningful on interval scales: 10 
degrees Celsius does not have half the thermal motion of 20 degrees Celsius.  
Ratio scales are the same as interval scales with the difference being there is a non-
arbitrary zero point. Examples of this include mass, time, distance and temperature 
when it is measured in Kelvin. Ratios are meaningful, e.g. 10 minutes is twice as 
long as 5 minutes.  
Both interval and ratio scales have cardinality. The important question is whether 
SWB scales are cardinal, as opposed to merely ordinal, when they are used 
interpersonally (across individuals). To see the problem, suppose the scales were 
interpersonally ordinal. In this case, if person A’s SWB goes up by one on A’s scale, 
and B’s SWB goes down by one point on B’s scale, we don’t know whether the total 
SWB has gone up, down, or stayed the same. This is because ordinal scales do not 
represent the underlying difference in magnitude. Cardinality is necessary but not 
sufficient to get us to a scale of ratio quality. I do not argue for or assume a ratio 
scale.90 
 
90 A ratio rather than interval scale is required in at least two important cases. First, if we want to 
compare how much net well-being results from (a) saving lives vs (b) improving lives, we need to 
know how far the saved lives are about the point of zero well-being, which only a ratio scale has. 
Second, if we want to apply a non-utilitarian aggregation function when determining the value of a 
state of affairs. If one is e.g. a prioritarian and gives more weight to the worse off, to give lives extra 
weight you need to know how far they are from a zero point. Hence only having a scale of interval 




4.2. Conditions for the Raw, Universal Cardinality thesis 
Depending on exactly what we want there to be cardinality of, more or less strict 
assumptions are required. For instance, one might think that, due to cultural 
differences, intracultural interpersonal cardinal comparisons are possible, but 
intercultural ones are not. Hence, we need a further assumption to get from the 
former to the latter. If the following six conditions are met, that is sufficient for 
individuals’ scores to be universally interpersonally cardinal: 
1. The underlying phenomenon of SWB (happiness or life satisfaction) has a 
cardinal structure 
2. There is a linear relationship between self-reported and actual SWB 
3. There is a consistent scale used over time for each individual (‘consistent’ in 
the sense that the same self-reported levels of SWB are used to represent 
the same actual levels of SWB) 
4. Individuals have the same maximum and minimum capacities for SWB 
5. Individuals, in a given society, use the maximum and minimum points of 
their scales to refer to their maximum and minimum SWB   
6. There is consistent scale use between societies 
 
1—2 together entail scale use that is intrapersonally cardinal at a given time. Adding 
3 entails scale use that is intrapersonally cardinal over time. Adding 4 makes scale 
use interpersonally cardinal in a given society. Adding 5 makes scale use 
interpersonally cardinal across societies. Before I evaluate how plausible each 
condition is in turn, I will make two comments. 
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First, while the conditions are jointly sufficient for RUC, there are not all 
individually necessary—only some are necessary. It will be easier to explain this 
later after more of the analysis has been completed. 
Second, one argument that comes up often in the context of interpersonal 
cardinality is (what I’ll call) the ‘Washing Out’ argument.91 The standard version of 
this argument has two premises. First, that variations in individuals’ scale usage and 
their capacities for SWB are random. Second, if these are random, so long as the 
surveyed populations are randomly constructed and large enough, any differences 
will statistically ‘wash out’ as noise and can be ignored. To illustrate this, if there are 
as many people with a (say) 10% greater capacity for SWB as those with a 10% 
smaller capacity, or as many people will self-report 1-point lower than average for a 
given level of actual SWB as will self-report 1-point higher, these differences will 
cancel each other out. The conclusion of the Washing Out argument is that we can 
treat the scales as interpersonally cardinal on average, even if we have doubts about 
doing this between any two given individuals. 
While the argument is valid and, as we will see later, will greatly help us, the first 
premise is questionable and hence the argument may be unsound, as there are 
plausibly non-random differences. Hence, it is non-random differences that we 
must pay attention to as we examine the conditions, which we do now. 
4.3. Assessing the conditions 
Condition 1: The underlying phenomenon of SWB (happiness or life 
satisfaction) has a cardinal structure 
 




If SWB lacks cardinal structure it would be confused to think that we could measure 
it on a cardinal scale.  
Regarding happiness, it is introspectively obvious this has a cardinal structure. As 
Ng points out, we do think it is coherent to make claims of the following type, “being 
thrown in a bath of sulphuric acid would feel at least twice as bad as stubbing my 
toe”.92 Perhaps the acid is between 10 and 100 times worse. It is hard to say exactly, 
but this imprecision is not due to problems in the intrinsic nature of happiness or 
its measurement, but simply because it is difficult to recall a toe stubbing and 
compare it with any accuracy to an imagined acid bath.93 It seems that we can 
compare the magnitudes of happiness in the two cases, which is only possible if 
happiness is cardinal. If happiness was ordinal then all that could be said was that 
the sulphuric acid was worse, but not worse by some amount. 
It is unclear what evidence could be produced to show happiness is cardinal. 
Edgeworth regarded it as axiomatic—a ‘first principle incapable of proof’—that no 
one could be infinitely sensitive and that the ‘just perceivable increments’ of 
pleasures would be the same for all persons and all pleasures.94 If each just 
perceivable increment (hereafter ‘JPI’) were the same, then it would follow that 
happiness has a cardinal structure—one built out of JPIs. Note that we need not 
actually count how many JPIs have changed to get a cardinal scale: we might expect 
individuals can intuitively judge equivalent quantitative changes in sensations 
without knowing precisely how many JPIs they’ve gone up or down. This 
expectation seems reasonable in other cases. For instance, one instance of the 
 
92  Ng (1997) 
93  Ng (2008) 
94 Both quotations are from Edgeworth (1881) at p7 
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Weber-Fechner law in psychophysics is that the objectively measured sound 
pressure needs to roughly double to get the same increment of increase in 
subjectively perceived loudness.95 It seems unproblematic here to trust subjects to 
report when the same subjectively perceived increase in loudness occurs without 
requiring them to say exactly how many extra JPIs of loudness they have 
experienced.96 
We can make similar claims about life satisfaction. As noted, life satisfaction is often 
taken to be a judgement. Arguably, there are JPIs for judgements too—people are 
presumably not infinitely sensitive in their evaluations. Alternatively, we might 
think that measures of life satisfaction are capturing the strength of a feeling of 
satisfaction; if this were the case, we could hold there are JPIs of this as well. For 
our purposes, given we’re interested in life satisfaction only as a proxy for happiness, 
and both versions of what the underlying construct is are cardinal, it doesn’t matter 
exactly what life satisfaction is. 
Condition 2: there is a linear relationship between self-reported and actual 
SWB 
It is often assumed that the relationship between self-reported and actual SWB is 
linear.97 However, there is at least some reason to think that scale use might be 
systemically non-linear.98 I outline and motivate the two most plausible non-
 
95  Jesteadt, Wier and Green (1977) argue that the law doesn’t quite hold, but this is unimportant for 
our purposes.   
96 It’s not strictly necessary for all individuals’ JPIs to have the same magnitude: so long as 
differences are randomly distributed, this will ‘wash out’.  
97 Or, rather, is approximately linear. Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) point out that as individuals 
are only given a limited number of response categories and SWB varies (nearly) continuously, 
reported SWB will follow a step-function as individuals report the nearest response available. Hence, 
they assume the reports are roughly linear. 
98 If it is randomly non-linear, washing out will apply.  
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linearities, offer some general reasons to suppose linearity is more plausible, and 
then highlight specific issues with each non-linear option. 
The first possibility is that there is a logarithmic relationship between reported and 
actual SWB. For definiteness, suppose that for every 1-point increase in reported 
SWB the level of actual SWB would double. This is shown in figure 4.4. In this case, 
the scales will not even be an intrapersonally cardinal measure; if this were the scale 
used, it would clearly be a mistake to take someone who reports 5/10 SWB and 
someone who has 9/10 and say their average SWB is 7/10. 
 
Figure 4.4. The logarithmic hypothesis 
Why think that reporting of SWB works this way?99 Some motivation comes from 
the Weber-Fechner law in psychophysics mentioned a moment ago. It’s thought that 
the relationship between income and SWB works this way—income needs to double 
 
99 Bond and Lang (2018) in a recent (scathing) critique of happiness scales, seem to suggest this is a 
possibility; my information here is second-hand from a social scientist colleague as I found the paper 
mathematically impenetrable. Toby Ord (personal conversation) suggested that SWB scales were 












to have the same increase SWB—so perhaps something similar occurs between 
actual and self-reported SWB.100  
Ng suggests a different possible non-linearity, which is that the relationship 
between actual and measured SWB takes an arc-tangent form.101 This means the 
distance in actual SWB increases at the extremes of the scale. Thus, the actual 
difference between a self-reported 9 and 10 (and 1 and 2) is greater than the 
difference between a 3 and 4, a 5 and 6, etc. This is represented in figure 4.5.  
Ng’s rationale is that SWB is theoretically infinite but measured on a bounded scale. 
Suppose someone becomes much happier than they thought was possible (as he has 
said occurred in his own case), they might be inclined to rate themselves as (say) 14 
out of 10, based on what they thought the maximum of the scale was. This would 
prompt them to adjust their scale to accommodate all possible happiness values. 
However, if the individual kept a linear representation, given the potential range of 
values, Ng says this would problematically “compress normal changes in happiness 
values of say 20 per cent to a very small decimal value (e.g. 5.0010 vs. 5.0012)”.102 
The apparent advantage of the arc-tangent is that it makes the scale’s middle 
comprehensive while still allowing very high happiness scores to be represented at 
the top of the range. On Ng’s model, those who say they are 10 out 10s are radically 
happier than the 9s. The same thinking applies to the bottom end of the scale too. 
 
 
100  Kahneman and Deaton (2010) 
101  Ng (2008) 




Figure 4.5. Ng’s Arc-tangency hypothesis 
The first argument in favour of linear reporting derives from Schwarz who argues 
that respondents try to work to understand what the researcher is asking them, as 
if they were talking to the researcher.103 Applying this idea to SWB scales, Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters suggest the most natural assumption for respondents to make 
is that they are being given a cardinal scale, as people are used to using cardinal 
scales, rather than ordinal or non-linear ones, in normal life anyway.104 In support 
of this thesis, Van Praag argues that, in experiments, subjects do tend to interpret 
scales as being roughly cardinal: when subjects are asked to assign numerical values 
of between 1 and 1000 to five verbal labels (very bad, bad not bad, not good, good, 
very good), the consistent pattern across individuals is to space the words so they 
are numerically roughly equal-interval, i.e. individuals construct a cardinal scale.105 
 
103  Schwarz (1995) 
104  Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) 












Hence, it would arguably be perverse for participants to use anything but a cardinal 
scale unless they were expressly directed to do otherwise. 
The second argument comes from statistical analysis. Krueger and Schkade 
conducted a test-retest of net affect one week apart.106 We would assume that 
people’s actual SWB would be expected to vary by about as much, week-on-week, 
whatever their level of actual SWB was.107 If self-reported and actual SWB are 
linearly related, then this week-on-week change would be the same at different 
points on the scale. This is effectively what Krueger and Schkade find, suggesting 
the relationship is linear.108 To make this finding consistent with the arc-tangency 
thesis, we would also need to suppose that those with very high or low levels of 
actual SWB would also have much higher variations in their SWB—this would make 
the variance in reported SWB appear to be linear up and down the scale.109  
In a different test, Kristofferson found that the relationship between mental health 
scores and self-reported SWB data ‘cannot deviate strongly from linearity’.110 
Kristofferson doesn’t seem to make this explicit, but her argument relies on the 
assumption that mental health scores and actual SWB will have a linear 
relationship. If they did, the test would provide evidence of linear between mental 
health scores and self-reported SWB. This further assumption seems fairly 
plausible. Possibly, one could object that those who reach the ends of the mental 
health scale are relevantly different from those who are only close to the ends. But 
such people would have to be very different to support Ng’s thesis, which is not what 
 
106   Krueger and Schkade (2008) 
107 Technically, we would expect ‘homoskedastic errors’. 
108 Krueger and Schkade (2008) 18 note “assumption of homoskedastic measurement error could be 
violated, but the deviation is probably slight”. 
109 A similar point can be made for the logarithmic thesis. 
110 Kristoffersen (2017) p845. 
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the evidence finds. It is not clear why one would think there should be a logarithmic 
relationship between mental health scores and actual SWB. 
Turning to the plausibility of logarithmic self-reporting, one observation is that it 
would be unrealistically cognitively demanding to expect respondents to report in 
this way and, therefore, this is not what they do. If you ask me how happy I am on a 
0-10 scale and I want to report this on a logarithmic scale, the first thing I intuitively 
do is to work out how happy I am on an arithmetic 0-10 scale. I then have to try to 
remember how logarithms work and convert my score on the arithmetic scale into 
one on the log scale. 
Another issue with logarithmic reporting is it would imply that individuals think 
their SWB is implausibly low. Suppose, as many do, I say my SWB is around 7 out 
of 10. If I used the scale in figure 4.4, it implies my actual SWB (on a 0—10 
arithmetic scale) is around 1.25.  
Regarding arc-tangency, we need to distinguish two issues. One is whether 
individuals adjust their scales over time, such that SWB scales are not 
intertemporally intrapersonally cardinal—that is the question of condition 3 that we 
turn to in a moment. The other is whether arc-tangency or its reverse (where there 
is a smaller difference between the extremes than at the end) is more plausible from 
the armchair. Kristofferson notes that some people—around 10%—choose the 
highest scores in SWB surveys while others are reluctant to ever use the top score.111 
She cites Lau, who asked participants to recall an extremely good moment in their 
lives and asked those who did not give the highest score, a 10, why they had not done 
 
111  Kristoffersen (2011) 
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so.112 40% said that the top score is never attainable. What follows from this, 
Kristofferson argues, is that there may not be much of a difference in actual SWB 
between those who report a 9 or a 10—the differences in reporting are more of a 
reflection on the individuals’ psychology. This runs exactly counter to Ng’s thesis 
there would be radical differences between those who reported 9 vs 10. What 
follows? 
Engaged as we are in armchair speculation, there do not seem to be stronger 
theoretical reasons to favour Ng’s thesis or its reverse. Here we can appeal to the 
Washing Out argument: suppose we think some people self-report as Ng suggests 
and some people report the opposite way. We have no particular reason to assume 
one form of reporting is more prevalent than the other, hence the average reporting 
will still end up being approximately linear. 
While we cannot prove linearity, it seems to be the only plausible assumption among 
the options. 
Condition 3: there is consistent scale use over time for each individual 
(‘consistent’ in the sense that the same self-reported levels of SWB 
represent the same actual levels of SWB) 
Ng observes that happiness researchers seem not to have noticed the possibility that 
individuals can and do adjust their scales throughout their lives.113 If individuals do 
this, self-reports are not intrapersonally intertemporally cardinal. I will first clarify 
what the problem is, make a few fairly speculative comments on whether it occurs 
and suggest how this could be tested. 
 
112  Lau (2007) 
113  Ng (2008) 
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Specifically, the concern is that some events happen to individuals which cause 
them to rescale, that is, they alter the levels of actual SWB that both the top and 
bottom of their self-reported SWB scale refer to. For instance, an individual, Sam, 
reports 7/10 SWB when playing tennis and has 7 actual SWB. Sam then becomes 
unable to walk and suddenly realises that his life can be much worse than he 
thought. Later, he is asked how he feels whilst playing his new hobby, chess, and he 
says he is 7/10.  
Let’s differentiate two possibilities. The first is that Sam’s actual SWB is lower, say 
6/10, but his self-reported SWB is the same. In this case, he has rescaled. The 
second is that his actual SWB is 7/10. In this case, Sam has not rescaled, but 
adapted—his SWB is back to where it was.114  
If we want to accurately measure Sam’s SWB then the occurrence of the second kind, 
adaptation, poses no issues for intrapersonal intertemporal cardinality. The first 
case, rescaling, is problematic. It means his self-reports represent different levels of 
actual SWB over time. 
Suppose that Sam tells us he is 7/10. Should we assume he’s rescaled, adapted, or 
done some combination of the two? As we can see from the earlier figures 4.1 and 
4.2, people sometimes do report adaptation to live events, but this could, in theory, 
be entirely due to rescaling. 
The first thing to say is that there are good evolutionary reasons to expect hedonic 
adaptation to occur, i.e. after a shock, happiness returns to where it was before.115 
 
114 A separate worry, which originates from Sen (1987) pp45-6 is whether the fact people do (or could) 
be happy in deprived circumstances. If we think such people are happy but have low well-being, that 
means well-being cannot consist in happiness. This is not our concern here. 
115 For more detailed accounts of how hedonic adaptation might function, see Perez-Truglia (2012), 
Graham and Oswald (2010). 
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The idea is that affective states are ‘Mother Nature’s’ way to punish/reward animals 
for actions that increase/reduce our ability to survive and reproduce. Producing 
these sensations is costly in terms of energy, so to maximise effectiveness, hedonic 
adaptation is the ‘rational’ solution. Hedonic adaptation can occur at the cognitive 
level too—people change their views on things.116 We wouldn’t expect hedonic 
adaptation to occur in response to a situation that continues to be good/bad for the 
creature’s survival; for instance, it would be disadvantageous to fully adapt to pain, 
as then pain would not be serving its warning function. As evidence of pain’s 
usefulness, those with congenital immunity to pain, a rare medical condition, often 
end up severely damaging themselves.117 
Second, if rescaling did occur, we would presumably expect to see it occur for all life 
events. As a matter of fact, this is not what we see. The life satisfaction scores in 
figures 4.1 and 4.2 above show that people report adaptation to some things—
getting married and becoming bereaved—and not others—being unemployed and 
disabled. The simplest explanation is that when adaptation is self-reported, it has 
actually occurred. Someone who wanted to say individuals had rescaled but not 
adapted would need to supply a story about why divorce but not unemployment 
causes rescaling. I can think of no such story. In contrast, we can draw on our theory 
of hedonic adaptation to explain why it occurs in particular places and not in others. 
We would expect disability and unemployment to continue to be bad—the former 
continues to make life difficult, the second continues to feel shameful, and both are 
potentially isolating. We can see how it would be disadvantageous for people to be 
permanently sad after bereavement. Regarding relationships, it’s worth noting that 
 
116  Wilson and Gilbert (2005) 
117  See e.g. Udayashankar, Oudeacoumar and Nath (2012) 
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while getting married (i.e. having a wedding) will cause a short-term increase in 
SWB (see figure 4.1), being in a relationship generally results in a permanent 
increase in SWB.118 Getting married is merely having a large, expensive party, 
whereas spending time with someone you like continues to be good. So far, there is 
no need to suppose rescaling does occur.  
Ng might respond, however, that I am simply not being inventive enough. Ng’s 
suggestion is that individuals sometimes find themselves either more or less happy 
than they had previously reckoned it was possible to be; as a result, they expand 
their scales to accommodate the new possibilities. Perhaps disability and 
bereavement don’t require rescaling because they are outside the bounds of what 
we expected when we formed the ends of the SWB scales. This still allows that events 
which are sufficiently good or bad that we don’t expect could force rescaling. On the 
negative end of the scale, the intuitively worst thing is being tortured; on the positive 
end, perhaps achieving a moment of great victory—scoring a goal in extra time of 
the FA Cup Final, perhaps—or being high on some drug. People presumably have 
some idea of what these feel like, but it could be a surprise. It seems at least an open 
question whether these sorts of experiences cause rescaling.  
Some further speculation. If the model is that only unexpected events cause 
rescaling, then SWB scales will underweight the best/worst experiences. It also 
implies that this won’t lead to widespread loss of cardinality in the SWB data as such 
events presumably happen to only a few people. Further, it’s unclear if these shocks 
would cause rescaling in typical reporting at all. Suppose some person, Sam, 
 
118 For timeseries on partnership, see Clark et al. (2018) on p. 80. For the long-term positive effect of 
divorce, we can see this as people returning to their pre-unhappy-marriage level of SWB. 
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becomes disabled in some grizzly accident, during which he feels more pain than he 
thought was possible. If asked about his SWB, he is tempted to say that, based on 
his previous usage of the 0-10 scale, he feels -5. As the scale can’t go below 0, he 
expands the scope of his scale to accommodate his current sensation, i.e. what he 
would have called ‘-5’ on the old scale becomes ‘0’ on the new one. Some months 
later, he’s then asked about his SWB. He thinks his actual SWB is just as high as it 
was pre-accident—what he would have said was 7/10. However, his scales have 
‘stretched’ downwards. Now, we would he say he’s 8/10 if he uses his new 
understanding of the scales. Yet, he realises that if he says he’s 8/10, the person 
conducting the survey will think he’s more satisfied than he was before. He’s just as 
satisfied and wants to convey this, so he says he’s 7/10, i.e. he uses his previous scale 
in order to make his old and new answers meaningfully comparable. Hence, if this 
is what happens, then scale use would be intrapersonally intertemporally cardinal 
anyway.  
Particular empirical tests would shed light on this. One of these would be to ask 
people who have experienced major life events if (a) they felt better/worse than they 
thought possible and (b) whether they have changed from old reporting patterns 
and, if so, by how much and in which direction. With that information, it would then 
be possible to transform raw self-reported data to make them intertemporally 
intrapersonally cardinal. I am not aware that any such studies.  
The other option which Ng suggests would be to develop an approach that measures 
SWB in terms of JPIs.119 If each just perceivable increment has the same change in 
terms of SWB, then we could, in principle, count the exact number of JPIs that 
 
119 Ng (1997), (2008). 
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individuals are experiencing at different stages of their life, avoiding the issue of 
having a bounded scale altogether. As Ng notes, moving to a JPI approach would 
not only allow us to make intertemporal intrapersonal cardinal comparisons but 
also give us a universally interpersonal cardinal scale that would apply across times 
and cultures. There is not space to pursue how a JPI scale might work here but this 
is a potential fruitful avenue for further work. 
This condition seems less plausibly met than the previous one was. It seems we can 
appeal to the evidence to rule out rescaling in some cases, but we cannot extinguish 
the worry that it does not happen in other cases. To settle this worry, further 
evidence seems necessary. I’ve given some theoretical reasons to suggest that the 
rescaling may not occur or, if it does, it will not substantially change results at a 
population level. My tentative conclusion is that we should assume this condition is 
met, at least broadly, until we find evidence that suggests otherwise. 
Condition 4: Individuals have the same maximum and minimum capacities 
for SWB 
Assuming we’ve granted intrapersonally cardinality, this and the next condition are 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient to reach interpersonal cardinality 
within a given society. To see this, note that there could be ‘utility monsters’ among 
us—those who can experience much more (or less) SWB than others.120 If there 
were, then a one-point self-reported increase for A and B might mean 5 times the 
changes in actual SWB. Hence, the self-reported scale will not be interpersonally 
cardinal. 
 
120 Nozick (1974) at p. 41 
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The existence of utility monsters who can experience many times more SWB, 
however, seems to be extremely unlikely. Presumably, humans’ capacities for SWB 
are determined by how our evolutionary history has shaped our biology and there’s 
some level of sensitivity that has to be optimal for survival. To return to an example 
noted earlier, being immune to pain is an extremely problematic condition that 
would put someone at an evolutionary disadvantage.121 What this suggests is that 
we should not expect huge differences.  
However, we might expect there to be some differences and, indeed, there are: twin-
studies indicate that about 33% of the variance in self-reported life satisfaction can 
be attributed to genetics.122 At this point, I note there are two ways genetics could 
affect reports of SWB: (a) by altering the capacities for SWB, (b) by changing the 
levels of SWB. Suppose, as seems reasonable, individuals report their SWB by 
scoring it between the maximum and minimum experiences they consider it 
possible for them to have. Suppose A and B feel the same level of actual SWB, say 
level 7. A’s genetics are such that his SWB goes from level 0 to 10, whereas B’s goes 
from 0 to 8. On the self-reported 0-10 scale, B will report a higher number as B is 
closer to B’s maximum. In this case, the scales are not interpersonally cardinal. The 
other possibility is that A and B have the same capacities, but A has different 
genetics and so has a higher level of SWB. In this case, the scales are still 
interpersonally cardinal.  
Hence, whether genetic differences alter the capacities or levels of SWB is relevant 
to the question at hand. That said, I concede I have no argument to show genetic 
 
121 See footnote 116. 
122  De Neve et al. (2012) 
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variations alter levels rather than capacities, nor can I think of a test that would 
settle the matter beyond doubt.  
For purposes of having a cardinal measure (and thus making decisions which rely 
on cardinality), genetic differences will only upset this if they occur non-randomly. 
If they occur randomly, they will ‘Wash Out’ across the surveyed populated. The 
problematic case would be if we thought, say, the Welsh had different genetics from 
the Scots, such as the two nations had different capacities, which meant their scores 
were not interpersonally cardinal.123 
How do we proceed? My suggestion, once more from the armchair, is to suppose 
that we would not expect large, non-random differences in capacities of SWB on 
account of genetics. Self-reported scores will then still be roughly cardinal, even if 
not exactly.124 I’ll return to this point later, but if we do suspect there are non-
random differences, we can, in principle, adjust the ‘raw’ reported scores so the 
transformed scores are cardinal: if we think the Welsh are 10% higher in SWB than 
the scales suggest, we can adjust the scales to account for that. It’s not immediately 
clear what method we would use to ascertain there really was a difference; this is a 
topic for further work. 
 
123 Readers might wonder if biological differences between the genders cause differences in 
happiness. Reviewing gender difference in SWB, Batz and Tay (2018) found the evidence is ‘highly 
inconsistent’. Where gender differences are found, the effect sizes are very different. The authors 
argue there are several explanations for the relationship gender and SWB (including biological ones) 
and disentangling them is difficult. 
124 Saliently, this response would not help us if we genetically engineered humans in order to give 
them higher SWB and then asked them for their self-reports. It might be possible to use JPI analysis 
to see how much higher their SWB is than ours, so we could correct for that in order to make cardinal 
comparisons between ordinary and enhanced humans. 
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Condition 5: individuals, in a given society, use the maximum and 
minimum points of their scales to refer to their maximum and minimum 
SWB   
Keeping to the terminology, another problem is ‘language monsters’, those whose 
self-reported SWB score capture a different range and/or levels of actual SWB. An 
example is represented in figure 4.6.  
 
 
Figure 4.6. ‘Language monsters’ 
As we can see, going from 0-10 on A’s scale is worth 6 actual points of SWB, whereas 
only 5 for B. Hence a 1-point reported increase for B is worth 1.2 units of A’s self-
report scale, and hence the scales are not interpersonally cardinal. 
A technical aside: specifically, the problem is if individuals self-reported scales do 
not have the same range of actual SWB. If A’s scale had had a range of 5 units of 
actual SWB, then the two scales would be interpersonally cardinal: a one-point 


















Interestingly, it is thus not important for interpersonal cardinality that different 
people’s scale represent the same levels of SWB. 
This is why I stated the six conditions are jointly sufficient but did not claim they 
were all individually necessary. To see why they are not, note that we could imagine 
person C has 10 times the capacity for SWB than D does, but that C’s self-reported 
scores only use 1/10th of the range of C’s actually possibly SWB. Here, we would have 
interpersonal cardinality between C and D’s self-reports but neither of conditions 4 
or 5 would be met. If conditions 4 and 5 are met, however, people have the same 
actual range of SWB and use the full breadth of the range in their self-reports, which 
is sufficient to meet: 
Condition 4*: individuals self-reported scales use the same range of actual 
SWB (even if they use different levels of actual SWB), in a given society 
Condition 4* that, along with conditions 1-3 and 6 are individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient for RUC. The easiest (only?) way to show condition 4* is met is by 
showing conditions 4 and 5 are met, which is why I arrange the conditions in this 
way. 
Returning our consideration to condition 5, it seems unlikely that language 
monsters will be much of a problem within a given society, e.g. a nation-state. One 
reason for this is a reason given in relation to condition 3: Van Praag finds that 
when different people are asked to assign a numerical value to verbal labels (e.g. 
‘good’) they give those labels similar values, suggesting that the words connote 
roughly the same emotional intensity to different people.125  
 
125  van Praag (1991) 
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Further, Van Praag offers the theoretical argument that the purpose of language is 
to transmit information between members of that language community. Thus, to be 
useful, words must have roughly the same meaning for any two individuals 
“[o]therwise, language would be no means of communication, and it is precisely 
that, which is the raison d'être of a language.”126 (emphasis in original). This is 
highly plausible, as evidenced by the fact that we regulate each other’s language use: 
if I say, ‘I stubbed my toe, this is worst I could possibly feel,” I would expect the 
response, “Come on. That’s not the worst you could feel.”  
Hence it would be surprising if individuals’ scales differ substantially either in (a) 
the range of actual SWB they capture or (b) the maximum and minimum levels of 
actual SWB they refer to. If there is variation, presumably it would be random, 
which means the Washing Out argument applies again.127 
Condition 6: there is consistent scale use between different cultures 
There are mean-level differences in SWB across countries.128 We might grant there 
will not be language monster issues within a given country (or linguistic 
community), but nevertheless, worry that cross-country(/cultural) comparisons are 
unintelligible on the basis of cultural differences. 
 
126  van Praag (1993) at p. 367 
127 Peter Singer raises the concern that extroverts, who report themselves as being happier than 
introverts, might not actually feel happier, but are simply using language differently (and this usage 
is arguably constitutive of their being extroverts). I am not sure if such a possibility could be ruled 
out by the empirical evidence, but it is possible to explain extroverts’ higher self-reported happiness 
without appealing to language use. Lischetzke and Eid (2006) surveyed some possible explanations 
for extroverts’ higher reported happiness; they then demonstrated through three studies that this 
difference can be accounted for by the fact that extroverts have better mood-maintenance abilities 
than introverts. I am unaware of any evidence indicating the particular possibility that Singer raises 
(this may be my ignorance). Without any such evidence, and given we have another explanation at 
hand, there doesn’t seem to be a reason to suppose the worry Singer raises is true.   
128  Helliwell, Layard and Sachs (2017) 
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This has been an active topic of research and, as far as I can tell, it seems scale use 
should be treated as cardinal between cultures. An important initial point is that, as 
Diener et al. observe, mean-level SWB differences in a country could be a result of 
culture, but they could also be explained by differences in the situations between 
those countries.129 Hence, we should not rush to assume it is culture that is doing 
the work. I note two recent intuitively compelling studies. First, Helliwell et al. 
examined a number of the predictors of life satisfaction across nations—e.g. income, 
levels of social capital, corruption—and found that “international differences in 
predicted values are entirely due to differences in their underlying circumstances” 
rather than different approaches to what constituents the good life.130 Second, a 
study by Helliwell (and different colleagues) of immigrants moving from over 100 
different countries to Canada found that, regardless of country of origin, the average 
levels and distributions of life satisfaction among the immigrants mimic those of 
Canadians.131 This strongly suggests life satisfaction reports are primarily driven by 
life circumstances—if there were cultural differences in scale use there would not be 
such homogeneity of self-reports. Hence it seems likely that scale use is cardinal 
across nations. 
4.4. Is the Raw, Universal Cardinality (RUC) Thesis true? What should 
we do if it isn’t? 
Let’s sum up the discussion of the conditions. Conditions one, two, five, and six 
seem relatively unproblematic to assume (a cardinal structure for SWB itself; 
linearity between actual and reported SWB; common language use in each culture; 
 
129  Diener et al. (2017) 
130 Helliwell et al. (2009) at p 1. 
131  Helliwell, Bonikowska and Shiplett (2016) 
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intercultural comparability). Conditions three and four are not met beyond 
reasonable doubt (rescaling over time; individuals having the same capacities for 
SWB). However, and notably, we lack clear, compelling evidence they are not met, 
either. In short, some questions marks remain on those two. We cannot be very 
confident, on the basis of the present evidence, RUC is true. 
What should we do if RUC is false? 
One obvious line of thought runs as follows. Suppose we would have used SWB 
scores as our measure of happiness (or, I suppose, well-being) if RUC was true. We 
might think that, if RUC is false, we must abandon the use of SWB scores and return 
to something else to measure happiness—perhaps income or QALYs.  
This is mistaken for the reason alluded to at the start of section 4: if we doubt the 
raw scores are universally interpersonally cardinal, what we should do is transform 
those raw scores such that the transformed scores are universally interpersonally 
cardinal. To elaborate on this, suppose someone was worried that condition 2—
whether there is linear relationship between self-reported and actual SWB—was not 
met. All they would need to do would be to apply a local ‘fix’ related to that 
condition: whatever they think the deviation from linearity was, they could adjust 
the raw scores so the relationship between the transformed reported scores and 
actual SWB becomes linear. Hey presto, their worry has been addressed. We can’t 
‘fix’ the first condition: if SWB really lacks a cardinal structure, we must give up on 
having a cardinal measure. However, we can apply transformations to address any 
problems with the other conditions. Thus, if someone thought the Welsh were 
actually 10% happier than the data would suggest, they could make that change too. 
And so on. Hence, the person who wishes to use SWB scores should not give up on 
doing so whether or not RUC fails. 
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My concluding suggestion is that we should take RUC to be true, even though we 
cannot be very confident on this, at least until new evidence suggests otherwise. 
There are two reasons for this. First, to some level of approximation, RUC seems 
true. We might have doubts about the conditions, but none of them seems both (a) 
clearly not met and (b) not met in a way that would make the scores deviate 
substantially from universal interpersonal cardinality. For instance, while there 
may be some genetic differences that cause different maximum capacities for SWB, 
presumably there are not groups who have (say) 50% greater capacities. Second, 
and relatedly, while we could ‘fix’ the raw scores by applying a transformation, there 
doesn’t seem to a strong justification for applying any particular transformation, as 
things stand. As such, it doesn’t seem we can take the raw scores any closer to 
universal interpersonal cardinality anyway. 
5. Increasing happiness 
The previous three sections argued that happiness can be measured through self-
reports, individuals’ happiness scores can be meaningfully compared, and that life 
satisfaction is a reasonable proxy for happiness. Three things follow from this.  
First, the impact that different outcomes have on happiness can be determined (at 
least, in theory) by using self-reported subjective well-being scores; ‘subjective well-
being’ (SWB), recall, is an umbrella term which includes both happiness and life 
satisfaction.  
Second, we can compare what looks best on SWB scores to the current suggestions 
made by Singer and MacAskill about how to increase happiness. Singer and 
MacAskill seem to have used health metrics (Quality Adjust Life-Years (QALYs) and 
Disability Adjusted Life-Year (DALYs) and income as their measures of 
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happiness.132 Let’s call this alternative method the ‘QALY+’ approach, which I will 
return to shortly.   
Third, if well-being consists in happiness, then we can get close—although, for 
reasons I will raise later, not all the way—to MacAskill’s ambition to measure impact 
in terms of Well-being Adjusted Life Years (WALYs) instead of QALYs: we can use 
SWB scores.133  
However, there are still two practical objections one could raise to using SWB scores 
instead of the QALY+ method to assess what increases happiness: first, there is not 
yet enough evidence on SWB to guide our decision-making; second, moving to SWB 
measures would not make a practical difference and is, therefore, unnecessary. 
The only way to fully address those concerns is to show that we can crunch some 
numbers and that, when we do, it makes a difference. I postpone such analysis until 
chapter 7, where I provide a cost-effectiveness analysis, using SWB scores, showing 
a charitable priority that is different from the ones currently recommended by 
effective altruists. Before we get to that, I want to discuss, in the next two chapters, 
various methodological issues that point us towards the choice of priorities that I 
evaluate in chapter 7. My limited objective here is to provide reasoning that goes 
some of the way to countering the latter two objections. 
In this section, I make two points. First, I note an advantage of using SWB scores 
over the QALY+ method to determine what increases happiness. Second, I state 
some of the latest SWB research and argue that mental health stands out as a 
 
132  See footnote 7.  
133  See footnote 8 
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potential priority, which is not evident if we rely on QALYs and income as outcome 
measures.  
5.1 The problem of subjective weights 
A general challenge, if one wants to assess cost-effectiveness, is to establish how 
much different outcomes contribute in terms of whatever common currency 
effectiveness is measured in. As WALYs aren’t available, MacAskill suggests 
measuring the benefit of different interventions in terms of QALYs. For the moment, 
let’s assume that the QALY is an accurate measure of happiness in the domain of 
health. QALYs are measured on a 0 to 1 scale with 0 equivalent to death and 1 to a 
year of full health. Different conditions are assigned different QALY weights: for 
instance, a year with AIDS without retroviral treatment is worth 0.5 QALYs—half as 
good as a year in full health.134 If QALYs are accurate in terms of happiness, then 
having untreated AIDS would remove half of your net happiness for a year. QALYs 
would then be a good metric where we compared health outcomes.  
The problem arises when we want to trade-off the impact that other outcomes, such 
as increased wealth, have on happiness. For definiteness, we could ask: how many 
years of doubled income are equivalent, in terms of happiness, to increasing 
someone’s health from a QALY-weighting of 0 to 1 for 1 year? 
If we measure happiness, an objective answer to this question can be derived: we 
can determine the impact that health and poverty each have on happiness. Unless 
we measure happiness, we’re forced to make an educated guess about their relative 
 
134 MacAskill (2015) at p. 47. 
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impact. This is the problem of subjective weights: a factual question—how much do 
different outcomes increase happiness? —is being judged subjectively. 
On what I’ve called the QALY+ method, we start with a health metric and then 
subjectively weight the relative importance of different outcomes relative to units of 
health metric. The obvious worry is that we’ll provide flawed subjective weights.  
5.2 SWB studies—some important results 
Information about how much different things impact happiness can either be found 
(ideally) from randomised-controlled trials, or from large population surveys where 
statistical methods can be used to estimate the associations between various factors. 
Figure 4.7. is taken from Clark et al. It is the state-of-the-art and uses a national 
panel data set (i.e. the same people were surveyed each year), allowing individuals 
to be used as their own controls and the changes observed over time. 135  
 
 
135  Clark et al. (2018) at p. 220.  
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Figure 4.7. Life satisfaction effect different life-events have on oneself and 
others136 
If we use the life satisfaction scores, the most surprising lesson, relative to what we 
might expect from our folk psychology of SWB, is the comparative unimportance of 
income and the importance of mental health. From the table, we can see that not 
only does being diagnosed with depression or anxiety have about 6 times the effect 
on life satisfaction as a doubling of income, the aggregate effect of doubled income 
is roughly nil when the impact on others is accounted for; the right-hand-column 
figure indicates the effect that doubling one person’s income has on others and 
suggests their loss is approximately the same size as the individual’s gain. This result 
isn’t particularly surprising: it’s consistent with a wider literature (some of it 
mentioned in section 3) on social comparisons and how the effect of income on SWB 
is a substantially relative. I won’t discuss the rest of the table as that is not necessary 
for our purposes. The above is developed world data, but it nevertheless indicates 
that mental health is a possible priority if we want to increase happiness. 
Neither Singer nor MacAskill mentions mental health in their books on effective 
altruism.137 Given the metrics they drew on, this result is not perhaps surprising. 
Not only does the above suggest mental health has a surprisingly large impact 
relative to income, different evidence that I now set out indicates mental health is 
relatively more important on SWB measures than it is on QALYs. Hence, QALYs 
turn out not to be an accurate measure of happiness in the domain of health. 
 
136  Ibid 
137  At the present time. Singer informs me that StrongMinds will be mentioned in the second edition 
of his book The Life You Can Save Singer (2019) due out in late 2019 (and this is due, in some part, 
to my agitation on the subject). 
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Clark et al. provide the following explanation of how QALY weights are determined: 
In the QALY system, the impact of a given illness in reducing the quality of 
life is measured using the replies of patients to a questionnaire known as the 
EQ5D. Patients with each illness give a score of 1, 2, or 3 to each of five 
questions (on Mobility, Self-care, Usual Activities, Physical Pain, and Mental 
Pain). To get an overall aggregate score for each illness a weight has to be 
attached to each of the scores. For this purpose members of the public are 
shown 45 cards on each of which an illness is described in terms of the five 
EQ 5D dimensions. For each illness members of the public are then asked, 
“Suppose you had this illness for ten years. How many years of healthy life 
would you consider as of equivalent value to you?” The replies to this 
question provide 45N valuations, where there are N respondents. The 
evaluations can then be regressed on the different EQ5D dimensions. These 
“Time Trade-Off” valuations measure the proportional Quality of Life Lost 
(measured by equivalent changes in life expectancy) that results from each 
EQ5D dimension.138 
Dolan and Metcalfe compare how individuals value the five dimensions of health in 
time trade-offs to the effect those dimensions have on SWB among people 
experiencing those states of ill-health.139 This is displayed in figure 4.8. As we can 
see, the relative weights are quite different. To highlight a particular discrepancy, 
Dolan and Metcalfe report that subjects agreed hypothetically to give up as many 
years of their remaining life, about 15%, to be cured of ‘some difficulty walking’, as 
they would to be cured of ‘moderate anxiety or depression’. However, from SWB 
 
138 Clark et al. (2018) at p. 85. 
139  Dolan and Metcalfe (2012) 
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measures, it is shown that ‘moderate anxiety or depression’ is associated with 10 
times a greater loss to life satisfaction, and 18 times a greater loss to daily affect than 
‘some difficulty walking’ is. On a moment’s reflection, it is obvious anxiety and 
depression must be much worse for happiness than some difficulty walking, but this 
is not what we see in the QALY weights. 
What explains this? The QALY method, as described above, is different from the 
SWB approach in two ways. First, the latter asks subject about their SWB, whereas 
the former, with the question “How many years of healthy life would you consider as 
of equivalent value to you?” leaves it open to respondents to answer in terms of 
whatever they value—what they value might not consist solely in (a component of) 
SWB.140 Individuals presumably value SWB to some extent, but not all will only 
value that. The extent to which individuals do value goods besides SWB is an as-yet 
unresolved empirical matter and hence it is unclear how much of the disparity in 
results this difference in methodology accounts for.141  
 
140 Arguably, the question leaves it open to answer not solely about prudential value (i.e. my own 
well-being) – I might say I want to live longer so I could do more good. 
141 Adler, Dolan and Kavetsos (2017) investigate hypothetical trade-offs between levels of SWB and 
levels of income, physical health, family, career success, and education. They found individuals 
prefer SWB to all the other attributes except health. This analysis doesn’t tell us how much weight 
individuals put on others goods vs SWB, or which of those goods are intrinsically valuable, only that 




Figure 4.8. How life satisfaction and daily affect (0-1) are affected by the EQ5D, 
compared with weights used in QALYs.142 
The second difference is that QALY weights are determined by asking people to 
judge how bad various health states would be, rather than by asking people who are 
experiencing those health states about their SWB and then inferring (via 
regressions) how bad they, in fact, are.143 Psychological research into affective 
forecasting—how individuals expect to feel about future events—finds that 
individuals display an impact bias, overestimating the intensity and duration of 
future emotional states.144 There are several reasons for this bias, such as focusing 
illusions, paying too much attention to easily imaginable details, and immune 
 
142  Data from Dolan and Metcalfe (2012). Table produced by Derek Foster. 
143 This is the approach taken in Clark et al. (2018) at the wider SWB-literature in economics.  
144  Wilson and Gilbert (2005) 
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neglect, not accounting for the fact they will adapt to some conditions but not 
others.145 
What seems to have happened is that, when you ask people to compare ‘some 
difficult walking’ to ‘moderate anxiety or depression’ they overweight the SWB 
impact of the former because it is easier to visualise—walking with a cane vs. feeling 
sad on the inside—and they haven’t considered that they will adapt to the former 
but not the latter. The general problem with time trade-offs, however they are done, 
is that there is a difference between how important something seems when you are 
instructed to think about it compared to how it normally affects your experience.146 
As Daniel Kahneman pithily puts it, ‘Nothing in life is as important as you think it 
is when you are thinking about it’.147 This is why, if we want to know the SWB-impact 
something has, it is essential to ask people about their SWB in general, and then 
infer what impact their circumstances have on their SWB, rather than asking them 
what impact they think X or Y would have on their SWB.  
Hence, if one used QALYs as a proxy for happiness, a key implication is that this 
would lead you to underweight the unhappiness caused by mental illness. I am not 
aware of equivalent research comparing SWB to DALY weights, but as DALY 
weights are also constructed by asking individuals to judge the badness of health 
states, the same concerns about affecting forecasting will presumably apply.148  
 
145 Kahneman et al. (2006), Gilbert et al. (1998) 
146 Hence, while QALYs are generally derived from members of the public making hypothetical 
judgments, they would not ‘fixed’ by getting those in poor health engage in time trade-off about their 
specific conditions; the concerns about affective forecasting remain. 
147  Kahneman (2011) at p. 400-1. 
148  Gold, Stevenson and Fryback (2002) 
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The preceding analysis should go some way to addressing two objections to using 
happiness data to guide (moral philosophers’) happiness-related 
recommendations—that there isn’t enough evidence to draw on and that, if we did, 
it wouldn’t change our priorities. What it shows is there is some data on SWB and it 
shows us at least one new priority compared to the QALY+ approach, namely the 
potential importance of mental health.  
Assuming we want to make people happier, given we now have a new methodology—
SWB scores—to assess this and, with it, new evidence, this should prompt us to 
revaluate our priorities and see if we can find more effective ways to increase 
happiness. This, in turn, leads us to ask what method we should use, in general, for 
determining what our priorities are. Effective altruists have suggested such a 
method, a three-factor ‘cause prioritisation’ framework. In the next two chapters, 
we assess whether this framework is fit for purpose and, having suitably modified 
it, we take another look at what the happiness-increasing priorities are. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter started with the realisation that while social scientists have been busy 
trying to measure happiness through self-reports, moral philosophers have not paid 
much attention to the social scientists’ endeavours. I considered four possible 
objections to relying on self-reports to measure happiness. I argued the first 
objection can be met and made some progress towards address the remaining three. 
I am unable to say any more on the second objection in this thesis, but I aim to 
provide a compelling response to the third and fourth objections in chapter 7. 
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Chapter 5: How should we prioritise among the world’s problems? 
0. Abstract 
In this chapter I set out what I call the ‘EA method’, the priority-setting methodology 
commonly used by members of the effective altruist (EA) community, identify some 
open questions about the method, and address those questions. I particularly focus 
on the three-factor ‘cause prioritisation’ framework part of the EA method. While 
the cause prioritisation framework is regularly appealed as a means of determining 
how to do the most good, it appears not to have been carefully scrutinised; its nature 
and justification are somewhat obscure. I argue that the EA method should be 
moderately reconceptualised and that, once it has been reconceptualised, we realise 
the method is not as useful we might have thought or hoped. Some practical 
suggestions are made in light of this.  
1. Introduction 
Let’s begin with a long quote from William MacAskill, one of the effective altruism 
community’s leaders, describing what I call the ‘Effective Altruism method’ or ‘EA 
method’, for short: 
Suppose we accept the ideas that we should be trying to do the most good we 
can with a given amount of resources and that we should be impartial among 
different causes. A crucial question is: how can we figure out which causes 
we should focus on? A commonly used heuristic framework in the effective 
altruism community is a three-factor cause-prioritization framework. On this 
framework, the overall importance of a cause or problem is regarded as a 
function of the following three factors 
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• Scale: the number of people affected and the degree to which they are 
affected. 
• Solvability: the fraction of the problem solved by increasing the 
resources by a given amount. 
• Neglectedness: the amount of resources already going toward solving 
the problem. 
The benefits of this framework are that it allows us to at least begin to make 
comparisons across all sorts of different causes, not merely those where we 
have existing quantitative cost-effectiveness assessments. However, it’s 
important to bear in mind that the framework is simply a heuristic: there may 
be outstanding opportunities to do good that are not in causes that would be 
highly prioritized according to this framework; and there are of course many 
ways of trying to do good within highly ranked causes that are not very 
effective. (Italics in original)1  
As such, it seems the EA method has two main steps: 
1. Cause prioritisation: comparing the marginal cost-effectiveness of 
different problems. This is done using the three-factor framework, i.e. 
assessing causes by their scale, neglectedness and solvability (these 
sometimes go by different names)2 
 
1  MacAskill (2018) 
2 ‘Scale’ has been called ‘importance’, ‘neglectedness’ called ‘(un/)crowdedness’, and ‘solvability’ 
called ‘tractability’. For different uses see, e.g. MacAskill (2015) chapter 10, Cotton-Barratt (2016), 
Open Philanthropy Project and Karnofsky (2014). 
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2. Of the causes which are most promising, move on to intervention 
evaluation: creating quantitative cost-effectiveness estimates of particular 
solution to given problems.  
Although the three-factor cause prioritisation method is popular—central, even—to 
effective altruists’ discussions about how to do the most good, there has been little 
analysis of the topic. There are a number of open questions about the method. I’ll 
list and motivate a number of them. 
First, what’s the distinction between cause prioritisation and intervention 
evaluation? Following the quotation from MacAskill, it seems we can evaluate which 
causes are higher priority, that is, have greater cost-effectiveness, before making 
quantitative cost-effectiveness assessments of particular interventions. But it’s not 
immediately clear how we can determine which causes are higher priority prior to 
considering, at least implicitly, the interventions we might use in each case and how 
cost-effective those interventions are.  
Second, and assuming there is a distinction between the two steps, what reason is 
there for engaging in the cause prioritisation at all? We could just jump to 
intervention evaluation—e.g. assessing different poverty alleviation charities we 
could give to—and bypass cause prioritisation altogether.  
Third, what role do the three factors—scale, neglectedness and solvability—play in 
helping us to determine a cause’s priority?  
Fourth, why are there three factors (rather than, say, four) and why are these 
particular factors used? 
I aim to clarify matters by working through these questions.  
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 suggests an initial distinction 
between cause prioritisation and intervention evaluation and explains how it is 
sometimes possible to determine causes are low-priority without examining 
particular interventions. Section 3 considers how to evaluate plausibly high-priority 
causes, distinguishes two stages of cause prioritisation and explains why and how 
to use scale-neglectedness-solvability framework to determine the cost-
effectiveness of causes at this second stage. Section 4 argues there is a very thin 
distinction between the second stage of cause prioritisation and intervention 
evaluation, suggests a slight reconceptualisation of the EA method, notes some 
worries that result from this, and asks whether this reconceptualisation is 
surprising. Section 5 makes some concluding remarks. 
2. How and why to prioritise causes 
It will help us to answer the questions posed if we realise that ‘causes’ and 
‘interventions’ are just different words for ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’, respectively.3 
To be clear, if we want to solve a problem, we will eventually have to use some 
particular solution(s) to the problem. Hence, reframed this way, the query becomes 
whether and how it is possible to evaluate problems in some sense, ‘as a whole’, as 
a distinct process from evaluating particular solutions to those problems. 
The explanation seems to be that we can evaluate problems as a whole if and when 
we can say something about the cost-effectiveness of all the solutions to a given 
problem. (From here, from stylistic reasons, I will usually talk of ‘evaluating 
problems’ instead of ‘evaluating problems as a whole’ even though the longer phrase 
 
3 After coming to realise this reframing myself, I subsequently discovered it had previously been used 
by Dickens (2016). 
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is more appropriate). In this case, we can evaluate the priority of a problem without 
having to look too closely at any of the particular solutions. Doing this is convenient 
because it allows us to quickly discard problems in which all the solutions seem cost-
ineffective and hence focuses our attention on investigating the more promising 
problems. There seem to be three situations where we can evaluate a problem and 
discard it as low-priority. 
First, if the problem is not solvable by any means. For instance, we might say putting 
our resources (i.e. money or time) towards gun control in America is not a good 
altruistic decision. All solutions seem to involve political reform; opposition to gun 
control is sufficiently strong it’s hard to imagine any political effort would succeed. 
Hence, it’s unnecessary to get into the specifics of any particular 
solution/intervention to gun control because we are confident none of them will be 
as cost-effective as some alternative altruistic option we already have in mind 
(perhaps e.g. alleviating poverty). Another example would be if someone suggested 
building a perpetual motion machine and showed us their blueprints—we can rule 
out all particular solutions as being unfeasible without needing to look at the 
schematics for this version. 
Second, if the problem will be solved by others whatever we do, our efforts will have 
no (or only a tiny) counterfactual impact. Some people think working to reduce 
climate change is a bit like this: there are now so many concerned individuals that 
my impact would be nearly nil, and I’ll do more good by doing something else. A 
further, stylised example would be that a child has fallen into a shallow pond and 
someone else is already saving them—it won’t help if you jump in too.  
Third, if the problem is so tiny it’s clear that putting any effort towards solving it 
would be a waste (compared to some already known potentially effective 
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alternative). Potentially, saving some rare species of beetle is like this. While it 
would (perhaps) be good if you did so, rather than doing nothing, you might 
conclude, without needing to look further at the details, the value will be so small 
that something else must be a higher priority. 
Rather neatly, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the three types of situation each draw 
on one of the three factors used for cause prioritisation—solvability, neglectedness, 
and scale, respectively. As we’re understanding intervention evaluation as the 
process of examining particular solutions to a problem, the foregoing analysis 
explains how and when we can engage in cause prioritisation without needing to get 
into intervention evaluation: sometimes we can ‘screen out’ entire problems quite 
quickly by noting something about all their solutions and concluding that none of 
them is comparatively cost-effective.4 Given we’re looking to do as much good as 
possible and our resources are finite, time spent investigating many different ways 
to solve unimportant problems is time wasted.  
A potentially helpful analogy here is determining where to go on holiday. In the end, 
we have to visit a particular part of a country, rather than every part (or an average 
part) of a country.5 Nevertheless, when thinking about our choice, we might start by 
seeing what we can say about countries as a whole (cause prioritisation) before 
considering the individual locations in more detail (intervention evaluation). If the 
country has features that make it unappealing—it’s ruled by a dictator, they speak 
French there, it’s very expensive, etc.—we can rule out going there without the need 
to look too closely at any particular places in those countries we could visit.  
 
4 If clarity is needed, I mean all the solutions that are actually possible, as opposed to, say, 
metaphysically possible.  
5 Except, I suppose, very small countries. 
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3. Prioritising causes using scale, neglectedness, and solvability 
In the examples above, we could easily screen out those causes for one reason or 
another. Of course, we would also want our cause prioritisation methodology to tell 
us, of the problems which remain, which are the highest priority. Let’s distinguish 
two stages of cause prioritisation. Stage A is where we screen out some of the 
problems, which we do by assessing all their solutions—this is the stage we have 
already discussed. At stage B, we determine the marginal cost-effectiveness of the 
problems which remain. In this section, I explain how the three factors (scale, 
neglectedness, solvability) combine to determine marginal cost-effectiveness of 
different causes and allow us to make progress at stage B. 
MacAskill, in an explanatory footnote, offers more formal definitions of the terms 
used informally in the first quote and sets out how the three factors combine to 
determine the cost-effectiveness of a cause: 
Formally, we can define these as follows: Scale is good done per by 
percentage point of the problem solved; solvability is percentage points of a 
problem solved per percentage point increase in resources devoted to the 
problem; neglectedness is percentage point increase in resources devoted to 
the problem per extra hour or dollar invested in addressing the problem. 
When these three terms are multiplied together, we get the units we care 
about: good done per extra hour or dollar invested in addressing the 
problem.6   
 
6 I believe Cotton-Barratt (2016) was the one who first identified how the factors could be combined 
to assess cost-effectiveness. EA career’s advice service 80000 Hours and Wilbin (2017) also uses this 
quantitative version of the framework. 
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We can write this as an equation: 
Scale x Solvability x Neglectedness = Good done/dollar 
(Good done/% solved) x (% solved/% increase in resources) x (% increase in 
resources/extra dollar) = Good done/dollar 
Hence, scale, neglectedness and solvability are defined as factors which, when 
multiplied together, calculate the cost-effectiveness of whichever cause is being 
analysed.  
It’s worth briefly noting the existence of an earlier/alternative version of the three-
factor framework that is qualitative in nature.7 On the qualitative version, the same 
three factors were thought relevant to understanding a cause’s cost-effectiveness—
causes that were larger, more solvable and more neglected were presumed to be 
higher priority. However, there was no mechanism to trade-off the factors against 
each other or to combine them to determine cost-effectiveness, something this 
quantitative version allows. I use the newer quantitative version as it—unlike the 
older, qualitative one—allows us to determine the cost-effectiveness of causes and 
thus compare them to each other on that basis. 
This brings us to the question of why there are three factors (rather than, say, four) 
and why these particular factors are used. This becomes clear once consider that 
causes generally have diminishing marginal returns: individuals will pick the ‘low 
 
7 This is version is used by MacAskill (2015) in chapter 10 and Wiblin (2016). It seems to have been 
originally proposed by Open Philanthropy Project and Karnofsky (2014). In conversation, Hilary 
Greaves suggests that this version is arguably implicitly quantitative in nature, or at least used in that 
way: individuals applying the framework would assume something like the following: if cause A was 
X% larger in scale but Y% less neglected than cause B, the two causes would be equally cost-effective 
at a given ratio of X:Y. It might be true that framework has been in used this way, but given that no 
explanation has been offered as to why the factors could be traded-off like this, or what the 
appropriate ratios are, it’s hard to see what justification there could be for using this framework to 




hanging-fruit’ first, which means that initial resources put towards the problem will 
do more good per unit of resource than those added subsequently. This is 
represented in figure 5.1. 
We can now point out the role each of the three factors plays. To determine the cost-
effectiveness of additional resources, we need to know three things. First, the scale 
of the problem—how far up the Y-axis, which represents value, the line goes (how 
much fruit there is to pick in a given field).  
Second, how much of the problem is solved for different amounts of resources, 
which is what solvability refers to (how easy it is to pick the fruit in this field and 
how this gets progressively harder). Combined with scale, this gives the shape of the 
cost-effectiveness line, which I’ll call the solvability line. We cannot determine the 
solvability line with a single assessment, which is what we might have thought, but 
a series of assessments: given diminishing marginal returns, the fraction of the 
cause that is solved for a given amount of resources reduces as more resources are 
added. If there were instead constant marginal returns, that is, the cost-











Third, we need to know how many resources are being directed at the problem, 
which is what neglectedness captures. Imagine two identical problems, A and B, 
with the same solvability line. Suppose no one will try to solve A but many people 
will try to solve B. Assuming people will pick the low-hanging fruit first, then the 
cost-effectiveness of additional resources to B will be lower than A. The way we’d 
represent that on the graph is pushing along the X-axis the point at which we start 
counting marginal resources. This fact is illustrated in figure 5.2. overleaf. 
Thus, we need to know the scale, solvability and neglectedness in order to correctly 
locate both ‘where on the curve we are’, so to speak—that is, where we should start 
counting the effectiveness of our marginal resources from—and where we would get 
to for the additional units of resources we contribute. If we know the three factors, 
we can determine the cause’s priority (its cost-effectiveness). Note, however, that if 
there were constant marginal returns, i.e. cost-effectiveness was linear, we would 
only need two pieces of information to determine cost-effectiveness: first, the scale 
of the problem; second, a single assessment of solvability, i.e. the absolute number 
of resources required to solve X% of the problem.  
Let’s state the answers to the third and fourth questions posed earlier (what role do 
the three factors play? Why there are three factors (rather than, say, four) and why 
these particular factors are used?). To the third, the response is that the three factors 
are multiplied together to determine the cost-effectiveness of a cause; to the fourth, 
our goal is to determine cost-effectiveness, and these three are individually 







4. Distinguishing problem evaluation from solution evaluation 
We haven’t yet got to the bottom of the first two questions (what’s the distinction 
between cause prioritisation and intervention evaluation? What reason is there for 
engaging in the cause prioritisation in the first place?). In this section, I argue the 
distinction between stage B of cause prioritisation and intervention evaluation, if 
there is one, is very thin. 
Suppose that we want to determine which of two causes, X and Y, is the priority. 
What we need to do at stage B of cause prioritisation is to plug in some numbers for 
each of scale, solvability and neglectedness and see what comes out the other end. 
But it’s unclear there is any way to do this without considering, implicitly or 
explicitly, particular solutions to the problems at hand. Where else could the 
numbers come from? More specifically, as we’re trying to do the most good, the 
relevant comparison is between the best solutions we are aware of for each problem, 
as opposed to (say) the median solution to the problem. The quality of our analysis 
will depend on our inputs to the formula being realistic, hence we want to have 
actual, particular solutions in mind, even if we are just intuitively weighing these up 
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problems. Yet, intervention evaluation is the process of evaluating particular 
solutions to given problems, so stage B of cause prioritisation isn’t a distinct process. 
We might think that although two processes are answering the same question—how 
cost-effective is a particular solution to a problem?—these are nevertheless 
somehow distinct. This is perhaps because we don’t have to consider the whole 
problem (scale) when we evaluate solutions, or the resources going to the problem 
(neglectedness). But notice that when we evaluate interventions, if you know the 
cost to solve a given fraction of the problem and the value of solving that fraction, 
it’s trivial to extrapolate those and work out the problem’s scale; further, to 
determine the counter-factual impact of the solution, you do have to consider the 
resources that are going to the problem anyway.  
Even though we may think we are referring to two different processes—stage B of 
cause prioritisation and intervention evaluation—both require the same inputs. 
What’s more, not only do both produce an output in the same terms—good done per 
additional unit of resources—we’ll presumably get the same answer whether we 
think we’re doing one or the other: it would be very strange if our cost-effectiveness 
estimate of contributing extra resources to a problem is not identical to our estimate 
of how cost-effective the best solution(s) to that problem is. As a further indication 
these things are not distinct, notice that we could easily relabel any of the figures I 
introduced as representing the cost-effectiveness of causes, as representing the cost-
effectiveness of interventions. 
I imagine an advocate of the EA method might try to insist there is a meaningful 
distinction between stage B of cause prioritisation and intervention evaluation. 
There are two distinctions we might draw. First, the former is done intuitively—the 
three factors are combined in the head to make comparisons—whereas the latter 
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necessarily involves making explicit, quantitative cost-effectiveness assessments. 
Second, the former is an assessment of the best solution to the problem, whereas 
the latter is any assessment of some solution to a problem. 
We can grant these distinctions, but it is still the case that stage B of cause 
prioritisation and intervention evaluation both consist in the same task: evaluating 
particular solutions to problems. Hence, if we assumed there was some deep 
difference between them, we are on thin ice. I note the second distinction is 
somewhat awkward: what follows from it is that if we use the three-factor 
framework to determine the cost-effectiveness of a problem and do this in our 
heads, it’s ‘stage B of cause prioritisation’, but if we get out our calculators we’re 
suddenly doing ‘intervention evaluation’. Note that even if we do stage B in our 
heads, it is still a quantitative comparison of marginal cost-effectiveness that we are 
making. 
What this analysis suggests is that we should conceptualise the EA method for 
setting priorities as having three steps: 
1. ‘Screen out’ problems where it’s clear all their solutions are cost-ineffective. 
This is done by appealing to one or more of scale, neglectedness, and 
solvability individually. 
2. Make an intuitive cost-effectiveness evaluation of the most promising 
solution(s) to each problem. This is done by combining scale, neglectedness 
and solvability. 
3. Make explicit, quantitative cost-effectiveness evaluations of particular 
solutions to problems. 
These steps map onto (what I’ve called) stage A of cause prioritisation, stage B of 
cause prioritisation, and intervention evaluation, respectively. 
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We might have thought that evaluating causes consists only in assessing the 
problem as a whole; that is, all possible solutions to it. What follows from the 
preceding analysis is that once we’ve done the initial screening step and are trying 
to determine the relative priority of the causes that remain—i.e. how cost-effective 
resources will be in each—that analysis rests on an assessment of the cost-
effectiveness of a particular solution(s) to the problem. Hence, while it may be more 
natural to make claims such as “poverty is a higher priority than climate change”, it 
would be more accurate, though less elegant, to say instead “the best solutions to 
poverty we are aware of are more cost-effective ways of doing good than the best 
solutions to climate change we are of”.8 When phrased this latter way, it’s clear that 
the cost-effectiveness of the solutions is doing the work in determining which of the 
problems is deemed the priority. Two concerns follow from this. 
The first worry is that although the scale-neglectedness-solvability framework 
seems very sophisticated, it is just assessing the cost-effectiveness of particular 
solutions; our analysis here is only as good as the information we put in. Hence, if 
we have overlooked excellent solutions or wrongly estimated the cost-effectiveness 
of those solutions we (intuitively) considered, we will be mistaken about which 
problems are higher priority. If we thought that cause prioritisation via the three-
factor framework resulted in a more holistic evaluation of the problem, we would 
not have this worry. 
 
8 Peter Singer asks whether a claim such as “poverty is a higher priority than opera houses” requires 
us to compare the best solutions in each case. I do not think we need to think carefully about the 
available solutions in each to defensibly make such a claim, but it still seems that we are (implicitly) 
appealing to the relative cost-effectiveness of the top solutions. To illustrate this, note how odd it 
would be to claim “poverty is a lower priority than opera houses”, even if one thought the top poverty 
solution was more cost-effective than the top opera house solution, simply because there are some 
ways of doing good via opera houses than are more cost-effectiveness than some solutions to poverty.  
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The second concern compounds the first. The EA method invites us to divide the 
world up into cause ‘buckets’, look for the best item in each bucket, compare what 
we’ve found, throw away the buckets that seem to have nothing valuable in them, 
and then look further in the buckets that remain. The issue with this is that is if we 
have thrown away a bucket because we overlooked something valuable, the method 
discourages us from looking in that bucket again. The risk is that causes are 
determined to be low-priority prematurely: if we’d have looked for potential 
solutions longer, a good one would have been found. In the previous chapter, I 
argued mental health had been overlooked; this is perhaps part of the explanation. 
The practical upshot of the analysis is as follows: if we want to find the most cost-
effective ways to do good, and be confident we haven’t overlooked the best options, 
we need to get stuck into the particular things we can do to make progress on each 
problem. Incorrectly believing that we can just take a quick look at a problem, 
consider its scale, neglectedness, and solvability, and thereby gain an accurate 
picture of a problem’s cost-effectiveness, is liable to lead us to overlook things. It’s 
these concerns which motivate, in the next chapter, proposing and testing a new 
approach to cause prioritisation that aims to overcome this issue.  
To be clear, I’m not claiming these concerns are ones that (sophisticated) effective 
altruists are unaware of, or they demonstrate that effective altruist’s prior 
prioritisation efforts are systematically mistaken and they must go back to the 
drawing board.9 I am merely noting the concern and highlighting the limitations of 
the methodology.  
 
9 I say this despite the fact that, in the next chapter, I go back to the drawing board to (re)consider 
what the priorities are if we want to make people happier during their lives. This is, however, a 
combination of both (a) wanting to create and test a different prioritisation method and (b) because, 
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It’s unclear if this proposed reconceptualisation is surprising or not. On the one 
hand, what I suggest seems to be in tension with comments others have made on 
this subject. For instance, Michael Dickens writes: 
The [three-factor] framework doesn’t apply to interventions as well as it does 
to causes. In short, cause areas correspond to problems, and interventions 
correspond to solutions; [the three-factor framework] assesses problems, 
not solutions.” (emphasis added)10  
Hence, Dickens implies that it is possible to assess problems without assessing 
solutions at all, from which it would follow that cause prioritisation (stages A and 
B) is really distinct from intervention evaluation. As argued earlier, it’s unclear how 
this could be possible.  
Robert Wiblin says of the three-factor framework that: 
This qualitative framework is an alternative to straight cost-effectiveness 
calculations when they are impractical […] In practice it leads to faster 
research progress than trying to come up with a persuasive cost-effectiveness 
estimate when raw information is scarce […] These criteria are 'heuristics' 
that are designed to point in the direction of something being cost-effective.11  
If the framework which we use for cause prioritisation is qualitative, then it must be 
distinct from the quantitative cost-effectiveness estimates we make of particular 
interventions. What seems to be going on here is that Wiblin is referring to the older, 
qualitative version of the three-factor framework I mentioned in the previous 
 
as argued in chapter 4, I think effective altruists have been using a non-ideal measure of happiness 
and this alone prompts a reevaluation of the priorities.  
10  Dickens (2016) 
11  Wiblin (2016) 
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section. The newer version—the one we’re using—is a quantitative framework where 
the factors do combine to produce ‘straight cost-effectiveness calculations’ and so 
the distinction between using the framework and making cost-effectiveness 
analyses of interventions disintegrates.  
More generally, it is somewhat surprising that no one seems to have made it explicit 
that the priority-setting process should be broken into (at least) the three steps I 
have suggested. We might have expected someone to offer a clarificatory description 
of the EA method along the following lines: “first, we ignore the problems with no 
good solutions; then, we make intuitive judgments of how cost-effective the best 
solution to each of the remaining problems is; finally, we make some explicit, 
numerical estimates of those solutions to check our guesses”.  
On the other hand, I don’t think anyone has explicitly denied priority-setting can 
work in the way I have just stated. Indeed, it seems clear, on reflection, that this is 
how we can and should approach the task. When we decide where to go on holiday, 
I presume most people make rough judgements about how much they want to visit 
entire countries, then consider particular in-country destinations in more detail 
and, at the final stage, compare prices etc. for the different options. 
As a further comment against this being surprising, my analysis seems at least 
compatible with MacAskill’s. In the opening quote, MacAskill states the three-factor 
framework allows us to make comparisons between causes even if we lack numerical 
cost-effectiveness assessments. What MacAskill is perhaps claiming is that the 
scale-neglectedness-solvability framework allows us to do step 2—make an intuitive 
comparison between problems—without having to go as far as step 3—making 
explicit quantitative cost-effectiveness assessments; his use of the word ‘heuristic’ 
seems to support this interpretation. As it happens, it seems plausible that we can 
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and do use three-factor framework in our heads to construct cost-effectiveness lines 
for different problems: we think about the size and shape of the curve and adjust 
where we are on the curve to account for what others will do. 
As such, it’s not obvious whether I am suggesting something different from what 
others thought of making explicit something that was previously implicit.  
5. Conclusion 
I began this chapter by asking: ‘what’s the distinction between cause prioritisation 
and intervention evaluation?’ This was motivated by the apparently odd suggestion 
that we can do the former before the latter. I’ve argued there is a sense in which we 
can evaluate causes(/problems) as a whole: if and when we can evaluate all their 
solutions – this was stage A of cause prioritisation. If intervention evaluation 
requires the assessing of particular solutions in some depth, then stage A of cause 
prioritisation can happen prior to intervention evaluation. Both stage B of cause 
prioritisation and intervention evaluation require the cost-effectiveness of solutions 
to a given problem to be determined. If we stipulate that stage B of cause 
prioritisation can be done intuitively, whereas intervention evaluation requires the 
writing down of some numbers and then crunching those, the former can be also 
prior to the latter; I noted this distinction is pretty flimsy. If we don’t stipulate this 
‘in-the-head’ vs ‘on-paper’ distinction, then the two are the same process and hence 
stage B of cause prioritisation is not prior to intervention evaluation.  
The second question related to why we should engage in cause prioritisation rather 
than leap straight to intervention evaluation. Following what we just said in the last 
paragraph, if we can evaluate causes as a whole—i.e. what happens at stage A—that 
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can usefully save time. We can now see there’s not much difference between starting 
at stage B of cause prioritisation or with intervention evaluation in any case. 
In this chapter, I’ve set out to address some of the outstanding questions about how 
the EA priority-setting method functions. What I’ve suggested here is a modest 
reconceptualisation of the EA method. I have not tried to argue the EA method is 
mistaken in some deep way, because it is not. Rather, I have tried to clarify 
something that seemed plausible but the details of which were murky. A practical 
conclusion emerged from the reconceptualisation: while we might have thought the 
three-factor cause prioritisation method assessed problems ‘as a whole’, this is only 
partially true: once we’ve sifted out unpromising problems (ones with no good 
solutions), our analysis of how problem A compares to problem B is nothing more 
and nothing less than a comparison of the best solutions to problems A and B that 
we’ve considered. Hence, if we want to find the most cost-effective ways to do good, 
we need to look carefully at these solutions. 
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Chapter 6: Finding ways to make people happier—developing and 
deploying the cause mapping method 
0. Abstract 
This chapter develops the three-factor cause prioritisation framework approach 
popularised by effective altruists. On my proposed method, ‘cause mapping’, the 
prioritisation process is broken down into several steps which are then systematically 
worked through to organise and identify potentially high-impact altruistic actions. I 
motivate and explain the method in general. I then apply it to the question of how 
philanthropists can most cost-effectively improve lives, that is, making people happier 
during their lives. The result is a long-list of potentially high-impact options; further 
empirical investigation will be required to determine which of these is the most cost-
effective. 
1. Introducing cause mapping 
In the preceding chapter, I examined the priority-setting method that is typically used 
by effective altruists (EA) to determine which of the world’s problem we should focus 
on if we want to do the most good; I dubbed this ‘EA method’. The EA method seems 
to have two steps. The first is to evaluate causes (i.e. problems), for instance, poverty, 
mental health, factory farming, using the ‘three-factor cause prioritisation framework’, 
which involves assessing the scale, neglectedness and solvability of those problems 
(the details of this assessment are not important here).1 This first step, it seems, is 
supposed to be prior to, and relevantly distinct from, the second step: making cost-
effectiveness estimates of particular interventions (i.e. solutions) to given causes. I 
 
1 See MacAskill (2015) at chapter 10, MacAskill (2018). 
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argued that this conceptualisation of the priority-setting process isn’t quite right and 
the EA method is better conceived of as having these three steps: 
1. ‘Screen out’ problems where it’s clear all their solutions are not cost-effective. 
This is done by appealing to one or more of scale, neglectedness, and solvability 
individually. 
2. Make an intuitive cost-effectiveness evaluation of the most promising 
solution(s) to each problem. This is done by combining scale, neglectedness and 
solvability. 
3. Make explicit, quantitative cost-effectiveness evaluations of particular 
solutions to problems. 
If we’ve done steps 2 or 3 for any two problems, we can then say which of those two 
problems is higher priority (in the sense of having the more cost-effective solution). 
While we might say ‘problem A is a higher priority than problem B’, e.g. poverty is a 
higher priority than climate change, what is ultimately being compared is the cost-
effectiveness of particular solution to each problem, namely the solutions that seem 
most cost-effective in each case. 
Where does this leave us? Suppose you are trying to do the most good. You already 
know you want to work out the cost-effectiveness of the different things you could do 
with your resources. Suppose someone tells you about the EA method, which suggests 
you “prioritise the world’s problems by assessing them for scale, neglectedness, and 
tractability”. Does knowing about the EA method help you, in the sense it gives you 
practical guidance for how to proceed? It doesn’t seem to provide much help; when 
push comes to shove, it turns out “assess problems for scale, neglectedness, and 
tractability” is effectively equivalent to “assess problems for their cost-effectiveness”. 
Further, “assess problems for their cost-effectiveness” is, in turn, effectively the same 
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as the suggestion “work out the cost-effectiveness of different things you could with 
your resources”. You already knew you needed to do that, and it’s not clear the EA 
method has given you new tools to make that assessment.2 
Given we’re trying to do the most good, what we want, presumably, is some method, 
or procedure, that helps organise our search for the most promisingly cost-effective 
solutions to the world’s problems. It seems the EA method does not provide much 
assistance. 
In this chapter, I develop a novel (but quite simple) approach, cause mapping, which 
attempts to provide a structured approach to organising this search. I explain and 
motivate it in general terms in this section. In the next sections, I put this method to 
work where the aim is improving lives—increasing well-being whilst people are alive—
where well-being is taken to consist in happiness. 
I’ll now explain how cause mapping works; this requires the specification of some 
terms to differentiate different parts of the process. First, we list the primary causes, 
the problems we want to ultimately solve. Second, we list the mechanisms, the 
different types of methods that make progress on the primary causes. Third, we list the 
obstacles, the barriers stopping those mechanisms from being used. Each combination 
of a mechanism with an obstacle gives us a solution—a particular action we can take 
to do good. Hence combining the different mechanism-obstacle pairs gives us a list of 
solutions. By looking at the solutions and seeing what shared obstacles they have, we 
can then form a list of secondary causes. By seeing what obstacles there are to the 
secondary causes, we can also list some meta-causes.  
 
2  This case is perhaps analogous to someone knowing they want to determine the volume of objects and 
being told “ah, volume is height * depth * width”. It’s unclear if the listener has learnt something new. 
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This process may seem abstract, so an example of one part of the map will help. Mental 
health would be a primary cause. Providing psychotherapy for mental health is a 
mechanism for that primary cause, i.e. it improves mental health if it is used. However, 
having established a mechanism for the primary cause, we can then ask what 
obstacle(s) is preventing that mechanism from reaching everyone who would benefit 
from it. Here, money is the obvious obstacle. Hence one solution (for a philanthropist) 
is to fund psychotherapy for mental health; the solution combines a mechanism with 
a way of allowing that mechanism to be used. There are a number of specific types of 
psychotherapy that could be provided, so we can group these together and say that 
generally ‘increasing access to psychotherapy’ is a secondary cause. To note the 
distinction between primary and secondary causes, the former refers to the type of 
problem we want to solve, the latter to an action (or type of action) we take to solve it. 
Regarding meta-causes, we might think encouraging others to give more to charity in 
general is a better way of increasing access to psychotherapy than funding it ourselves. 
Hence ‘encouraging altruistic behaviours’ would be a meta-cause—it is causally 
‘upstream’ of actions which ultimately do good and has an impact indirectly through 
changing the behaviour of other agents. 
Attempting to list all the possibilities at each step—all the primary causes, all the 
mechanisms, etc.—is clearly unrealistic, hence that is not what I suggest. Instead, I 
propose only to list the priority primary causes and their main mechanisms and 
obstacles. How are the priority primary causes determined? Through the same method 
used in the first step of the (reconceptualised) EA method above: we rule out 
unpromising primary causes using our intuitive judgements. Specifically, we see if any 
of the solutions to the primary causes seem more cost-effective than the most cost-
effective solutions we are already aware of. The aim is to do the most good and our 
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best existing option(s) ‘set the bar’: the aim is to clear it with something even better. 
Hence, there’s no point listing the mechanisms and obstacles that apply to 
unpromising primary causes. A similar process is applied thereafter: I won’t list all the 
mechanisms and obstacles to the priority primary causes, only those that seem they 
could lead to the most cost-effective solutions. 
Broken into its constituent steps, the cause mapping process functions as follows: 
0. Divide the world up into primary causes 
1. ‘Screen out’ primary causes where it’s clear all their solutions are cost-
ineffective. This is done by appealing to one or more of scale, neglectedness, 
and solvability individually. 
2. Of the primary causes that remain, list the main mechanisms available for 
each primary cause. 
3. Assess the main obstacles in the way of each mechanism. 
4. Create a list of solutions by combining 2. and 3.  
5. From the list of solutions, set out secondary and meta-causes. 
6. Evaluate the solutions for cost-effectiveness. 
Readers may wonder how this is different from the EA method, either as originally 
stated or on my reconceptualisation. There are two comments to make.  
First, I do not think it’s the case the above steps are incompatible with, or different, 
from those in the EA method. Rather, I am simply making explicit the different steps 
that were already implicit in EA method (and that one must undertake when thinking 
about how to do the most good). What occurs in steps 2-4 of cause mapping is 
something that must implicitly occur between steps 1 and 2 of the reconceptualised EA 
method—to get to step 2 of the latter, we must acquire a set of particular solutions from 
somewhere. Cause mapping is about filling out the items on that set. 
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Second, the EA method, at least as articulated by MacAskill and others, does not 
encourage or require us to map out the different mechanisms, obstacles, solutions and 
so on.3 While this is not a radical innovation, it does seem useful to carefully work 
through the different steps in the hope of discovering altruistic opportunities that were 
not prima facie obvious—this is, indeed, what I found when applying it to the question 
that follows. Given there seems to be no a priori means of working out what our 
altruistic priorities are in the actual world, this sort of approach seems to be the best 
we can do. 
Thus, cause mapping can be seen as an attempt to break down the EA method into its 
smallest distinct steps, record the most promising items considered, and identify how 
those items connect together to produce a reasonably comprehensive list of altruistic 
options. Once that list is in hand, the subsequent step is to evaluate those options for 
cost-effectiveness.  
2. Using cause mapping to find ways to make people happier 
In this section, I apply the cause mapping method to the question of how best to 
improve lives, where improving lives refers to increasing people’s well-being while 
they are alive. As in chapter four, I assume well-being consists in happiness. To explain 
the focus on improving lives, as opposed to any other problem, e.g. reducing extinction 
risks to humanity, I am sympathetic to Person-Affecting Views on population ethics 
(on which there is no value in creating new lives) and to hedonistic utilitarianism (the 
right act is the one that maximises happiness).4 On this combination of views, we 
 
3 See the long MacAskill quote at the start of chapter 5. 
4  For a general discussions of population ethics, see Greaves (2017) and (Arrhenius, unpublished). For 
arguments on person-affecting view, in particular, see (Bader, forthcoming) and Heyd (2009), (2014) 
For a classical argument for classical utilitarianism, see Mill (1861) and Bentham (1789). 
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ought, quite literally—to paraphrase Narveson’s Dictum— to make people happy 
rather than make happy people.5 The two potential ways to increase someone’s lifetime 
well-being are by improving or lengthening their lives, i.e. enhancing quality or 
quantity of life. Chapters 1 to 3 discussed the latter at length. Chapter 4 argued we can 
measure happiness and discussed how, assuming we want to make people happier 
during their lives, moving to happiness-based cost-effectiveness might alter our 
priorities from those presently suggested by effective altruists. However, that left many 
possible ways to improve lives unexamined; this mapping aims to fill that gap. I do not 
defend person-affecting views or hedonistic utilitarianism here, nor does it seem 
necessary to do so—nearly everyone holds making people happier has some value and 
will want to know how best to do it and how it compares to whatever their current 
altruistic priorities are. 
For definiteness, I approach this question from the perspective of a hypothetical 
philanthropist looking to spend their money on making other people happier. The 
other obvious perspectives to take would be to consider what the most impactful 
careers are for altruistic agents to take or what governments could do. It’s harder to 
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of time put into different careers than money put into 
different organisations—people have different skills. Thinking about government 
policies raises different issues that are too complicated to consider here.6 Hence, I stick 
to the simpler, pecuniary question facing private agents. Further, while I will 
 
5 Narveson (1973). I assume in his expression ‘morality is in favour of making people happy and neutral 
about making happy people’, Narveson used ‘happy’ as a placeholder for well-being and his statement 
is not necessarily an endorsement of hedonism (well-being consists in happiness).  
6 Some problems: do we have a developing or a developed country government in mind – presumably 
the policy prescriptions would be different for e.g. the UK vs Zimbabwe? If we’re talking about taking 
money from one area, e.g. defence, and putting it into another, e.g. health, it becomes hard to calculate 
the expected value of those trade-offs – e.g. the value of an extra peace-keeping mission vs X person 
being treated for mental health. Recent work on happiness-based public policy has mostly on individual 
policy areas without discussing trade-offs, see e.g. Sachs et al. (2019) 
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concentrate on improving the lives of currently existing persons, almost all the analysis 
could be reused if one wanted to also consider how to make all possible people happier 
during their lives.7 I note that my investigation here is necessarily highly limited: 
investigating this question could be at least an entire thesis in itself. As such, to borrow 
an analogy from actual map-making, my aim in this chapter is similar to that of 
Magellan, the first person to sail around the world: I want to make an initial ‘map’ of 
how things fit together while recognising this map cannot be very detailed or accurate 
and highlight where I have not be able to go.  
Cause mapping for this domain is presented as follows. Section 3 discusses the priority 
primary causes. Section 4 considers, in hypothetical terms, what the available types of 
mechanisms and obstacles are. Section 5 presents the most relevant mechanisms and 
obstacles, given the priority primary causes. Section 6 presents a list of secondary 
causes. I will note in advance that my discussion does not stretch to a detailed 
consideration of meta-causes—more on this is said in section 6. Section 7 sets out what 
further work is required and makes some concluding remarks.  
3. What are the priority primary causes? 
The first question to ask is: what are the problems we want to address so as to improve 
lives as much as possible? As improving lives refers to increasing people’s happiness 
during their lives, before we can answer this question, we need to say what we mean 
by happiness and how we measure it. Here, I restate the answers given in chapter 4, 
which is that happiness is the positive balance of pleasure over pain. While the most 
accurate way to measure how happy people are, given current technology, is to track 
 
7 Peter Singer helpfully notes that someone concerned with the welfare of all possible lives would also 
need to consider other questions, for example regarding how many people to bring into existence.  
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individuals’ experiences and ask them to report how good/bad they feel at randomised 
moments, this is not very practical to do and there is resultantly not that much data 
available.8 As such, I suggested the most practically suitable measure for happiness is 
life satisfaction, which is normally found by asking people ‘Overall, how satisfied are 
you with your life, nowadays?’ (0—10). 
We can now turn back to the question. One way to answer it would simply be to list 
absolutely everything that, if we addressed it, would take us closer to maximum 
possible happiness—wars, climate change, fickle politicians, noisy neighbours, poor 
journalism, Mondays, etc.—but not only would this list be impossibly unwieldy and 
hard to manage, it would also not consist solely in primary causes. Fixing problems, 
such as poor journalism and bad politicians, would not, in themselves, increase 
happiness, but would do so indirectly through other things—the better politicians 
would enact better policies that would increase happiness. Those are what I dub ‘meta-
causes’ for that reason. We must start with the primary causes and return to meta-
causes later. 
As mentioned in the previous section, to evaluate what the priority problems are I 
follow the first step in the reconceptualised EA method: screening out problems that 
seem to have no solutions better than the best ones we are already aware of. Because 
the current top life-improving interventions, as proposed by effective altruists, involve 
alleviating the poverty of the world’s poorest people, I will use those as the point of 
intuitive comparison: if a primary cause doesn’t seem to have a solution that is more 
cost-effective than those interventions, I leave it off the list. I note in advance this 
analysis relies on the author’s subjective judgements; while this is perhaps 
 
8 How good/bad they feel with respect to their levels of pleasure and pain (or displeasure). 
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unsatisfying, the relevant alternative—to produce evidence-based, quantitative 
assessment of all, or even some, of the different solutions before declaring them to be 
cost-ineffective—is impractical.  
I’ll state the four primary problems that seemed most promising and why that is the 
case, then explain what was also considered and why those alternatives didn’t make 
the list. The four problems are poverty, mental health, pain and what I’ll call 
‘mundane, sub-optimal happiness’, hereafter shortened to ‘MSH’. It is reasonably clear 
what the first three refer to, so I’ll only explain the fourth. The idea behind MSH is that 
it captures the gap between maximum possible happiness and the level of happiness 
people experience when living what we could call ‘a fortunate life’—they are mentally 
and physically healthy, their material needs met and not experiencing any obvious 
major ‘life event’, such as bereavement, divorce, crime, bankruptcy, marriage, 
unemployment, becoming a parent, etc. The focus on MSH directs our attention 
towards the sub-maximal experiences in the mundane, unexceptional moments of our 
lives. At this level of analysis, it is unnecessary to define any of the primary causes 
more precisely. 
Let me say something fairly general about why those four causes look promising. It 
seems the key results from the empirical research on happiness are as follows. First, 
‘hedonic adaptation’: we get used to most things over time, so that few things make us 
feel very good or very bad for very long.9 Second, ‘social comparison’: we often judge 
ourselves against others so that one person’s gain can be another’s pain. 10 Third, 
failures of ‘affective forecasting’ (‘affect’ is a psychologist’s term for emotion): that is, 
 
9 For a general theoretical discussion of adaptation, see Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) and Diener, 
Lucas and Scollon (2009). For empirical evidence of adaptation to specific events Luhmann et al. (2012) 
and Clark et al. (2018). 
10  See e.g. Alderson and Katz-Gerro (2016), Kim et al. (2017), Clark (2017).  
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we struggle to accurately predict how we’ll feel in the future; the general rule is we 
overestimate the duration and magnitude of good/bad events.11 Evolutionary theory 
provides an explanation for these results: happiness is ‘nature’s’ reward and 
punishment system that steers us towards activities that aid survival and 
reproduction.12 Thus, for instance, we shouldn’t expect to adapt—get used—to 
sensations like pain, hunger or sadness because their function is to keep us feeling bad 
so we’re motivated to act.  
Focusing on non-adaptive and non-comparative (i.e. not effectively zero-sum) 
problems seems like a good place to start, as all others will either have a short-term 
effect or not do much to increase overall happiness.13 The four primary causes are the 
obvious examples of non-adaptive, non-comparative problems where we are 
concerned with improving lives.14 Specifically, that is why I focus on pain rather than 
physical illness: there are many physical illnesses but the thing that is distinctively bad 
about them, which is also non-adaptive and non-comparative, is being in pain, hence 
that seems to be the thing to target.15 Regarding MSH, the idea that it is possible to 
improve our everyday experiences can be regarded as a hypothesis that I later suggest 
is plausible.  
 
11  See Ayton, Pott and Elwakili (2007), Wilson and Gilbert (2005), Morewedge and Buechel (2013). 
12 For discussions from an evolutionary theoretical perspective see Ng (1995), Rayo and Becker (2007), 
Perez-Truglia (2012), Ahuvia (2008). 
13 In effect, I am appealing to scale here. As discussed in the previous chapter, if a problem is very small, 
e.g. helping a particular bee, we can quickly intuitive it won’t be the most cost-effective use of our 
resources. 
14 I am grateful to Peter Singer for observing that, if we were concerned with improving and saving lives, 
then having’s one life shortened would be a non-adaptive, non-comparative problem: you do not ‘get 
used’ to being dead, nor do we seem to be made happier if we learn other will live less long; on the 
contrary, others living longer is a taken to be a good sign as we infer we will live longer. 
15 It’s hard to believe one person’s experience of pain makes others happier by an equal and opposite 
amount. What’s more, as Dolan and Metcalfe (2012) show, using subjective well-being data (both affect 
and life satisfaction) is that it is the mental distress and pain components of poor health that have the 
bigger impacts on subjective well-being, as opposed to those related to increased difficulties in mobility, 
self-care or performing usual activities (the other 3 components of the EQ-5D, a health questionnaire 
used to determine QALY-weights).   
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To see what else might have been on the priority list, we (re)turn to figure 6.1, which 
featured in chapter 4; this lists the effects of different life changes in life satisfaction.16 
As noted there, this analysis is state of the art, using a national panel data set (the same 
people were surveyed each year), allowing individuals to be used as their own controls 
and changes observed over time.  
 
Figure 6.117 
Given that we are thinking from the perspective of a philanthropist, rather than a 
government, it seems hard to think of what could cost-effectively be done about 
unemployment, quality of work, being partnered, being separated, being a parent, or 
committing a crime. To emphasise one of these, even though being partnered has a 
huge impact on life satisfaction, it difficult to see what a well-meaning philanthropist 
(or, in fact, government) could cost-effectively do with their resources that would 
improve on individuals’ efforts to find love.18 
 
16 Clark et al. (2018) at p199. 
17  Clark et al. (2018) at p. 220. 
18  This is not to say there is nothing that could be done. The philanthropist could invest in research into 
‘love drugs’, as (Earp and Savulescu, 2018) suggest, or provide couples counselling. 
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If we strike out those life changes, that leaves the effects of income, education, physical 
illness, and depression or anxiety. I further rule out education, in the sense of 
providing additional, conventional academic education, because (a) this seems not to 
have large positive effects for recipients, and (b) there seems to a negative social-
comparison effect on non-recipients when others are more educated (see figure 6.1).19 
I don’t rule out the effects on income, despite its other-regarding effect, because this 
is data from the developed world and it is plausible, as discussed in chapter four, that 
raising the income of the very poor does increase aggregate happiness. 
Besides the above, other events that we would expect to have a long-term (i.e. non-
adaptive) impact that I considered, but didn’t seem particularly tractable, were being 
imprisoned, enslaved, lonely, experiencing war, and the effects of climate change. For 
all but the last, it is also hard to think what interventions a philanthropist could take 
that would be anywhere near as cost-effective targeting global poverty. I did not 
include climate change as modelling what its impact on happiness would be is too 
complex to take on here (e.g. what would we expect the effect of sea rises to be on 
happiness and how much would preventing the release of X tonnes of carbon alter this 
by?).20 
 
19 The explanation of this is that education functions as a positional good, much like money – it is better 
for me to more educated, but this comes at a cost to you. It is puzzling that figure 6.1 shows the effects 
of extra education of others is negative and (three times!) larger than benefits to those who receive more 
education. I have asked Richard Layard, one of the cited book’s authors about this (personal 
conversation): he was not sure why the negative, other-regarding effect should be this large.  
20 While there are estimates of the economic costs of climate change, it’s not straightforward to think 
what impact such effects will have on happiness. The worry here is the evidence from the Easterlin 
Paradox, where rising incomes do not seem to increase aggregate life satisfaction. Hence, it’s an open 
question how much reducing economic activity will reduce life satisfaction and thus happiness. See 




We could also think about causes which would increase happiness over the short-
term—as Keynes noted, ‘in the long run, we’re all dead’21—and these could potentially 
still be cost-effective to do things about them. Etile et al. provide a handy set of 10 life 
events and show that people eventually adapt to all of them.22 These are: (1) major 
financial worsening; (2) fired or made redundant; (3) separation from spouse; (4) 
death of spouse or child; (5) death of close relative; (6) death of close friend; (7) injury 
or illness to self; (8) injury or illness to relative; (9) victim of physical violence; (10) 
victim of property crime. I exclude these as unpromising for various reasons. For (1)—
(3) and (9) and (10) it is unclear what a philanthropist could usefully do. (4)—(6) relate 
to death and the value of saving lives, which I have discussed elsewhere. (7) and (8) 
would potentially be captured by pain and mental health treatments anyway. 
I also considered more exotic problems, such as a global pandemic, nuclear war, rogue 
artificial intelligence or an asteroid strike. I assume their importance is based on their 
impact on reducing the number of future lives, rather than on their impact on the 
quality of people’s lives (either in the near or long-term).23 
While this set of problems covered here is reasonably comprehensive, I do not claim it 
is exhaustive. There is also the serious possibility that there are cost-effective solutions 
to some of these problems that I have mentioned above. 
 
21 Keynes (1923) p. 80 
22 Etilé et al. (2017)  
23  Although I note in chapter 3.3.1 I discussed Lewis (2018) who makes a case that reducing existential 
risk is still a ‘good buy’ compared to other health spending, if one wished to save lives. 
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4. What types of mechanisms are available? What types of obstacles block 
those mechanisms? (Theoretical) 
Now we have the primary causes we wish to solve, we need to look for some solutions. 
My earlier suggestion is to split solutions, particularly the actions we can take, into two 
component parts: mechanisms and obstacles. In this section, I’ll explain each of the 
parts in turn and propose typologies of them. In the next section, I will apply these 
typologies to the primary causes. 
The first component of solutions are the happiness mechanisms, the different ways 
that we can change parts of someone’s life to try to increase their happiness. 
Schematically, it seems we can split these into six categories, for which I provide an 
illustrative example in each case: 
1. External: altering someone’s objective circumstances, such as wealth, 
education, physical environment or the society they live in. 
2. Temporal: how people spend their time. 
3. Psychological: changing how people think, e.g. cognitive treatments for 
mental health. 
4. Chemical: using mood-enhancing substances, e.g. alcohol, painkillers or anti-
depressants. 
5. Physical: direct manipulation of the body or brain, e.g. surgical procedures, 
Deep Brain Stimulation (‘DBS’). 
6. Biological: genetically modifying people to be happier. 
These are all meant as types of mechanisms we can use at least once for any of the 
primary causes. It is not obvious that all six mechanisms can be used for every cause.  
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The motivation for creating a categorisation is that it gives us a toolkit, or a check-list, 
that we can refer to when thinking about finding the mechanisms for any happiness-
related cause. The motivation for using this particular categorisation is these seem to 
be the full range of different pathways we can use to eventually change someone’s 
conscious experiences.24 Of course, having a typology doesn’t guarantee we’ll find 
every possible item of each type, but it does at least prompt us to look. 
I noted earlier that the analysis would not change much if one considered improving 
just the lives of current people, or of all possible people. The case where it would likely 
change relates to the biological mechanisms. Arguably, altering the genetics of a foetus 
would be tantamount to preventing one person from existing and causing another to 
exist. On a narrow(/strict) Person-Affecting View in population ethics, where all that 
matters is how things go for particular individuals, there would be no value in making 
this change: it is not better for either the pre-modified or the post-modified person to 
be created and have a happy life, and hence the change is not better overall (ignoring 
the effects on other people, if any).25 However, as Savulescu and Kahane argue, on a 
wide person-affecting view, it would be better to engage in gene-editing in cases where 
we value the well-being of the people that come into existence, whomever they happen 
to be, because it would be better for people (although not for the particular persons).26 
On a wide person-affecting view, gene-editing seems a very promising way to improve 
lives.    
 
24 This is not the only possible typology. One alternative would be to have a three-way split into external, 
temporal and internal, where 3 to 6 on the list were lumped in with internal. Another would be sub-
divide external further, possibly into capital (both human and economic), environmental and social.  
25 This, indeed, is Parfit’s famous Non-Identity problem. See Derek Parfit (1984) Chapter 16. For 
distinctions between different Person-Affecting Views, see chapter 3.3, footnote 26. 
26  Savulescu and Kahane (2009)  
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Obstacles are the second component of solutions. Once we’ve found a particular 
mechanism that helps with a particular primary cause, we can ask ‘What is stopping 
that mechanism from being used to benefit as many people as possible’? Our answer 
to that question indicates what we think the obstacles are. In general terms, there seem 
to be five types of obstacles: 
• Research: the mechanism is (theoretically) usable, but more know-how is 
required 
• Behaviour/motivation: people don’t want to use the mechanism, even though 
it’s available  
• Education: people would use it, but they don’t know about it 
• Resources: people know about it and would use it but can’t afford it 
• Policy: the state needs to act before the mechanism can be used  
For each mechanism, we would expect all or nearly all the obstacles to apply to some 
extent, so the particular question to ask is: which obstacle(s) should we target if we 
want to have the most cost-effective impact? For instance, one way of increasing 
happiness would be providing psychotherapy to people with mental illnesses. 
Intuitively, the obstacle seems to be money. If someone came along and funded more 
services somewhere in the world, presumably additional people would use them. 
However, this might not be the case, or might not be the case everywhere—in some 
places, perhaps the bigger obstacle is stigma, such that people are not motivated to 
take up services even if they are available. Ultimately, we would want to rely on 
empirical research to investigate which obstacles are more significant. 
It is important to note that the question ‘which is the most important obstacle?’ can 
only usefully and sensibly be asked from the perspective of a particular agent, rather 
than from the perspective, as it were, of the world. Different types of agents will have 
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different capacities, so we need an agent in mind. For instance, it might be more 
effective for an influential celebrity to try to educate people about mental health, a 
doctor to do research, a politician to campaign for policy change, and a hypothetical 
billionaire to fund an organisation providing mental health services. When we ask, as 
we often do in relation to some problem, ‘what needs to be done?’ we must, at least 
implicitly, have some (sort of) agents in mind who we expect should act. I think in 
pecuniary terms: this is because the analysis is the same whoever’s money it is. As a 
methodological aside, if we wanted to redo this analysis with a different agent in mind, 
we would only need to recalibrate it from the point of obstacles onwards; everything 
before that seems to be agent-neutral. 
5. What types of mechanisms are available? What types of obstacles block 
those mechanisms? (Applied) 
The previous section focused on setting up the parameters that are relevant for 
determining the solutions in general, theoretical terms; however, we’ve not yet filled 
in the details. This is what happens next. As there are four causes and six categories of 
mechanism, that gives us twenty-four different potential sets of solutions.  
I’ve put my results from this process in table 6.1, the 4 by 6 box that follows in two 
pages. What I’ll now do is quickly describe the contents of the parts of the box in turn, 
stating the particular mechanisms and what seems to be the relevant obstacle in each 
case. While there are 24 individual boxes to cover, we can avoid a repetitive analysis 
by grouping the discussion by mechanism type. I note that, as we are engaged in cause 
mapping, the objective is only to list the main possibilities. Making an exhaustive list 
is unfeasible. Analysing the possibilities in detail and evaluating their comparative 
cost-effectiveness is a further empirical task subsequent to the cause mapping process. 
I note my concern here is solely with trying to understand what might increase 
209 
 
happiness, not with the ethics of using this or that intervention—the moral question is 
distinct from the one I pursue and an area for further work.27 
5.1 External 
The external mechanism captures ways we could change the world around people, as 
opposed to changing them in some way. External is a reasonably capacious category 
and can be broken down further into capital (i.e. resources), social, and environmental 
changes.  
Starting with poverty, to simplify matters, I assume that poverty is only solvable by the 
provision of extra resources—if we can make those in poverty happier by (say) 
changing how they think then I stipulate that to be part of MSH instead. Following 
GiveWell, the particularly promising interventions for poverty are providing cash 
transfers or deworming, and the obstacle to more of these happening is simply 
money.28 Also plausible are systemic changes, such as attempting to reform 
international trade laws or immigration policies, where the obstacle is policy.29 
Moving on to social and environmental external changes, we could try to improve MSH 
by making people friendlier, more moral, less corrupt, more trustworthy, reducing the 
inequalities with societies as well and making physical spaces more pleasant and less 
polluted, to name the main options.30 The relevant obstacles here seem to be policy 
(e.g. for corruption, inequality, and pollution) as well as behaviour (for the others). 
 
27  For, e.g. some discussion of the ethics of human enhancement, see (Savulescu, Muelen, and Kahane 
2011). 
28  GiveWell (2019c) 
29  E.g. Wenar (2015) sets out how current international trade rules cause poverty. 
30 See Helliwell, Layard and Sachs (2019) ch.2 on how international differences in subjective well-being 
can by six key variables: GDP per capita, social support, healthy life expectancy, freedom to make 




The philanthropist could fund organisations that spread prosocial attitudes—building 
the effective altruist movement being an obvious example—or advocate for various 
changes at the policy level. If it were possible to teach such kindness and 
considerateness in schools, that would seem an obvious place to do so. 
In the external category, pain and mental health would also be the social determinants 
of those conditions: what the WHO calls the situations in which “people are born, 
grow, live, work and age”.31 These are very diffuse, encompassing employment, social 
exclusion, globalisation, gender, and so on. They are sufficiently diffuse that I do not 
investigate them here—it seems unpromising to focus on any one of these many 
contributing factors rather than directly addressing the problems at hand.   
  
 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As people enjoy some things more than others, a natural thought is to nudge people 
into making changes to their lifestyle, so they do more of the things they do like, e.g. 
socialising and exercising, and less of the things they don’t, e.g. commuting and 
working.32 This most clearly improves MSH, but would also improve mental health: 
for instance, one treatment for mental health is Behavioural Activation where people 
are encouraged to be active and do things they enjoy.33  
The interventions we’re considering here are those which individuals are already free 
to undertake. Presumably the obstacle is education and motivation: similarly, there 
are already huge public efforts to encourage people to engage in healthier behaviours, 
such as smoking and drinking less and exercising more, and these are often tackled 
through campaigns, as well as policy changes (for instance, making cigarettes more 
expensive). Encouraging people to change their time use is something that could and 
would be included in any ‘positive education’ curriculum, which I will come back to in 
the next section. 
5.3 Psychological 
Teaching people to change how they think works for mental illness, pain and MSH. 
This is a major way of treating mental illness, where Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, 
which teaches people to understand and change their thinking patterns, is a standard 
and effective approach;34 a more recent approach is mindfulness, a secular form of 
meditation.35 The main obstacle here seems to be money: people would use such 
 
32  For an example of a time-use study indicating this, see Kahneman et al. (2004) 
33  Ekers et al. (2014) 
34  Cuijpers et al. (2013) 
35  Khoury et al. (2013) 
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treatments if they were available for free. That said, many people who could afford to 
see a therapist privately—or treat themselves using freely available resources, e.g. on 
the internet—seem not to do so, which raises the question of whether education and/or 
motivation are the obstacles. 
Regarding pain, there’s evidence that cognitive strategies can be used to treat this.36 
The obstacles here seem similar to those for mental health.  
It turns out the same types of interventions, e.g. cognitive behavioural therapy and 
mindfulness work on non-clinical (i.e. healthy) populations, which means they could 
be used for MSH too.37 One promising idea to get this to people is to teach various 
thinking and resilience techniques in schools. This is approach is called ‘positive 
education’ and research testing it in very large populations (i.e. in the hundreds of 
thousands of students) indicates it raises self-reported well-being scores, as well as 
standardised academic test scores.38 Note that positive education—teaching and 
providing psycho-social skills—is different from ‘conventional’ education, the 
imparting of academic knowledge about, e.g. biology and history. Hence, while 
providing extra positive or conventional education may have a positional effect (see 
section 3), the former has a greater positive impact on the subjective well-being of 
recipients. Another avenue for spreading this useful information would be to run 
public well-being campaigns, which are either directly funded by the philanthropist or 
use private resources to lobby governments to do so.  
 
36  Ehde, Dillworth and Turner (2014) 
37 See e.g. Cukrowicz and Joiner (2007); Kaviani (2011) 
38 See e.g. Sachs et al. (2019) chapter 4 on positive education.  
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I haven’t included any temporal mechanisms to alleviate pain as it’s unclear what they 
could be. 
5.4 Chemical 
Various chemical interventions could help with the primary causes. If we start on 
mental health, it is clear anti-depressants are a widespread and somewhat effective 
treatment. In the more developed world, these seem to be relatively cheap and easily 
available from doctors, hence the obstacle—assuming more of them could be more 
useful—is presumably that people do not choose to ask for them (behaviour). In the 
developing world, access to anti-depressants (like many medicines) can be hard to 
come by. Presumably, the obstacle here is resources. 
There’s evidence that some currently illegal drugs, such as LSD and psilocybin, show 
great promise in the treatment of mental health conditions.39 Their use, even for 
research, is typically heavily restricted by government regulation, hence policy seems 
the obstacle.40  
Turning to pain, a recent commission by The Lancet noted a lack of access to opiate-
strength painkillers in the developing world, which means many people there suffer 
avoidably (this should be distinguished from the problem of opiate ‘over-prescription’ 
that currently affects America). The issue here is again policy—developing world 
governments would need to improve access. 
Regarding MSH, there’s a possibility some form of drug liberalisation may improve 
happiness.41 There are several potential reasons for this here, which are: casual 
 
39  Nichols, Johnson and Nichols (2017) 
40  Nutt, King and Nichols (2013) 
41 Depenalisation, decriminalisation and legalisation are all different options for liberalisation. 
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recreational use may improve lives; liberalisation could reduce harm to users; it could 
reduce crime and increase development around the world—countries like Mexico and 
Columbia are hamstrung by drug conflicts. The obstacle to change is policy here too.  
5.5 Physical 
While increasing happiness through physical mechanisms, such as direct brain 
stimulation, may seem very ‘sci-fi’, I note this already occurs: deep brain stimulation 
(DBS) has been used to treat pain and depression;42 repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (rTMS) has been used to treat depression.43 Technologies such as these 
can already be used by consumers.44 They could potentially increase MSH, but it 
remains to be seen whether they do or not.45 The obstacles here seem to be research—
i.e. more know-how is required to investigate and increase their effectiveness—and 
also policy issues related to their use in medical and consumer contexts. 
5.6 Biological  
As noted earlier, genetically modifying people to become happier is at least 
theoretically possible.46 Just as for physical mechanisms, the relevant obstacles appear 
to be research and policy.  
6. Which interventions share the same obstacles? What secondary causes 
do we get as a result? 
The previous sections identified different mechanisms by which we might improve 
lives and the obstacles in each case. What we can do now is group together cases where 
 
42 See e.g. Kennedy et al. (2011) 
43 Ren et al. (2014), George et al. (1995) 
44  Maslen et al. (2013) 
45 Wexler and Reiner (2019), Page (2001) 
46  Savulescu and Kahane (2009) 
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the obstacles are all the same to form secondary causes, which are the different 
candidate solutions for making progress on the primary causes. I propose six 
secondary causes. These turn out to be substantially, but not entirely, the same as the 
groups of interventions discussed in the previous section. This is perhaps not 
surprising—for instance, if we’re thinking about changing how people think, we would 
expect to run into many of the same issues, whether we are trying to alter their thinking 
to help them with mental illness or with pain. Similarly, for the chemical mechanisms, 
a broad, shared obstacle is policy—access to such substances is widely regulated.  
I’ll now list the six secondary causes, providing the subsection of section 5 from which 
they are drawn. Where it’s obvious what the secondary cause is, I will not provide 
further commentary in order to avoid repetitiveness. How the secondary causes 
emerge is indicated in the graphical representation of the cause mapping in figure 6.2. 
After setting these out, I make some brief remarks on meta-causes. 
1. Poverty alleviation (5.1). 
2. Positive education (5.2 and 5.3). This focus on helping people to improve how 
they think (a psychological mechanism) and how they spend their time (a 
temporal mechanism). Note this secondary cause would also serve the 
purpose of building resilience to all the short-term ‘life-events’ I mentioned in 
section 3 but didn’t include as primary causes in their own right, such as 
losing a partner, being a victim of crime, becoming unemployed, etc.  
3. Improving access to psychological therapies for mental health (5.3). 
4. Drug policy reform (5.4). In the chemical mechanism section, it was clear that, 
both in a medical and recreational context, quite a few specific ways of 
increasing happiness would be available if drug policy was changed. Hence a 
broad secondary cause is drug policy reform. 
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5. Social, cultural and environmental change (5.1). This picks the social and 
environmental changes in the external mechanism sub-section.  
6. Happiness, mental health and pain research (5.4, 5.5, 5.6). While lack of 
insight is frequently a problem, it appears to be the main obstacle for the last 
three mechanisms we have discussed so these have been grouped together. 
That completes the list of six secondary causes. 
In figure 6.2, I have also included three meta-causes. I don’t propose to say much about 
meta-causes because, in order to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of meta-causes, we 
need to be able to tell a story about how resources to the meta-causes will eventually 
translate into better outcomes among the primary causes through affecting the 
secondary causes anyway (‘how exactly will spreading altruistic values increase 
donations to charities? By how much will it do this and where will the new money go? 
Etc.’). Indeed, a test to identify whether something is a meta or a secondary cause is 
that you can’t calculate the expected value of the former unless you already know the 
expected value of additional resources in the latter. Seeing as we currently can’t say 
much about the efficacy of the secondary causes here, it seems we should make more 
progress on those before returning to this topic. It is worth saying that if we want to 
assess the impact of meta-causes accurately, we’ll need to consider what sort of impact 
they will have on everything else. This is something made much more straightforward 
by having done the cause mapping approach. The arrows I’ve drawn from the meta to 
the secondary causes are merely illustrative and indicate the direction of causality, in 




















































































































































































































































































































7. Conclusion  
In this final section, I tie up a few loose ends: clarifying the nature of the secondary 
causes and how to make progress on them, the potential oddness that my secondary 
causes are at odds with the current suggestions of effective altruists, the usefulness of 
cause mapping in other domains.  
The secondary causes are best understood as a ‘longlist’ of areas for further 
investigation in the sense that we hope they will contain all the good options, but not 
all the options they contain are good—by differentiation, we would say a ‘shortlist’ 
would have only good options. As such, more work is required to carefully look through 
them. This would start with explicit, quantitative expected value calculations of 
particular options, from which some conclusions could be reached about what the best 
ways to improve happiness are.47 
More specifically, making progress on evaluating the secondary causes requires doing 
one or more of three tasks. First, running new empirical experiments to test key claims. 
For instance, running randomised-controlled trials using happiness measures to test 
the cost-effectiveness of mental health and anti-poverty interventions in the 
developing world. Second, building cost-effectiveness models of interventions where 
evidence already exists, such as on the effect of positive psychology programmes that 
teach children to be happier. Third, establishing the particular places money could be 
donated to and comparing the effectiveness of particular organisations in that field. 
For instance, it is unclear how best to pursue drug policy reform: would it be a ballot 
initiative in California to legalise all drugs, funding research into the using of 
 
47 A more detailed set of specific questions for which research would need to be done or, where it exists, 
collected, can be found here Plant (2019). 
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psychedelics to treatment mental health conditions, or something else? Even having 
considered that, organisations in that particular domain require assessment. 
Clearly, there is a huge amount of further work to be done here, much of it outside the 
domain of academic philosophy. While I am unable to complete all this analysis, I will 
attempt to take a bite out of it in the final chapter, 7, where I compare charities that 
alleviate poverty—which are currently favoured by effective altruists—to one that 
treats mental health, and do so in terms of subjective well-being scores. Having 
investigated prioritisation methodology in this and the previous chapter and then, in 
this one, looked through the possible options, mental health interventions—
specifically, mental health treated through psychotherapy—stands out as the first 
option to investigate if we are looking to find something more cost-effective than 
alleviating poverty.  
This is for a couple of reasons. First, treating mental health via psychotherapy is, 
intuitively, among the most promisingly cost-effective options we considered, 
particularly given (as noted) the large per-person badness of mental illness is relative 
to other life-changes and the existence of effective treatments. Second, it allows a 
direct comparison: we can compare the efficiency of developing world charities that 
directly provide evidence-based interventions of one type—poverty alleviation—
against one that provides another—treating mental illness. Third, mental health has 
not been considered as a serious contender for the most effective ways to improve well-
being, and using different approaches to measuring well-being might show that it is a 
serious contender. 
Before we move to this analysis in the next chapter, there are two further points to 
make. As noted in chapter 4, effective altruism, in as much as it is concerned with 
benefiting those alive today, seems to focus on poverty and physical health. That might 
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be taken as evidence I’ve made some serious error, given that the secondary causes 
listed suggest there are many additional options worth investigating. The explanation 
here, as mentioned before, is that effective altruists seem to not have seriously 
considered how best to improve lives and/or have not incorporated the empirical 
evidence on subjective well-being in their analyses. Certainly, no one has explicitly 
made claims about which are the best things to do if one wants to improve lives and 
provided arguments or evidence I can critique. Hence, my suggestions could be 
understood as a reasonable list of options that emerge when this question is 
investigated seriously for the first time.  
The final point is about whether cause mapping should be used in other areas besides 
maximally improving lives, such as when the question is how to maximise good over 
the long-term. This seems at least worth trying: it may clarify thinking and indicate 
new topics to be investigated but there is no guarantee of this. To re-run it in other 
domains would require a new list of priority primary causes and a different typology 




Chapter 7: Spending money, buying happiness 
0. Abstract 
This chapter asks: if one wanted to give to charity to make people happier, and do so 
as cost-effectively as possible, is alleviating poverty the priority? The answer to this 
question among effective altruists, notably Singer and MacAskill, seems to be Yes. 
Against this, I argue that, if we measure happiness using self-reported subjective well-
being scores, treating mental health currently looks better.  
1. Using subjective well-being score to estimate charity effectiveness 
The current view among effective altruists, as exemplified by Singer and MacAskill, is 
that global poverty is the priority if we are trying to make people alive today happier.1 
In chapter 4, I noted that neither Singer or MacAskill make use of the social science 
literature on self-reported subjective well-being (SWB) and then argued SWB scores 
can and should be used to measure happiness. In this chapter, I attempt a first-pass of 
what the most cost-effective charities are if we evaluate them through the ‘happiness 
lens’, that is using SWB scores as the measure of success. Specifically, I use life 
satisfaction scores and then convert from those into happiness scores.2 As Singer and 
MacAskill recommend the recommendations of GiveWell, a charity evaluator, I 
compare a mental health charity, StrongMinds, to GiveWell’s current eight top-
recommended charities, all of which target poverty or physical health. Mental health 
has not so far been considered as a potential priority either by GiveWell or Singer and 
 
1 See chapter 4. To be clear, I use ‘making people happier’ to refer to increasing someone’s happiness, 
either by increasing the quality or length of their life. What happiness is discussed in chapter 4 also. 
2 See chapter 4 for an explanation and justification of this approach to measuring happiness.  
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MacAskill.3 I show that StrongMinds looks competitive with the best of GiveWell’s four 
life-improving charities (which focus on poverty). I run into problems comparing life-
improving with life-saving charities due to the uncertainties about where to say the 
‘neutral point’ equivalent to non-existence is on a 0—10 life satisfaction scale.  
In so doing, this final chapter addresses some unresolved questions from chapter 4 
and builds on the analysis of chapter 6.  
In chapter 4, I raised four objections against using self-reported subjective well-being 
(SWB) scores to measure happiness, instead of the proxies that are currently favoured 
by moral philosophers (i.e. income and QALYs). While I tackled the first two 
objections there, I was unable to convincingly deal with the last two practical concerns: 
(3) there is not yet enough evidence on SWB to guide our decision-making; (4) moving 
to SWB would not make a practical difference and it is, therefore, unnecessary. The 
only way to fully address those concerns is to show that we can crunch the numbers 
and, when we do, it does make a difference to our priorities in at least one case. This is 
exactly what I do in this chapter. As mental health has not so far been thought of as a 
potential priority but looks competitive with the existing priority when we shine the 
light on self-reported happiness scores on matters, I think that is sufficient to address 
those two objections. 
This chapter also picks up where the preceding chapter (6) ended. We had completed 
the ‘cause mapping’ survey of potentially high-impact ways to make people happier, 
but not gone to the next step of assessing if any of the as-yet-unexamined possibilities 
 
3 The notable exception is Plant and Singer (2017), a newspaper column, which argues (developed 
world) governments should urgently provide additional mental health treatment as doing so would 
alleviate suffering and reduce overall health expenditure. Singer informs me that StrongMinds will be 
mentioned in the second edition of his book The Life You Can Save Singer (2019) due out in Autumn 
(and this is due, in some part, to my agitation on the subject). 
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offered a most cost-effective way to do good than the existing priorities. Here, we take 
one step in that direction. GiveWell recommend developing world organisations that 
carry out evidence-based ‘micro-interventions’—i.e. those that help people 
individually, as opposed to changing the system. As such, I choose to compare those 
against StrongMinds, another developing world organisation providing an evidence-
based micro-intervention, because that allows the most straightforward ‘apples-to-
apples’ analysis. I am not claiming interventions of this type are the most effective way 
to increase happiness, but it is easiest to start here. 
I need to make a few preliminary comments before we get stuck into the cost-
effectiveness analysis. 
In a more ideal world, there would already have been randomised-controlled trials 
(RCTs) which had measured the impact of all the charities’ interventions using 
measures of self-reported happiness. We could then look at that data and see, at a 
glance, if changing our measure of impact would change our priorities. Sadly, such 
information does not exist, nor is it likely to in the near future, and so I do the next 
best thing and create some estimates on the basis of currently available information.4 
Specifically, my approach is to estimate the impact of different interventions in terms 
of life satisfaction point-years, abbreviated to ‘LSPs’, where 1 LSP is equivalent to 
increasing life satisfaction for one person by one point on a ten-point scale for one 
year. As noted earlier (chapter 4.2) some outcomes have a bigger impact on life 
satisfaction than on happiness (and vice versa). Hence, I then adjust the LSPs to get 
 
4 Among the economists using SWB measures I have spoken to, there appears to be almost no interest 
in using them to evaluate charity cost-effectiveness. If we want to wait for such information, we will be 
waiting for a long time. 
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happiness point-years, or ‘HPs’, where 1 HP is equivalent to increasing happiness for 
one person by one point on a ten-point scale for one year.  
LSPs and HPs are similar in structure to QALYs, but with two differences.5 First, LSPs 
and HPs are measured on a 0-10 scale, while QALYs are on a 0-1 scale (this is a trivial 
difference and I note it to reduce potential confusion). Second, while QALYs are 
measured on a ratio scale, life satisfaction and happiness are perhaps better 
understood having an interval scale. On the QALY, 0 is equivalent to having no health 
and thus also quite naturally equivalent to death. The typical scale that measures life 
satisfaction runs from 0 (“not at all satisfied”) to 10 (“extremely satisfied”). 
Participants are not asked to specify what point on the 0 to 10 scale is the ‘neutral 
point’, where they are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, which would be equivalent to 
non-existence, nor is a neutral point specified for them. The neutral point is arguably 
somewhere between 0 and 5 for life satisfaction, but I postpone discussion of this issue 
until section 3, when I set out the problems this uncertainty causes for assessing the 
cost-effectiveness of life-saving charities. As such, HPs and LSPs are not as 
straightforwardly interpretable as Well-being Adjust Life-Years (WALYs), which 
would, by specification, have a clear neutral point built-in.6 
It will useful to briefly explain GiveWell’s approach and how it differs from the SWB-
based one I use. In short, GiveWell start with an estimate of how much it costs an 
organisation to achieve particular outcomes. The two most important outcomes in 
their analysis being (a) saving the life of an under-5-year old child and (b) doubling 
consumption for one person for one year. In order to trade-off those two outcomes 
 
5 See chapter 4.5 for a discussion of QALYs compared to SWB scores as a measure of happiness. 
6 As noted in chapter 4 at footnote 8, MacAskill suggests we would ideally measure the impact of our 
actions in WALYs. 
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against one another, they poll their staff, asking them how many years of doubled 
consumption are morally equivalent to saving the life of an under-5-year old child. 
GiveWell uses an aggregate of their staff’s views to determine the trade-off between 
the outcomes—hence the ‘GiveWell view’ is a black box and no one’s view in particular. 
In the recent analysis, the GiveWell view is that doubling someone’s consumption for 
one year has 2% of the value of saving an under-5-year old.7 To the best of my 
knowledge, no staff member makes their decisions based solely on SWB data, and only 
some take happiness to be the only intrinsic good. Hence the GiveWell approach is not 
(entirely) an attempt to maximise happiness. Nevertheless, for the purposes of my 
comparison, this is how I will interpret their view. I do not think this is grossly unfair, 
at least to an approximation: after all, Singer and MacAskill are looking for the most 
effective ways to increase happiness and recommend GiveWell’s charities;8 further, 
GiveWell’s recommendations—which focus on saving lives and alleviating poverty—
are intuitively highly plausible ways to increase happiness. Of course, if GiveWell were 
not at all interested in happiness—and instead, to illustrate the point with a silly 
example, were trying to maximise the total number of hats in the world—there would 
be little point in evaluating their recommendations in terms of their happiness impact. 
As it is, this seems a reasonable comparison to make. 
I first compare StrongMinds against Givewell’s life-improving recommendations and 
then against its life-saving recommendations. 
 
7  GiveWell (2018a) 
8  See chapter 4, footnotes 7 and 8. 
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2. StrongMinds vs GiveWell’s recommended life-improving charities 
I first estimate the cost-effectiveness of GiveDirectly, which provides unconditional 
cash transfers to poor villages in southern Africa, in terms of life satisfaction. I 
consider the impact of StrongMinds in terms of life satisfaction. I then convert their 
impact in terms of life satisfaction into their impact in terms of happiness. Finally, I 
attempt some comparisons between StrongMinds and GiveWell’s other life-improving 
organisations and mention two further important considerations. 
A study on GiveDirectly’s cash transfers indicates they increase life satisfaction by 
about 0.3 LSPs after 4.3 months. I assume this effect lasts a whole year; it is the same 
for everyone in the recipient household, and there are 5 people per household on 
average. Hence, the annual LSP impact is 0.3 (LS/person) x 1 (year) x 5 (persons) = 
1.5 LSPs. The average cash transfer is $750, implying a cost-effectiveness of 2 
LSPs/$1000. The calculation and sources for this estimate are set out in table 7.1 at 
the end of the chapter. 
We might wonder if there are impacts beyond one year. A 2018 study on the long-term 
(3-year) effects of GiveDirectly by Haushofer and Shapiro found that recipients, 
compared to non-recipients in distant villages, had 40% more assets but that 
recipients did no better on a psychological well-being index.9 That the psychological 
well-being index didn’t improve while assets did is admittedly surprising—research 
indicates wealth is associated with SWB.10 Recalling the construct validation approach 
mentioned in section 3, I note one or more odd results shouldn’t be taken as 
compelling evidence against the validity of SWB measures in general: someone making 
 
9 Haushofer and Shapiro (2018) Working paper. P. 22. 
10 E.g. see Headey and Wooden (2004)  
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such an objection would also need to explain how SWB measures could broadly get the 
‘right’ answers whilst nevertheless failing to generally capture their underlying 
constructs.11  
I note that my estimate of GiveDirectly’s short-term impact on its recipients is large 
compared to what we would expect for that same relative increase in income to 
someone in the developed world. $1000 might be equivalent to a year’s income for 
GiveDirectly’s poorer recipients.12 For someone in the UK, a doubling of income is 
associated with a 0.12 LSPs increase per year, whereas I infer GiveDirectly’s per-
person impact is 0.3, nearly three times larger. This doesn’t seem that surprising, given 
the poverty of GiveDirectly’s recipients. Extending this per-person effect across the 
whole family is likely generous to GiveDirectly: the association between family income 
and children’s SWB has not been much examined, but one UK study found no 
statistically significant effects on children below 13 and only a small one for those 
above.13  
Turning to StrongMinds, there have been no studies which directly measure its impact 
on life satisfaction, so I infer this using other available information. More detail is 
provided in table 7.1. The short explanation is that I use both UK data on life 
satisfaction and standardised mental health scores to estimate the life satisfaction 
impact of being treated for depression in the UK. I found this to be 0.3 LSPs in the first 
year. The main treatment method used in the UK (cognitive-behavioural therapy) is 
different from the one used by StrongMinds (interpersonal therapy), but studies have 
 
11 I thank Peter Singer for identifying that this result could be taken as an objection as SWB measures 
in general. 
12 Singer (2015) at p. 113. 
13  Knies (2017) 
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found the methods are comparably effective.14 However, as most of these studies were 
in a high-resource setting, I reduce StrongMinds’ effectiveness by a third to be 
conservative. 
The other important issue is how long the treatment lasts. A UK study of the long-term 
effects of psychotherapy found it lasted 4 years without substantial reduction—there 
was only 4 years of data.15 Conservatively, this suggests that StrongMind’s total effect 
is 0.8 LSPs per patient. In their analysis of StrongMinds’ cost-effectiveness, Snowden 
et al. assumed the treatment effect had a 75% annual retention.16 Modelled this way, 
the total effect is 0.75 LSPs per patient, which is very similar. I take the average of two 
estimates. StrongMinds say their per-participant costs are $102, which indicates their 
impact is 7.4 LSPs/$1000 (1 d.p.). 
Hence, compared in terms of life satisfaction, StrongMinds is around 4 times more 
cost-effective than GiveDirectly—2 LSPs/$1,000 vs 7.4 LSPs/$1,000. 
In chapter 4.2, I noted some things have more effect on life satisfaction measures than 
happiness (and vice versa) and that once we had outcome measures in terms of life 
satisfaction, we could convert these into happiness scores by adjusting for these 
differences. The evidence indicates that mental health has about a 40% bigger impact 
on affect than life satisfaction,17 and income increases have about a 60% smaller 
impact on affect than life satisfaction.18 Hence, crudely, we could infer that 
StrongMinds’ cost-effectiveness is 10.4 Happiness Point-Years (HPs)/$1,000 and 
 
14  Cuijpers et al. (2013); Donker et al. (2013); Lemmens et al. (2015) 
15  Wiles et al. (2016) 
16  Halstead, Snowden and Heoijmakers (2019)  
17 Inferred from Dolan and Metcalfe (2012): anxiety/depression level 3 has a 35% bigger impact on affect 
than life satisfaction; anxiety/depression level 2 has a 45% bigger impact on affect than life satisfaction. 
I take the average of these two numbers.  
18 Boarini et al. (2012) 24. 
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GiveDirectly’s is 0.8 HPs/$1,000. If we make this adjustment, StrongMinds is then 
around 13 times more cost-effective than GiveDirectly in terms of happiness.  
We can quickly compare StrongMinds to GiveWell’s other life-improving charities—
SCI, Deworm the World, SightSavers and END—all of which run deworming 
programmes where children are treated for intestinal worms.19 On GiveWell’s analysis, 
all these other charities are at least five times more cost-effective than GiveDirectly: 
Deworm the World is rated as 18.3 times better (the highest) and END 5.5 (the 
lowest).20 Let’s assume that GiveWell’s analysis about the relative cost-effectiveness of 
these organisation is correct—there is not enough space to dispute that, and this is the 
charitable assumption. In that case, as StrongMinds is around 13 more cost-effective 
than GiveDirectly, it puts StrongMinds and Deworm the World roughly on a par in 
terms of happiness-based cost-effectiveness. Deworm the World is 40% more cost-
effective on these numbers but, given the uncertainty that surrounds such estimates, 
we might think this is within the margin of error.  
Before I move on, I want to note two further ways in which this analysis is likely to be 
generous to GiveWell’s choices. First, it ignores the fact that making some people 
richer (and so happier and more satisfied) may have negative spillovers: it makes non-
recipients feel poorer (and so less happy and satisfied). There seems to be mixed 
evidence that GiveDirectly has a negative spillover effect. One study found it was large 
enough to offset all the gains to life satisfaction.21 However, GiveWell state that a more 
recent, not-yet-public study finds there are no negative SWB spillover effects across 
 
19  GiveWell (2019c). 
20  GiveWell (2018a). 
21  Haushofer, Reisinger and Shapiro (2015). 
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villages and positive spillover effects to non-recipients within the same village.22 The 
broad picture in the literature, as illustrated in figure 6.1, is that comparison effects do 
occur, hence it would be surprising if there were none at all. This concern will apply to 
GiveWell’s other three life-improving organisations too: according to GiveWell, the 
vast majority of the benefit of deworming comes not from reducing the physical 
discomfort the worms cause, but from the fact that dewormed children do better in 
school and earn more in later life as a result.23 Presumably, this extra income will also 
result in some negative spillover effects on the earners’ peers.24  
The second concern is one raised in chapters 1 and also relates to the potential 
downsides to making some richer: if people become richer, they eat more meat; 
assuming the animals suffer, and creating unhappy lives is bad, this will somewhat 
reduce the value of wealth-increasing interventions. Presumably, even if mental health 
interventions make people somewhat richer, e.g. because they can work more, poverty 
alleviation programmes would have a larger effect on income, which further relatively 
reduces the impact of the latter against the former. 
I do not attempt to quantify these further considerations. Such matters are too 
complicated to resolve here. Even without doing so, I think the analysis is sufficient to 
show both that we can use happiness scores for cost-effectiveness and that doing so 
this indicates new potential priorities. It seems striking that by moving to a new 
outcome measure (self-reported happiness scores) we are able to find a type of 
 
22 See GiveWell (2018c). GiveWell just state the effects in terms of ‘subjective well-being’ so I don’t know 
what measure is being used.  
23 GiveWell (2018a) states that 2% of the cost-effectiveness of the deworming charities (DtW, SCI, 
Sightsavers, END) comes from 'short-term health effects' and 98% from 'eventual income and 
consumption gains'. See the Results tab in the spreadsheet. 
24 Peter Singer notes that improving education would also a further, societal benefit – better-educated 
workers boost the economy, increase employment, raise tax revenue, etc. This seems plausible and I 
merely concede I am unable to account for or quantify these potentially disperse benefits here.   
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intervention (treating mental health), one that had not been previously considered and 
is comparably cost-effective to the best of the existing interventions.  
I anticipate a critical response here along the following lines: on closer inspection, my 
hopeful efforts to find a more cost-effective way to do good will turn out to be less 
promising than it currently seems, and no one should change where they donate their 
money until further evidence has been acquired. 
I think this objection is probably correct. However, it is beside the point for the 
objections I am trying to counter, namely that the use of self-reported happiness scores 
to determine what increases happiness is either impractical or irrelevant. It seems the 
correct response to the concern I’ve raised is to more accurately assess charitable 
impact by using self-reported happiness scores and then see if the result will still hold.  
3. StrongMinds vs GiveWell's recommended life-saving charities 
The other important comparison to try to make is between StrongMinds and 
GiveWell’s recommended life-saving interventions, such as the Against Malaria 
Foundation (AMF), which provides malaria-resistant bednets. For simplicity, this 
analysis ignores two major complexities discussed elsewhere in the thesis. First, that 
there are different philosophical views about how to assess the badness of death (see 
chapter 3). Second, the other-regarding impacts of saving lives (see chapters 1 and 2). 
Here, I use the Deprivationism account of the badness of death (see chapter 3), on 
which the value of saving a life is the total well-being that the person would have had 
if they’d lived.25 
 
25 If we wish to be more technical: the life comparative account of the badness of death could be restated 
as the additive account of lifetime well-being. That is the lifetime well-being value of a life is the sum of 
the momentary well-being which the individual has at each moment they exist.  
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How cost-effective is AMF? According to GiveWell’s estimates, AMF saves a life (i.e. 
prevents a premature death) for around $4,500.26 Suppose that grants 60 
counterfactual years of life. To pick at random, average life satisfaction in Kenya, one 
country where AMF operates, is 4.4 out of 10.27 Now we run into a problem. The typical 
scale that measures life satisfaction runs from 0 (“not at all satisfied”) to 10 
(“extremely satisfied”). But it’s unclear where on the 0—10 is the ‘neutral point’ which 
we can take as being equivalent to non-existence. This is a deficiency of relying on life 
satisfaction scales for our measure of happiness: in contrast, measures of affect (i.e. 
happiness) usually specify a neutral point to represent the feeling of being, on balance, 
neither happy nor unhappy. Life satisfaction scales are of interval quality when we 
need a ratio scale to compare improving to saving lives.28 To transform them to the 
latter we must assign a neutral point.  
Prima face, the mid-point in the scale, 5, would be the neutral point. Yet, if that’s true, 
then saving lives through AMF would, in fact, be bad: 4.4/10 is below the neutral point 
and thus, in saving lives, AMF would be prolonging lives not worth living.29 It’s not 
particularly plausible that those in Kenya have such bad lives. 
Alternatively, as Clark et al. suggest, we could ‘at a stretch’ take 0 as being equivalent 
to having no life satisfaction.30 One issue is that it then makes it impossible for 
someone to say they are dissatisfied with their life, even though such a view is 
intelligible. Clearly, it is possible to feel unhappy.31 Here, we find an opposite problem: 
 
26  GiveWell (2019b). 
27 Helliwell, Layard and Sachs (2017) at p 28. 
28 See chapter 4.4 for discussion of different types of scales. 
29 This issue is complicated by the fact we might assume those lives will be happier and more satisfied 
over time. For simplicity, I leave out this issue.  
30 Clark et al. (2018) at p. 206. 
31 This may well be a limitation of using life satisfaction scores as a proxy for happiness. 
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if the neutral point is too low, it will erroneously count saving lives that are not worth 
living as good. 
We could instead partially split the difference and say the neutral point is 4. If this is 
so, saving the child is worth 0.4 LSPs a year for 60 years, a total of 24 LSPs (0.4 x 60). 
Given the $3,500 cost, we can calculate cost-effectiveness as 6.9 LSPs/$1,000. Earlier, 
I estimated that StrongMinds’ cost-effectiveness was 7.4 LSPs/$1000 and 11.8 
HPs/$1,000. It’s unclear what adjustment, if any, we should make for life-saving 
interventions when converting from life satisfaction to happiness, so I have made no 
adjustment and assumed that AMF’s cost-effectiveness is 6.9 HPs/$1,000. If these 
estimates are correct, then StrongMinds is still more cost-effective, whether it is 
measured in terms of LSPs or HPs. 
However, all this is sensitive to where the neutral point is placed: if the neutral point 
were 3/10, AMF’s cost-effectiveness would leap to 24.4 LSPs/HPs per $1,000 and 
outperform StrongMinds. If the neutral point were 0, AMF would be about 75 
HPs/LSPs per $1,000 and about seven times more cost-effective than StrongMinds. 
Note this analysis excludes any other-regarding impacts of saving lives.   
If it were the case that life-improving interventions were clearly better or worse than 
life-saving ones on any (plausible) specification of the neutral point, this issue could 
be ignored. As it is, the comparison is highly sensitive to it. Further work is needed to 
determine the correct methodological approach to this issue. I am unsure what to 




In this chapter, I attempted a first-pass cost-effectiveness analysis of which charities 
are the best at making people happier.32 While effective altruists have thought 
alleviating poverty is the best option, I argued that a mental health organisation, 
StrongMinds, seems to be roughly as cost-effective as the leading poverty-alleviating 
entities when we assess impact in terms of SWB. I was unable to satisfactorily compare 
this mental health intervention to life-saving physical health interventions.  
Earlier (in chapter 4), I argued that SWB scores should be used to measure happiness 
but noted there were two practical objections to using SWB data—that judging 
outcomes in terms of self-reported happiness scores was both unfeasible and would 
not make a difference. As mental health interventions have not been previously 
identified as a potential happiness-increasing priority, the analysis in this chapter 
addresses those objections. 
This chapter also made some progress by investigating one of the many possible ways 
of making people happier that was set out in chapter 6. While there are many other 
options still to examine, I was able to assess one novel option from that list and 
indicate it provides a means to do good even better. 
  
 




Item Number Source Note 
GIVEDIRECTLY 
   
Increase in life satisfaction 





Haushofer and Shapiro 
(2016) p1976 
Measured after 4.3 months. Note 
Haushofer, Reisinger and Shapiro 
(2015) at p32 show there is adaptation 
to the transfers—the initial effect 
reduces over time. I’m assuming the 
average effect over the year was a raise 
of 0.16 standard deviations. (I checked 
this with Julian Jamison, a 
development economist, who thought 
this was a reasonable approximation.)   
Standard deviation of life 
satisfaction scores 1.9 
 
Clark et al. (2018) p16 
I could not find the standard deviation 
in (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016) so 
use I UK data, assuming the standard 
deviation is the same—I have no reason 
to think it should be larger or smaller. 
Life satisfaction increase 
per household member 0.304 Calculation 
Multiplication of two previous 
numbers.  
Members of household 5 Guess 2 parents, 3 children 
Total life satisfaction effect 
on household (LS point-
years) 1.52 Calculation 
Assumes assumption all members of 
household had the measured effect 
size. 
Cost-effectiveness of 
GiveDirectly in LS point-
years/$1,000 (assuming 
no negative spillovers) 2.0 Calculation To 1 d.p. 
Cost-effectiveness of 
GiveDirectly in happiness 
point-years (HPs) 0.8 Calculation 
 
Boarini et al. (2012) p24 find income 
increases have about a 60% smaller 
impact on affect than life satisfaction 
STRONGMINDS 
   
Reduction in life 
satisfaction from suffering 
from depression/anxiety 0.7 Clark et al. (2018) p212.  
LS impact of being diagnosed with 
mental illness vs not (from multiple 
regression) 
Average PHQ-9 of those 
diagnosed with depression 15.5 Kendrick et al. (2009)  UK data. 
Average PHQ-9 score of 
non-clinical population 
(i.e. those without 
depression) 5 Gyani et al. (2013)  Cut-off is 10. Assume the average is 5. 
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Difference in PHQ-9 scores 
between average person 
diagnosed with depression 
and non-clinical 
population 10.5 Calculation 
 
Average reduction in PHQ-
9 score of treatment (UK) 4.47 Gyani et al. (2013) 
From the UK's Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies (IAPT) 
programme which provided CBT. 
Figure is from the treatment of 
moderate depression. This is 
conservative—those with more severe 
depression had larger average 
improvements. 
StongMind own estimate 
of PHQ-9 reductions 4.5 
 
StrongMinds (2015) 
Note this was a quasi-RCT and 
conducted by StrongMinds. The 
‘control group’ consisted of women 
who did not want the group therapy 
StrongMinds provides (rather than 
those who did want it).  
Annual increase in life 
satisfaction from the 
treatment of 
depression/anxiety (UK) 0.298 Calculation 
 
First-year increase in life 
satisfaction caused by 
StrongMinds 0.2 Adjustment 
Note StrongMinds's self-rated PHQ-9 
reduction nearly identical to that seen 
in UK mental health treatment. I 
discount the effectiveness by 1/3 for 
conservatism. 
Duration of the effect of 
mental health treatment 
(years) 4 Wiles et al. (2016)  
Reduction in clinical scores for the 
UK’s CBT appeared to be almost 
constant when measured 4 years later. 
Study only looked at a 4-year duration, 
so it is reasonable to assume the effect 
lasted longer. I assume 4 years for 
conservatism. An alternative would be 
to assume the effect fades as found in 
Reay et al. (2012)—see below. 
Total LS effect, calculated 
as constant for 4 years 0.8 Calculation 
 
(Alternative calculation) 
Total LS effect, assuming 
there is a 75% annual 
retention of the benefit 0.75 Calculation 
To check, I also calculated the total LS 
effect using the same method as 
Halstead, Snowden and Heoijmakers 
(2019), who assume a 75% annual 
retention of benefits based on the 
results of Reay et al. (2012). Numbers 
for this are below. The two methods 
give almost exactly the same results. 
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Per participant cost of 
StrongMinds ($) 102 StrongMinds (2018) Total programme costs/no. of patients 
Total LS effect of Strong 
(average of two duration 
calculations) 0.75 Calculation Average of two estimates 
Cost-effectiveness of 
StrongMinds in LS point-
year/$1,000) 7.4 Calculation to 1 d. p. 
 
Cost-effectiveness of 
StrongMinds in happiness 
point-years (HPs) 10.4 Calculation to 1 d. p. 
Inferred from Dolan and Metcalfe 
(2012): anxiety/depression level 3 has 
a 35% bigger impact on affect than life 
satisfaction; anxiety/depression level 2 
has a 45% bigger impact on affect than 





   
Retention rate of benefits 75% Reay et al. (2012) 
 
Year 1 benefit (LS points) 0.2 
Taken from the inferred 
1st year of StrongMind’s 
effect 
 
Year 2 benefits (LS points) 0.15 calculation 
 
Year 3 benefit (LS points) 0.1125 calculation 
 
Year 4 benefits (LS points) 0.0844 Calculation to 4 dp. 
 
Year 5 benefit (LS points) 0.0639 Calculation to 4 d.p. 
 
Year 6 benefits (LS points) 0.0475 Calculation to 4 d.p. 
 
Year 7 benefit (LS points) 0.0356 calculation to 4 d.p. 
 
Year 8 benefits (LS points) 0.0267 Calculation to 4 d.p. 
 
Year 9 benefits (LS points) 0.0200 Calculation to 4 d.p. 
 
Year 10 benefits (LS 
points) 0.0150 Calculation to 4 d.p. 
 
Total after 10 years (LS 






 ‘What should we do if we want to do as much good as possible?’ is a question that has 
only recently become the subject of serious inquiry. The effective altruism social 
movement has been responsible for a considerable portion of the analysis of it. In this 
thesis, I have argued that some of the claims by effective altruists are, to a greater or 
lesser extent, mistaken and shown how rectifying these errors could substantially alter 
both our understanding of, and our priorities for, doing the most good.  
My modus operandi across the chapters has been to take for granted the sort of basic 
assumptions philosophers normally argue about—assumptions about morality or 
facts—and then identify a whole range of considerations, given those assumptions, 
which have been overlooked so far and whose inclusion alters the analysis in 
interesting ways. In what follows, I’ll restate the specific assumptions I made in each 
chapter. Two general assumptions that underly all the analysis are that we ought to do 
the most good with some of our ‘spare’ resources (in whatever sense one’s normative 
theory determines constitutes ‘spare’) and that it is valuable to determine how to do 
the most good; I expect few to find these two assumptions controversial. The result of 
structuring the thesis in this way is there was no attempt to argue what the correct 
theory of value is or to offer an all-things-considered assessment of what the priorities 
would be on such a theory, assuming that we wanted to do the most good. I hope to 
examine such topics in future work. 
I’ll now say, more specifically, what I think I have achieved, what I have not achieved 
and what I have not sought to do.   
Chapter 1 drew out the underlying tension between two propositions: that saving 
humans is good and that being a meat eater is wrong because of the animal suffering 
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this causes. I argued that, given certain other not implausible normative and empirical 
assumptions, saving strangers’ lives bad (in expectation) and (thus) not required. 
Although both Singer’s essay Famine, Affluence and Morality (from which the famous 
Drowning Child case originates) and book Animal Liberation (from which the 
argument against meat eating arises) are decades old, the strong tension between them 
appears not to have been brought out and evaluated before.1 I did not attempt to argue 
that eating meat is wrong on the grounds that it creates animals with lives not worth 
living (this conclusion is the result of accepting a few assumptions: eating meat creates 
new animals, these animals live lives not worth living, and that creating lives not worth 
living is wrong in this case); rather, I assumed it for the sake of argument and then 
raised a problem for those that do accept it. 
Chapter 2 puts pressure on the acceptance of a different pair of beliefs. Many seem 
inclined towards the ‘Intuitive View’: that saving lives is good and that, due to concerns 
about overpopulation, averting lives is also good. I developed Greaves’ earlier analysis 
of the topic. I showed how improbable the Intuitive View would be on Totalism and 
how, if the Intuitive View were true, neither saving nor averting lives would be 
particularly valuable. This raises a different challenge for Singer, who seems tempted 
to hold Totalism, the Intuitive View, and that saving and averting lives are charitable 
priorities for individuals who want to do the most good. I also explored this topic from 
a particular Person-Affecting View. A general challenge emerged: we don’t know the 
value of saving or averting lives until we know whether and to what extent the Earth is 
under- or overpopulated. I was unable to say much about this question other than that 
where the Earth is in relation to its optimum population seems to be a highly complex, 
 
1  Singer (1972), Singer (1975) 
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unclear empirical matter, regardless of whether one considers the effects on this 
generation or on all generations. I noted this uncertainty is relatively interesting, given 
how many people seem to assume it is either evident that the Earth is overpopulated 
or discussing this topic is morally unacceptable.  
Chapter 3 took a different tack and considered whether, if we looked just at the self-
regarding value of saving lives, saving lives—or, more specifically, saving children’s 
lives in the developing world through highly cost-effective health interventions—could 
be the most good we could do. It seems obvious, at least to some, that this is the most 
good we can do. I assessed this question from four different views of ‘life-value’ (a 
combination of a population axiology with a view of the badness of death) and 
presumed the majority of people would accept one of these views, or a variant of them. 
I argued that, for each view, either something else seemed more cost-effective than 
saving lives, or it was not straightforward to make such an assessment due the 
indeterminacy of the view. As such, even if we set aside the considerations from 
chapters 1 and 2, many of those who are currently spending their resources saving lives 
should wonder if they can do more good elsewhere. 
We might have believed it to be a settled issue, not just that saving lives was good, but 
that it was the most good you could do (at least, with your charitable donations). The 
practical upshot of the first three chapters is that matters are (frustratingly) more 
complex. 
Having reached the limits of our analysis regarding saving lives, the attention of the 
thesis moved to considering how best to improve lives, that is, to make people happier 
during their lives. Chapter 4 is motivated by the realisation that, while social scientists 
have been measuring ‘subjective well-being’ (SWB) via self-reports for the last few 
decades, moral philosophers’ suggestions about how to increase happiness have made 
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little use of the findings produced by social scientists. In making their 
recommendations about which charities are most effective at increasing happiness, 
Singer and MacAskill, for instance, have tended to rely on other proxies for happiness, 
such as income and QALYs. This scenario is puzzling. I proposed four objections to 
using any type of self-reported SWB scores to measure happiness: (a) happiness can’t 
be measured through self-reports; (b) happiness scores are not interpersonally 
cardinally comparable; (c) there isn’t enough evidence of this type of guide decision 
making; and (d) using self-reports instead of current proxies would not change the 
priorities. This chapter assumes (uncontroversially) that increasing happiness is 
valuable (either intrinsically or instrumentally) and we want to know how to increase 
it.  
Having raised the objections, chapter 4 fully answers the first objection and partially 
answers the other three. Philosophers of science and social scientists have both 
previously argued happiness can be measured via self-reports. However, the 
arguments of these two disciplines are usually made in isolation. My contribution 
regarding the first objection is to stitch these arguments together into an answer that 
provides both an adequate theoretical and empirical justification. On the subject of 
interpersonal cardinality, I specify the six conditions are jointly sufficient for this 
(something that I do not believe has been done before). I then assess how reasonable 
it is to assume those conditions. I argue four of the six conditions do seem reasonably 
assumable, but there are doubts over the remaining two. I specified where further 
work would be needed and proposed that, in the meantime, as a practical matter, we 
should assume interpersonal cardinality. Finally, I argue that whether or not the ‘raw’ 
SWB scores are interpersonally cardinal is not, in itself, a sufficient reason not to use 
SWB scores—we can simply apply the relevant mathematical transformation so that 
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the transformed scores become interpersonally cardinal. Hence, I hope to have 
provided a rigorous, somewhat reassuring, but necessarily incomplete, analysis on the 
use of SWB scores as a measure for happiness. Chapter 4 ends by noting that SWB 
scores indicate, at least prima facie, different priorities for increasing happiness than 
the proxies Singer and MacAskill relied on.  
Chapter 5 asks, if we are going to reassess our priorities, what would be the best 
method to do this? Effective altruists, MacAskill observes, typically use a three-factor 
cause prioritisation framework for determining what the world’s most pressing 
problems are. The framework seems not to have been thoroughly investigated. I take 
a closer look in order to try to address some open questions about its functioning; I 
suggest a moderate reconceptualisation. The main practical conclusion is that 
assessing problems via the three-factor framework is tantamount to assessing the cost-
effectiveness of particular solutions to those problems; hence the strength of the cause 
prioritisation analysis rests on how carefully we’ve thought about the particular 
solutions to the problems we’re interested in. 
In response to this conclusion, chapter 6 proposes a way of developing the extant cause 
prioritisation methodology to better find and organise promising solutions. I call this 
the ‘cause mapping’ approach. In essence, my suggestion is to break down the 
prioritisation process into smaller steps which can then be systematically worked 
through. I then apply cause mapping to the question of how a philanthropist could 
make people happier during their lives. I end up with a long list of potentially high-
priorities options, many of which are novel (in the sense of not having been considered 
by effective altruists so far) and require further empirical investigation. As such, 
chapter 6 makes some progress towards creating an improved methodology for 
effective altruists whilst also highlighting some new problems to examine. 
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Building on this work, in chapter 7 I evaluate the cost-effectiveness of a novel item on 
this long list—treating mental health. Drawing on the arguments from chapter 4 that 
happiness can be measured by self-reported SWB scores, I compare the cost-
effectiveness of a developing world mental health charity, StrongMinds, against the 
charities recommended by GiveWell, a charity evaluator, using SWB scores. In my 
initial analysis, I find that StrongMinds seems roughly on a par with GiveWell’s top 
life-improving charity and better than the rest. Although the analysis is somewhat 
simplistic and the numbers will presumably change on refinement, I nonetheless 
consider this result to be sufficient to meet the two practical objections to measuring 
happiness with SWB scores raised in chapter 4: that there isn’t enough SWB-evidence 
to guide decision-making and using it would not give us new priorities. I think it is 
clear that moving to the measurement of happiness through self-reports opens 
promising new lines of inquiry in the pursuit of greater worldwide happiness. 
The achievement of the thesis then is this. I have provided a sustained examination of 
three topics: the value of saving lives, how to best improve lives, and cause 
prioritisation methodology. In each case, I have brought new analysis and 
considerations to bear. These unsettle the apparent consensus around how to do the 
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